CORNERSTONE CAPITAL LENDING LLC v. CRUPI (2023)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover on a promissory note, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Joan B. Lefkowitz, J.), dated February 5, 2020.  The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Michael V. Crupi.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Michael V. Crupi is granted.

In this action, inter alia, to recover on a promissory note executed by the defendant Michael V. Crupi, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against Crupi.  The plaintiff demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing the existence of the note and Crupi's failure to make payments according to the terms of the note (see Lupo v. Anna's Lullaby Café, LLC, 189 A.D.3d 1205, 1207–1208, 138 N.Y.S.3d 103;  Intermax Eco, LLC v. Eco Family Food Mart Corp., 172 A.D.3d 1040, 1041, 101 N.Y.S.3d 93).  In opposition to the plaintiff's prima facie showing, Crupi failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to a bona fide defense (see Gullery v. Imburgio, 74 A.D.3d 1022, 1023, 905 N.Y.S.2d 221).  Contrary to Crupi's contention, the plaintiff established that it had standing by demonstrating that the allonge was firmly affixed to the note (see LNV Corp. v. Allison, 206 A.D.3d 710, 170 N.Y.S.3d 162;  cf.  Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Hollien, 198 A.D.3d 615, 617–618, 154 N.Y.S.3d 572).  In addition, Crupi's speculation that the signatory on the allonge may not have had authority to transfer the note does not raise a triable issue of fact with regard to the plaintiff's standing (see UCC 3–307[1][b];  U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Varian, 156 A.D.3d 1255, 1257, 68 N.Y.S.3d 556;  CitiMortgage, Inc. v. McKinney, 144 A.D.3d 1073, 1074, 42 N.Y.S.3d 302).  Nor does Crupi's contention that the maker of the note may not have been authorized to conduct business in New York raise a triable issue of fact (see KSK Constr. Group, LLC v. 26 E. 64th St., LLC, 126 A.D.3d 568, 568–569, 7 N.Y.S.3d 29;  Unique Laundry Corp. v. Hudson Park N.Y. LLC, 55 A.D.3d 382, 382, 865 N.Y.S.2d 203;  Cohen v. OrthoNet N.Y. IPA, Inc., 19 A.D.3d 261, 261, 800 N.Y.S.2d 380).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against Crupi.

CONNOLLY, J.P., IANNACCI, MILLER and FORD, JJ., concur.