PEOPLE v. GRIER (2025)

Defendant moves for an order of dismissal on speedy trial grounds alleging that omissions in the Prosecution's automatic discovery render their Certificate of Compliance (COC) and Statement of Readiness (SOR) illusory.

The Prosecution opposes.

For the reasons explained more fully herein, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Defendant was arraigned on a misdemeanor complaint charging Assault in the Third Degree and related offenses on August 15, 2024 (PL § 120.00[1]). The case was adjourned for a Crawford hearing at Defendant's request. On August 27, the parties appeared in Part DV2, where the Court conducted the Crawford hearing and adjourned the case for discovery compliance. On October 29, the Prosecution served and filed a Superseding Information (SSI). On November 13, the Prosecution served and filed their COC and SOR. On November 15, the case was called in Part DV2; Defendant did not appear, and the Court stayed a bench warrant On November 20, the parties appeared in part DV2, where Defendant was re-arraigned on the SSI; the Court vacated the bench warrant and ordered the parties to confer about discovery. On January 24, Defendant, through counsel, emailed a list of missing discovery. On January 27, the parties again appeared in Part DV2, where the Court set a motion schedule.¹ On January 29, the Prosecution replied to Defendant's discovery conferral email. Defendant filed the instant motion on February 14; the Prosecution filed their response on March 17, 2025.

Defendant argues that the Prosecution's failure to disclose the following items of discovery prior to filing their COC render it invalid: the names, contact information, and witness designations for three civilians who were present at the scene of the alleged incident; and underlying impeachment materials related to civil lawsuits against two testifying police witnesses. Defendant also argues the Prosecution should be charged speedy trial time for their delayed filing, which was three days past the Court-imposed deadline. Defendant points out that the Prosecution stated on the record that they had filed their COC with ninety days of speedy trial time accrued on November 15 and 20.

The Prosecution argues they filed their COC and SOR in good faith after exercising due diligence, as required by CPL § 245.50(1). They argue the underlying impeachment materials are not related to the subject matter of the case and are therefore not subject to automatic discovery. They surmise that the three civilian witnesses to whom Defendant refers are the complainant's grandmother, mother, and another family member or close friend. They further explain that they have requested their information from the complainant, but she has not yet responded. When she does, the Prosecution affirms they will disclose it and file a Supplemental Certificate of Compliance (SCOC). Regarding speedy trial time, the Prosecution argues the first adjournment between August 15 and 27 is excludable under CPL § 30.30(4)(b), as Defendant requested the hearing.

RELEVANT LAW

Pursuant to the automatic discovery provisions of CPL § 245.20(1), the prosecution is required to disclose to the defendant, without motion, a list of enumerated items. Disclosure under this section is limited to “all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case and are in possession, custody or control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction and control” (CPL § 245.20[1]). The prosecution must perform its initial discovery obligations as soon as practicable, but not later than thirty-five calendar days after arraignment where the defendant is at liberty (CPL § 245.10[1][a][ii]).

Once such disclosure is made, the prosecution must certify compliance with these discovery obligations by the service and filing of a COC (CPL § 245.50[1]). The statute further provides that “[n]o adverse consequences to the prosecution shall result from the filing of a certificate of compliance in good faith and reasonable under the circumstances; but the court may grant a remedy or sanction for a discovery violation as provided in 245.80 of this Article” (Id.).

If the prosecution provides additional discovery after filing their COC but prior to trial, they must file a SCOC, detailing the additional materials (CPL § 245.50[1]). In the SCOC, the prosecution must also detail the basis for the delayed disclosure so the court may evaluate whether the late disclosure affects the validity of the original COC (CPL § 245.50[1-a]; see also People v. Bay, 41 N.Y.3d 200, 208 N.Y.S.3d 490, 232 N.E.3d 168 [2023]). The filing of a SCOC shall not affect the validity of the original COC if the COC was filed in good faith after exercising due diligence (id.).

Pursuant to CPL § 30.30(1)(b), the prosecution must declare trial readiness within ninety days from the date of commencement of a misdemeanor criminal action. To properly announce trial readiness, the prosecution must certify in good faith compliance with their discovery obligations pursuant to CPL § 245.20 (CPL § 30.30[5]). “Absent an individualized finding of special circumstances in the instant case by the court before which the charge is pending, the prosecution shall not be deemed ready for trial until it has filed a proper certificate [of compliance]” (CPL § 245.50[3]). A defendant seeking dismissal pursuant to CPL § 30.30 meets their initial burden by alleging that the prosecution has failed to declare readiness within the statutorily prescribed period (People v. Beasley, 16 N.Y.3d 289, 292, 921 N.Y.S.2d 178, 946 N.E.2d 166 [2011]).

Once the defendant has shown that there is more than ninety days of delay, the burden of proving the existence of excludable periods falls upon the prosecution (People v. Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d 333, 349, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927, 406 N.E.2d 783 [1980]). The prosecution must demonstrate that the disputed adjournments are excludable by reference to a statutory provision (People v. Luperon, 85 N.Y.2d 71, 77-78, 623 N.Y.S.2d 735, 647 N.E.2d 1243 [1995]; People v. Cortes, 80 N.Y.2d 201, 590 N.Y.S.2d 9, 604 N.E.2d 71 [1992]; People v. Santos, 68 N.Y.2d 859, 508 N.Y.S.2d 411, 501 N.E.2d 19 [1986]; Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d at 348-350, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927, 406 N.E.2d 783). The prosecution also bears the burden to clarify, on the record, the basis for an adjournment so that the motion court can determine to whom the adjournment should be charged (Cortes, 80 N.Y.2d at 215-216, 590 N.Y.S.2d 9, 604 N.E.2d 71; People v. Liotta, 79 N.Y.2d 841, 580 N.Y.S.2d 184, 588 N.E.2d 82 [1992]; Berkowitz).

ANALYSIS

The issues under consideration are twofold: the substantive challenge to the COC and what, if any, bearing it has on the COC's validity; and whether the adjournment for a Crawford hearing is excludable from speedy trial calculations. The Court will first address the COC.

The Court agrees with the Prosecution that they are not required to disclose the underlying impeachment materials related to civil lawsuits against the officers. CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv) requires the prosecution to disclose “all evidence and information that tends to impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness.” This mandate is limited to materials in their possession or control that relate to the subject matter of the case (CPL § 245.20[1]). First, as the Prosecution astutely argues, materials related to civil lawsuits are not only not in their custody and control, but also public and equally available to both parties. Second, recent binding precedent excludes such underlying materials as unrelated to the subject matter of the case (People v. Earl, 84 Misc.3d 44, 217 N.Y.S.3d 813 [2024]). Thus, the Court finds that the Prosecution has satisfied their disclosure duties pertaining to the impeachment materials.

On the other hand, the Prosecution has not complied with their obligation to disclose information about the three civilians with whom police spoke at the scene. CPL § 245.20(1)(c) requires the prosecution to provide “the names and adequate contact information for all persons other than law enforcement personnel whom the prosecutor knows to have evidence or information relevant to any offense charged or to any potential defense thereto, including a designation by the prosecution as to which of those persons may be called as witnesses.” It is undisputed that the three witnesses spoke with police at the scene and that the Prosecution has not disclosed their information or witness designations. That leaves the question of whether the COC is nevertheless valid.

When a COC is reasonable under the circumstances and filed in good faith, it meets the requirements of CPL § 245.50(1). This does not demand perfection; rather, it requires due diligence (id.; People v. Bay, 41 N.Y.3d 200, 208 N.Y.S.3d 490, 232 N.E.3d 168 [2023]). Evaluating due diligence relies upon a “familiar and flexible standard that requires the People to make reasonable efforts to comply with statutory directives” (internal quotations omitted) (People v. Bay, 41 N.Y.3d at 211, 208 N.Y.S.3d 490, 232 N.E.3d 168). The inquiry is case-specific and turns on the individual circumstances presented (Bay at 212, 208 N.Y.S.3d 490, 232 N.E.3d 168). The Bay court enumerated a list of factors to make this determination, such as the efforts made by the prosecution to comply with their discovery obligations, the volume of material omitted, the complexity of the case, how obvious the missing materials would have been to a reasonably prudent prosecutor, the prosecution's explanation for the omission, and their response when alerted to the issue (id.).

The Court is troubled by the Prosecution's failure to obtain this information prior to filing their COC. Both parties gleaned the existence of these three civilian witnesses from body-worn camera footage (BWC) supplied by the responding officers; thus, the Prosecution should have been aware of their existence and potential for pertinent knowledge since receiving and reviewing the BWC. Although they do not provide a date on which they contacted the complainant to learn the witnesses’ names, the Prosecution attests that, on January 29, they emailed defense counsel that they would do so in the future. They offer no reason for their inaction prior to January 29.

Still, the Court must consider the broader context. The volume of material at issue is small relative to the rest of the discovery. The Prosecution has demonstrated a substantial effort to comply with their discovery obligations, including pre-COC efforts to obtain materials and information on August 20, September 3, September 10, October 18, and November 8. Because the three people were inside the residence with Defendant and the complainant, it stands to reason that Defendant likely already knows who they are.² Although the lapse between the Prosecution's COC and their email stating they would contact the complainant is long, the Court notes that Defendant waited a particularly long time to confer about missing discovery. In other words, the Prosecution acted quickly upon Defendant's notification of the missing material, responding five days later. The Court finds that the Prosecution exercised due diligence and filed their COC in good faith. This leaves the question of speedy trial time.

The Prosecution concedes that they accrued seventy-eight days of speedy trial time between August 27 and November 13. The Court will evaluate the remaining periods, between August 15 and 27 — the Crawford hearing adjournment — and March 14 and 17 — the Prosecution's late response filing.

The Prosecution cites CPL § 30.30(4)(b) for exclusion of the Crawford hearing adjournment. CPL § 30.30(4)(b) provides that “the period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his or her counsel” is excluded from speedy trial calculations.

There is no controlling authority dictating whether an adjournment for a Crawford hearing falls within this statutory exclusion. Few courts of concurrent jurisdiction have evaluated this question, reaching opposite conclusions (see People v. Hooks, 78 Misc.3d 398, 181 N.Y.S.3d 877 [2023] [holding that an adjournment for a Crawford hearing is excludable under CPL § 30.30(4)(b)]; cf. People v. Winston, 78 Misc.3d 1201[A], 2023 WL 2232055 [2023] [in which the court charged the prosecution with speedy trial time for the first Crawford hearing adjournment, but not for subsequent Crawford hearing adjournments resulting from the defense's unavailability]). The Court believes the distinction between pre-readiness and post-readiness time is important to this question, because pre-readiness time is presumptively chargeable. Thus, the Court believes an explicit speedy trial waiver is essential for the exclusion to apply before a valid SOR (People v. Liotta, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 185, 588 N.E.2d 82 [“Consent to an adjournment must be clearly expressed by the defendant or defense counsel to relieve the People of the responsibility for that portion of the delay”]; see generally People v. Worley, 66 N.Y.2d at 528, 498 N.Y.S.2d 116, 488 N.E.2d 1228 [finding that “exclusions rest generally on theories of estoppel or waiver”]).

In this case, Defendant indeed requested the Crawford hearing upon the Court's issuance of a temporary full order of protection. However, Defendant did not indicate any intent to waive speedy trial time. Rather, at the conclusion of Defendant's arraignment, the Court asked the parties what date they would prefer to return for the next appearance, to which Defendant suggested August 27 and asked for a Crawford hearing on that day. Court sees no basis upon which to conclude this adjournment constitutes a “delay” as contemplated by CPL § 30.30(4)(b) (People v. Suppe, 224 A.D.2d 970, 971, 637 N.Y.S.2d 850 [1996] [“The statute does not exclude generic periods of delay requested or consented to by defendant or his counsel, but is limited to those periods of delay resulting from a continuance or adjournment of court proceedings granted by the court at the request of the defendant or with his consent”]; see also People v. Worley, 66 N.Y.2d 523, 527, 498 N.Y.S.2d 116, 488 N.E.2d 1228 [1985] [“Those delays have been caused by the defendant for his own benefit, and with the court's permission, under circumstances in which both the defendant and the court have determined that the adjournment is desirable”]). Thus, the period between August 15 and 27 is chargeable to the Prosecution.

Finally, the Prosecution offers no explanation for their late filing, three days beyond the deadline. When the prosecution does not meet court-imposed deadlines, they incur speedy trial time (see People v. Delosanto, 307 A.D.2d 298, 763 N.Y.S.2d 629 [2003]). As such, the Prosecution is charged three days of speedy trial time from March 14, the missed deadline, until March 17, when they belatedly filed their opposition.

CONCLUSION

In total, the Prosecution has incurred ninety-three days of speedy trial time, including ninety days between August 15 and November 13 and three days between March 14 and 17. Because the Prosecution has exceeded ninety days of speedy trial time, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted (CPL § 30.30[1][b]).

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant's COC challenge was due on February 14 and the Prosecution's response was due on March 7. The Court later amended the schedule to permit the Prosecution to file their response on March 14.

2.   The Court infers from Defendant's application for a Crawford hearing that he has some property interest in the residence, if not a legal tenancy.

Joshua Glick, J.