The People of the State of New York, v. Jerry Carter, Defendant. (2025)

Via a counseled omnibus motion, defendant Jerry Carter seeks to dismiss the entire misdemeanor accusatory instrument in this case on C.P.L. § 30.30 speedy trial grounds or, failing that, to dismiss just the reckless driving and reckless endangerment counts as facially insufficient. He also asks for hearings.

For the reasons set forth below, the branches of the motion seeking dismissal are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the reckless endangerment count is DISMISSED as facially insufficient. The People are ORDERED to disclose certain attachments to an IAB log reflected in People's Exhibit 5. Ingle/Dunaway/Huntley hearings are ORDERED. All other requests for relief are either REFERRED to the trial court or DENIED.

Background

A November 26, 2024 misdemeanor information charged Carter with reckless driving (V.T.L. § 1212), second-degree reckless endangerment (P.L. § 120.20), third-degree criminal possession of a forged instrument (P.L. § 170.20), aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle (V.T.L. § 511(1)(a)), and unlicensed driving (V.T.L. § 509(1)). According to deponent Officer Brandon Roman, Carter was seen weaving his motorcycle between cars, and eventually failed to stop at a stop sign near the intersection of Third Avenue and E. 153rd Street in the Bronx:

Deponent states that, at the above time and place, he observed defendant sitting behind the handle bars and operating a black 2023 motorcycle, Ohio license plate UCC1-308, with the keys in the ignition, engine running, while said motorcycle was traveling at the abovementioned location, a public roadway.

Deponent further states that he observed defendant driving closely in between several vehicles traveling at the aforementioned location, causing said motorist to abruptly stop to avoid colliding with defendant's vehicle. Deponent further states that he further observed defendant fail to stop at a stop sign.

Misdemeanor Information at 1—2.

After pulling Carter over—the details of which were not recited—Officer Roman determined that Carter's license plate was fake, as it did not match the format used in Ohio; for instance, "an authentic Ohio motorcycle license plate sequence is not spaced [and] does [not] contain a dash." Id. Carter also was unable to produce a valid driver's license, and a DMV abstract revealed that his license to drive was suspended. See id. at 2.

Carter was arraigned November 28, 2024. According to the C.P.L. § 710.30(1)(a) statement notice served at arraignment, Carter told Officer Roman "I don't have one" while still on the scene.

The People declared ready and filed their certificate of compliance (COC) on February 7, 2025, about 71 days later. In their statement of readiness, the People certified pursuant to C.P.L. § 30.30(5-a) that they had examined the accusatory instrument for facial sufficiency and had dismissed all charges that were not sufficient.

The People's COC reflected disclosure of a wide variety of material, including the body cameras for eight officers and the activity logs for three officers (Roman among them). The People had not yet disclosed activity logs for five other non-testifying officers. Giglio impeachment material had been disclosed for Officer Roman and Officer Reyes, the two testifying officers, although the COC did not specify precisely what this encompassed.

Later in the day on February 7, the People obtained the five missing activity logs. The People disclosed them to the defense and filed a supplemental COC.

Through current counsel, who had been assigned on February 7, Carter then lodged two objections to the People's discovery disclosures. Via email of March 4, he objected to the way in which the audiovisual material had been shared. See People's Resp., Ex. 4. The next day, on March 5, he contended that the People failed to provide "all Giglio material deemed to be within its possession," listing as outstanding:

IAB log; Internal Case Management System Worksheet/Internal Affairs Log; IA Reports; Internal Case Management and Tracking Worksheet/Allegation Finding (ICMT); documents from the NYPD Legal Bureau; CCRB Allegation History; CCRB CTS; and CPI (disciplinary file including incidents investigated and where no action taken)[.]

People's Resp., Ex. 5 at 22 (pdf pag.). Carter also objected to the provided Giglio material for Officer Roman and Officer Reyes as improperly redacted and sought "underlying" Giglio material consisting of "all PDF attachments, photographs, media files and other attachments." Id. Carter pointed to materials associated with an IAB report for Officer Reyes, alleging that certain underlying media had not been provided and that other materials were impermissibly redacted. See id. at 23 (pdf pag.).

Upon reviewing Carter's objections, the People apparently realized they had failed to disclose full CCRB allegation histories for Officer Roman and Officer Reyes. The People sent this material March 21 and filed another supplemental COC, explaining that they "believed this material had been included in our prior production" and had "promptly disclosed it" when they learned otherwise. People's Resp., Ex. 6 at 26 (pdf pag.).

Carter has now filed moved both for dismissal and omnibus relief. His motion is fully briefed and ripe for decision.

§ 30.30 Dismissal

The Parties' Arguments

Carter seeks dismissal of the entire accusatory instrument under C.P.L. § 30.30. He premises his request on three grounds: (1) the People failed to timely provide initial discovery within 35 days of arraignment as required by C.P.L. § 245.10(1)(a)(i), (2) the incomplete and improperly redacted Giglio materials served to invalidate the People's initial and supplemental COCs, and (3) the alleged facial insufficiency of two counts invalidated the People's declarations of readiness. See Defense's Mot. at 11, 17—20, 26—29 (pdf pag.).

Responding to the first ground, the People do not dispute that there was no discovery within 35 days of arraignment, and do not otherwise provide any record of their discovery outreach prior to declaring ready. They argue, however, that any failure to abide by § 245.10(1)(a)(i) does not result in dismissal because the People exercised diligence overall.

Responding to the third, the People argue that neither count is facially insufficient, so dismissal is not warranted.

As to the second, relating to Carter's Giglio challenges, the People contend that all discoverable Giglio material has now been turned over. Any remaining material cited by Carter either is not discoverable or does not exist. For the IAB log, the People assert that "the log contains all the information and evidence needed to determine" a good-faith basis for impeachment of Officer Reyes. People's Resp. at 20 (pdf pag). The People read Carter's motion as also requesting disclosure of the Giglio material, which the People believe is unwarranted. See People's Resp. at 18 (pdf pag.).

In reply, Carter challenges the People's diligence and reaffirms the arguments of his motion.

Discussion

When the top count is a class A misdemeanor, the People must be ready for trial within 90 days. C.P.L. § 30.30(1)(b). As relevant here, to be ready, the People must (1) be actually ready, having done all that is required to bring the case to trial, People v. Brown, 28 NY3d 392, 404 (2016); (2) certify under C.P.L. § 30.30(5-a) that all charged counts are facially sufficient, and those that are not have been dismissed; and (3) be in compliance with their discovery obligations, see C.P.L. § 30.30(5); People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 210 (2023).

The People certify their compliance with discovery obligations by filing a COC. Under the now-familiar standard articulated in 2023 by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Bay, a COC is valid if it is the product of due diligence and good faith. People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 211 (2023). Factors relevant to diligence are fact- and case-specific, and include the People's efforts to comply with their obligations, the volume of discovery provided, the complexity of the case, the obviousness of any missing discovery, and the People's response to objections from the defense. Id. at 212. The People bear the burden of demonstrating their diligence. Id. at 212—13.

While Carter does not directly challenge the People's actual readiness, he asserts that their declaration of readiness should nonetheless be invalidated, and the case dismissed, because the People's C.P.L. § 30.30(5-a) certification was inaccurate. But while the reckless endangerment count is indeed facially insufficient, as set forth at greater length below, an otherwise-proper § 30.30(5-a) statement undermined by the later dismissal of a count as facially insufficient currently has no effect on the People's readiness, at least where there is no bad faith alleged. See People v. Williams, 83 Misc 3d 21, 23 (App. Term 2d, 11th & 13 Jud. Dists.), leave granted, 42 NY3d 941 (2024); see also People v. Clarke, 2025 NY Slip Op. 51204(U), at *3 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Kings Co. 2025) (Tisne, J.) ("A complete certification is not invalid, however, merely because a court later determines that one of the counts in the information is facially insufficient."). The People could certify the validity of the reckless endangerment count in good faith, as the insufficiency of that count is a close call. Accordingly, this challenge to the People's readiness does not succeed.

Moving to the validity of the People's COC: as Carter acknowledges in his reply, see Defense's Reply at 2—3 (pdf pag.), noncompliance with the 35-day initial disclosure deadline of C.P.L. § 245.10(1)(a)(ii) is not a freestanding deficiency, but is instead relevant to the People's overall discovery-compliance diligence.¹ Decisional law bears this out. One of the few on-topic appellate decisions, People v. Stamm, concluded that the People's failure to provide discovery within 35 days of arraignment went hand-in-hand with a lack of timely outreach on impeachment material, which (in turn) yielded a response on impeachment material beyond the § 30.30 deadline—shortcomings that were all fatal to due diligence. See People v. Stamm, 85 Misc 3d 136(A), 2025 NY Slip Op. 50497(U), at *3 (App. Term, 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2025).² And trial courts largely agree that noncompliance with the § 245.10(1)(a)(ii) deadline can, when relevant, undermine the People's overall diligence. See, e.g., People v. Kents, 86 Misc 3d 1206(A), 2025 NY Slip Op. 50880(U), at *6 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2025) (Krompinger, J.) (relying in part on Stamm in finding that the People's delayed initial disclosures were relevant to an overall lack of diligence); People v. Mendoza, 86 Misc 3d 1201(A), 2025 NY Slip Op. 50807(U), at *3 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Kings Co. 2025) (Glick, J.) (assessing noncompliance with § 245.10(1)(a)(ii) as relevant to the People's diligence).

Here, the § 245.10(1)(a)(ii) issue favors Carter, as the People do not dispute that initial discovery was not provided within 35 days of arraignment. See People's Resp. at 12—13 (pdf pag.). The People also have made no record of their contemporaneous attempts to obtain discovery, as the narrative in their affirmation jumps from the second in-court appearance on January 21 to the declaration of readiness on February 7. See People's Resp. at 3 (pdf pag.) (Aff. of ADA Eric Benoit).³

However, any shortcoming in timely provided initial discovery is outweighed by the remaining Bay factors. The People disclosed extensive discovery within the 90-day deadline, including body cameras and activity logs for eight officers, photographs, and 911 materials. See People's Ex. 3. Unlike in Stamm, nothing in the record suggests that any delay in outreach also delayed the timely provision of discovery to the defense past the 90-day deadline. The People also swiftly responded to Carter's (relatively narrow) objections to the Giglio material, correcting an error in their initial proffer. This otherwise is not a particularly complicated or complex case. So under the fact- and case-specific inquiry mandated by Bay, the People have shown both good faith and due diligence in complying with their discovery obligations overall.

Meanwhile, Carter's core challenge to the People's COC—focusing on allegedly missing, incomplete, and redacted Giglio impeachment materials—is difficult to assess against the People's overall diligence, because he does not (and apparently did not) provide enough detail and context about what he seeks, what is (or may be) outstanding, and what is redacted.⁴ For instance, although Carter challenges the scope of the People's redactions, and the People respond in kind, the record does not clarify precisely what was redacted in the relevant documents, or whether the challenged redactions go beyond what might be allowed by statute (although the People assert that they do not, see People's Resp. at 20—21 (pdf pag.)).

Nevertheless, the People bear the burden of showing diligence under Bay, and the representations made in their papers—which, unsworn or not, are credited for the purposes of this decision—suffice to establish substantial compliance with their obligations regarding Giglio material. The People assert that they disclosed CCRB records, all records pertaining to both substantiated and unsubstantiated IAB investigations into the testifying officers, and information about any lawsuit where the testifying officers were sued for acts related to their job duties. See People's Resp. at 18—22 (pdf pag.).

Accordingly, the People's COC was the product of good faith and due diligence under the relevant Bay factors. Carter's attempt to invalidate it does not succeed.

To the extent that Carter requests disclosure of the challenged material, the lack of specificity complicates ordering specific disclosures, with one exception. He provides a specific example of "[u]nderlying media referenced in the Giglio" material, Defense's Mot. at 17 n.6, in the form of objections to withheld attachments to what may be a substantiated offense in an IAB finding regarding testifying Officer Reyes. If there was indeed an unfavorable finding involving Officer Reyes, attachments to the underlying IAB investigation could conceivably be relevant to Officer Reyes's credibility.

Thus, automatic discoverability aside, the People are ORDERED to provide this material pursuant to C.P.L. §§ 245.30(3) and 245.35(4). Carter will be authorized to make future motions or requests for specific disclosures of Giglio materials.

Facial Insufficiency

The Parties' Arguments

Carter argues that dismissal of the reckless endangerment and reckless driving counts is required because neither is facially sufficient. See Defense's Mot. at 21—26 (pdf pag.). The reckless endangerment count fails because the facts alleged in the accusatory instrument do not show reckless conduct creating a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person or violation of multiple traffic control devices. The reckless driving count fails because Carter was not violating multiple rules of the road or interfering with other motorists; at most, he may have been following too closely, and disobeyed a traffic control device in a manner that did not affect other motorists.

The People defend the sufficiency of the counts, arguing that Carter's conduct could have caused a traffic accident and otherwise posed a substantial risk to others on the roadway. See People's Resp. at 23—25 (pdf pag.). Regarding the reckless endangerment count in particular, the People rely on People v. Rodriguez, 81 Misc 3d 1237(A), 2024 NY Slip Op. 50091(U) (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2024) (González-Taylor, J.), where allegations that a defendant was driving a gas-powered scooter on a public sidewalk and swerving through a large crowd, with pedestrians forced to move out of the way to avoid being hit, were sufficient to support a count of reckless endangerment. See Rodriguez, 2024 NY Slip Op. 50091(U), at *1—3.

In reply, Carter argues that the People's view of the law would lead to the widespread criminalization of conduct that would otherwise amount to mere traffic infractions. Defense's Reply at 13.

Discussion

A count of a misdemeanor information is facially sufficient if supported by facts which, taken as true and with all reasonable inferences drawn in the People's favor, see People v. Jackson, 18 NY3d 738, 741, 747 (2012), establish every element of the charge while also providing reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the offense, People v. Ocasio, 28 NY3d 178, 180 (2016). The facial sufficiency standard is not demanding, in part because all allegations must be given a "fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading," People v. Guaman, 22 NY3d 678, 681 (2014), and be evaluated in the context of "common sense [and] the significance of the conduct alleged," People v. Gonzalez, 184 Misc 2d 262, 264 (App. Term 1st Dept. 2000). But while reasonable inferences from the facts must be drawn in the People's favor, a court may not rely on "impermissible speculation" to "fill the gaps left open by" insufficient facts. People v. Mejicanos, 40 Misc 3d 23, 26 (App. Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. 2013).

The facts alleged here establish a facially sufficient count of reckless driving, which prohibits (among other things) driving a motorcycle in a way that "unreasonably interferes with the free and proper use of," or "unreasonably endangers" the users of, a public roadway. V.T.L. § 1212(a). While the offense is called "reckless driving," it does not require an actual mental state of recklessness. See People v. Walton, 70 AD3d 871, 874 (2d Dept. 2010); People v. Badke, 21 Misc 3d 471, 479 (Cnty. Ct., Suffolk Co. 2008) (Hinrichs, J.). The facts must nevertheless support at least an inference of "reckless disregard of the consequences," People v. Earley, 121 AD3d 1192, 1193 (3d Dept. 2014), which can be demonstrated by "the presence of additional aggravating acts or circumstances beyond a single violation of a rule of the road" alongside "something more than mere negligence," People v. Goldblatt, 98 AD3d 817, 819 (3d Dept. 2012) (quoting, in part, People v Grogan, 260 NY 138, 143 (1932)).

The facts of the misdemeanor information established that Carter was seen at the corner of Third Avenue and E. 153rd Street driving "closely in between several vehicles," causing at least one to abruptly stop. Misdemeanor Information at 1—2. He then failed to stop at a stop sign. Id. at 2. While the temporal proximity of these two events is not clearly spelled out, it would not be unreasonable to infer that Carter failed to stop at the stop sign while between two other vehicles. Emerging into an intersection without any warning from between two cars could endanger other users of the roadway, or interfere with the use of the roadway. Even if the incidents were taken separately, however, the information adequately alleges that Carter's decision to drive in between several vehicles actually caused at least one to abruptly stop, interfering with the use of the roadway.

Carter responds that he may have followed too closely and disobeyed a single traffic control device in a manner that had no effect on any other vehicle, which falls short of the multiple infractions or more-than-mere-negligence standard for reckless driving. Defense's Mot. at 25 (pdf pag.); see also Goldblatt, 98 AD3d at 819. But while Carter cites V.T.L. § 1129 ("Following too closely"), he overlooks that riding a motorcycle in between vehicles can also violate V.T.L. § 1252(b) and (c), which prohibits motorcyclists from lane-splitting by driving "between lanes of traffic or between adjacent lines or rows of vehicles" or overtaking another vehicle in the same lane. Because this accusatory instrument contains facts supporting more than one violation of the traffic laws, and could support an inference of a reckless disregard for potential consequences of those violations, it is similar to other instruments found to be facially sufficient. See, e.g., People v. Medard, 63 Misc 3d 165(A), 2019 NY Slip Op. 50943(U), at *1—2 (App. Term 2d, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. 2019) (failing to stop at a stop sign and swerving into oncoming traffic, which required another car to itself swerve to avoid a collision, adequately pleaded reckless driving).

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the reckless driving count is facially sufficient.

The reckless endangerment count, on the other hand, presents a much closer call. That charge prohibits "recklessly engag[ing] in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person." P.L. § 120.20. Unlike reckless driving, reckless endangerment requires an actual mental state of recklessness, as well as the creation of a "substantial risk" of "serious physical injury" to another person—not just inference with the use of a roadway. See People v. Woodruff, 4 AD3d 770, 772 (4th Dept. 2004) (addressing required mental state of recklessness). Recklessness itself requires a person to be aware of and consciously disregard a substantial and foreseeable risk. See People v. Reagan, 94 NY2d 804, 806 (1999); P.L. § 15.05(3).

These distinctions from reckless driving make all the difference. The allegations of the accusatory instrument do not quite establish conduct that created a substantial risk of serious physical injury, as opposed to the mere possibility of such a risk. They also do not quite establish or permit the inference of a mental state of recklessness. Accordingly, the reckless endangerment count must be dismissed as facially insufficient.

Beginning with the alleged close and in-between driving, the accusatory instrument establishes that at least one of those other vehicles "abruptly stop[ped]" to avoid "colliding" with Carter's motorcycle. Misdemeanor Information at 2. But the instrument provides no reason to think that any such collision was likely or imminent, or would have risked serious physical injury to the other motorists. For instance, there are no facts pleaded about the speed of the traffic, or even what the other "vehicles" were (which would be relevant to the risk Carter posed to their drivers and passengers). On these facts, driving a motorcycle between several vehicles, causing one of them to stop suddenly, is not by itself sufficient to make out a count of reckless endangerment.

The same problem affects the alleged failure to stop at the stop sign. Running a stop sign can, of course, cause a substantial risk of injury to other motorists if it results in, or risked causing, a collision or sudden stop. But the accusatory instrument provides too little information from which to reasonably infer either a mens rea of recklessness or the creation of a substantial risk. How fast was Carter driving? Were there other vehicles in the intersection that were forced to maneuver around him (or abruptly stop) after he failed to stop and entered the intersection? Was the failure to stop something more than a failure to come to a complete stop? The instrument does not say. And while some of those gaps can be bridged by inferences drawn in favor of the People, neither the facts themselves nor those reasonable inferences quite suffices to establish reckless endangerment.⁵

In sum, on these minimal facts, the assumption that Carter's conduct created a substantial risk of injury to someone else, or was the product of a reckless mental state, crosses the line from reasonable inference to filling a factual gap through impermissible speculation. See Mejicanos, 40 Misc 3d at 26. The inferential leap that was reasonable for reckless driving is less so when the required outcome is a substantial risk of injury that was consciously disregarded. Without more about the effect of Carter's conduct, the reckless endangerment count is not supported by sufficient facts.

Decisions that have upheld the facial sufficiency of reckless endangerment counts in the context of driving infractions have usually done so by relying on facts that establish a concrete risk of injury. Judge González-Taylor's decision in Rodriguez, for instance, focused on the clear risk created by a gas-powered scooter swerving through a crowd of pedestrians on a sidewalk. Pedestrians are vulnerable to injury from a powered vehicle, and while nobody was injured, Judge González-Taylor emphasized that it was the risk of injury (as opposed to the actual outcome) that mattered. See Rodriguez, 2024 NY Slip Op. 50091(U), at *2—3 (citing People v. Davis, 72 NY2d 32, 36 (1988)). Here, by contrast, the accusatory instrument lacks comparable allegations that Carter's conduct actually created a risk of injury to anybody around him. A motorcyclist driving between cars may be risky behavior, but the risk it creates is less than that posed by a scooter swerving through a crowd of pedestrians on a sidewalk.

Similarly, while the Appellate Term has at least twice upheld reckless endangerment charges against sufficiency challenges where disruptions to traffic could have created the risk of an accident or collision, each of the relevant instruments pleaded facts suggesting a concrete and non-speculative risk to others on the roadway. For instance, in People v. Veriguete, 73 Misc 3d 132(A), 2021 NY Slip Op. 50980(U), at *1 (App. Term 1st Dept. 2021), a defendant's decision to run into traffic with an officer in pursuit—after stating "you'll have to catch me first"—amounted to reckless endangerment to the pursuing officer, who was almost hit by a car, as well as to the drivers of the "three cars" that slammed on the brakes to avoid colliding with the defendant. And in People v. Hawkins, 57 Misc 3d 142(A), 2017 NY Slip Op. 51395(U), at *1 (App. Term 1st Dept. 2017), a defendant ran three red lights on a bicycle while weaving in between traffic, forcing drivers to slow down to avoid hitting him, which established a risk of injury to other drivers and pedestrians.

Again, by contrast, the facts here establish only that one vehicle abruptly stopped to avoid hitting Carter. That allegation, plus Carter's subsequent failure to stop at a single stop sign—without any facts pleaded about the aftermath of the alleged failure to stop—does not yield or permit a reasonable inference in favor of a substantial risk of injury to others, nor arguably even a pattern of misconduct sufficient to suggest a true mens rea of recklessness.

Accordingly, the reckless endangerment count is not adequately pleaded. Carter's request for dismissal is GRANTED in part, and that count is DISMISSED as facially insufficient.

Hearings

Carter requests Ingle and Huntley/Dunaway hearings. The People oppose.

The requested hearings will be granted. While the People argue that the stop was based on probable cause, the accusatory instrument omits the actual stop entirely, and Carter otherwise denies the allegations. Accordingly, Carter should be permitted to litigate these issues at a hearing.

* * *

In sum, the branches of Carter's motion seeking dismissal are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the reckless endangerment count is DISMISSED as facially insufficient. The request for hearings is GRANTED, and Ingle/Huntley/Dunaway hearings are ordered. The People are ORDERED to disclose the attachments listed in the IAB log at People's Exhibit 5. Any Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia/preclusion issues are referred to the trial court. Further pretrial motions will not be authorized absent good cause, except that Carter may seek disclosure of additional Giglio material via a more-specific application. All other requests not specifically mentioned are DENIED.

Dated: August 1, 2025

Bronx, NY

David L. Goodwin

Judge of the Criminal Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   The People do not argue that this issue is barred by a lack of relevant objections by Carter, so it will be assessed on the merits. Regardless, current defense counsel did not join the case until after the 35-day period expired.

2.   According to the Court of Appeals, leave to appeal has not been sought on Stamm.

3.   The People mention some of their discovery outreach in their memorandum of law— for instance, that they "requested information from the New York City Law Department to identify any lawsuits in which the testifying officers were named defendants in a civil suit in their capacity as a police officer" before "filing the COC." People's Resp. at 22 (pdf pag.). But "before" does not clarify how long before, or how often. And unsworn statements in a memorandum of law are, standing alone, generally not competent evidence. See Bisk v. Manhattan Club Timeshare Ass'n, Inc., 118 AD3d 585, 585 (1st Dept. 2014); Kulhawik v. Holder, 571 F.3d 296, 298 (2d Cir. 2009).

4.   It is somewhat unclear whether Carter challenges the lack of Giglio material for non-testifying officers. The general rule is that the People need not disclose impeachment material for non-testifying witnesses, although there are certain exceptions. Compare People v. Henderson, 237 AD3d 853, 854 (2d Dept. 2025) (concluding that the People were not required to provide disciplinary records for non-testifying officers), with People v. Jawad, 84 Misc 3d 31, 34—35 (App. Term 2d, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. 2024) (observing, without resolving, that the records of non-testifying officers might still be relevant if related to the subject matter of the case). Regardless, little to no information has been provided about the role played by any of the non-testifying officers in this case.

5.   Because an assessment of facial sufficiency is limited to the four corners of the instrument itself and any supporting depositions, see People v. Hardy, 35 NY3d 466, 475 (2020), the role of judicial notice is circumscribed, although some courts have concluded that taking judicial notice of matters of common knowledge has a place in review for facial sufficiency. See, e.g., People v. Bize, 30 Misc 3d 68, 70 (App. Term, 9th & 10 Jud. Dists. 2010) (approving of the taking of judicial notice of "geographical facts and the location of streets"); People v. Montanez, 177 Misc 2d 506, 512 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., NY Co. 1998) (Billings, J.) (taking judicial notice of, among other things, "traffic conditions prevailing on city streets"). That said, the People have not asked for judicial notice to be taken of any relevant facts here, so review is limited to the four corners of the instrument.

David L. Goodwin, J.