REINOSO v. HAN MA UM ZEN CENTER OF NEW YORK INC (2022)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals, and the plaintiff cross-appeals, from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Maureen A. Healy, J.), entered January 8, 2020.  The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment, in effect, dismissing the complaint.  The order, insofar as cross-appealed from, denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6).

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying those branches of the defendant's cross motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6), and substituting therefor a provision granting those branches of the cross motion;  as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

On May 14, 2015, the plaintiff, who was employed by a nonparty, allegedly was injured when he fell from a ladder while painting the exterior of a detached garage that had been converted into a meditation room which was owned by the defendant.  The ladder from which the plaintiff allegedly fell was owned by the defendant.  The defendant is a religious organization which owns adjoining properties.  One property contains a Buddhist Temple.  The building that the plaintiff was painting is located on the other property, which also contains a house that is used by monks as a residence.

The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant to recover damages for personal injuries, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6), and common-law negligence.  The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6), and the defendant cross-moved for summary judgment, in effect, dismissing the complaint.  The Supreme Court denied the motion and the cross motion.  The defendant appeals and the plaintiff cross-appeals.

The Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the defendant's cross motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6).  “Under the homeowner's exemption, owners of a one- or two-family dwelling used as a residence are exempt from liability under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) unless they directed or controlled the work being performed” (Ramirez v. I.G.C. Wall Sys., Inc., 140 A.D.3d 1047, 1048, 35 N.Y.S.3d 159;  see Santibanez v. North Shore Land Alliance, Inc., 197 A.D.3d 1123, 1125, 153 N.Y.S.3d 497;  Alexandridis v. Van Gogh Contr. Co., 180 A.D.3d 969, 973, 120 N.Y.S.3d 347).  “The phrase direct or control as used in those statutes is construed strictly and refers to the situation where the owner supervised the method and manner of the work” (Salgado v. Rubin, 183 A.D.3d 617, 618, 123 N.Y.S.3d 153 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Here, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to the homeowner's exemption.  The deposition transcripts of the plaintiff and of the defendant's employee demonstrated that the defendant did not direct or control the plaintiff's work.  Additionally, the deposition transcript of the defendant's employee and the affidavit of the defendant's expert architect demonstrated that the defendant was the owner of a one-family dwelling to which the meditation room was an accessory.  Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the defendant is entitled to the protections of this exemption even though it is a religious organization (see Labor Law §§ 240[1];  241[6];  Bautista v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 164 A.D.3d 450, 84 N.Y.S.3d 47;  Uddin v. Three Bros. Constr. Corp., 33 A.D.3d 691, 823 N.Y.S.2d 178;  Muniz v. Church of Our Lady of Mt. Carmel, 238 A.D.2d 101, 655 N.Y.S.2d 38).  In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law duty of an owner or contractor to provide employees with a safe place to work (see Comes v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d 876, 877, 609 N.Y.S.2d 168, 631 N.E.2d 110).  “Cases involving Labor Law § 200 fall into two broad categories, namely, those where workers are injured as a result of dangerous or defective premises conditions at a work site, and those involving the manner in which the work is performed” (Torres v. City of New York, 127 A.D.3d 1163, 1165, 7 N.Y.S.3d 539;  see Ortega v. Puccia, 57 A.D.3d 54, 61, 866 N.Y.S.2d 323).

Here, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the defendant's motion which were for summary judgment, in effect, dismissing the causes of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence.  The defendant failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that it lacked notice of the allegedly dangerous or defective condition with respect to the ladder (see Cantalupo v. Arco Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 194 A.D.3d 686, 690, 148 N.Y.S.3d 224;  Dougherty v. O'Connor, 85 A.D.3d 1090, 1090–1091, 926 N.Y.S.2d 635).

The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.

CONNOLLY, J.P., ROMAN, CHRISTOPHER and FORD, JJ., concur.