ROE v. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN MISSIONARY SOCIETY OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH (2021)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for negligent hiring and retention, the defendants Episcopal Diocese of Long Island and Christ Episcopal Church appeal, and the defendant Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society of the Protestant Episcopal Church separately appeals, from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Steven M. Jaeger, J.), entered June 26, 2020.  The order, insofar as appealed from by the defendants Episcopal Diocese of Long Island and Christ Episcopal Church, denied those branches of their motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the causes of action alleging negligent hiring and retention and intentional infliction of emotional distress insofar as asserted against them.  The order, insofar as appealed from by the defendant Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society of the Protestant Episcopal Church, denied those branches of its motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the causes of action alleging negligent hiring and retention and intentional infliction of emotional distress insofar as asserted against it.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with one bill of costs to the defendants appearing separately and filing separate briefs, and those branches of the separate motions of the defendants Episcopal Diocese of Long Island and Christ Episcopal Church and the defendant Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society of the Protestant Episcopal Church which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the causes of action alleging negligent hiring and retention and intentional infliction of emotional distress insofar as asserted against each of them are granted.

The plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to CPLR 214–g, asserting, inter alia, causes of action alleging negligent hiring and retention and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The complaint alleged that when the plaintiff was seven years old, she was abducted near her home by a man (hereinafter the alleged attacker) who drove her to a secluded area and brutally sexually assaulted her.  The complaint further alleged that at the time of the assault, the alleged attacker was employed and/or under the supervision of the defendants, Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society of the Protestant Episcopal Church (hereinafter the DFMS), Episcopal Diocese of Long Island (hereinafter the Diocese), and Christ Episcopal Church (hereinafter the Church).

Prior to the joinder of issue, the Diocese and the Church moved, and the DFMS separately moved, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.  In an order entered June 26, 2020, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied those branches of the separate motions which were to dismiss the causes of action alleging negligent hiring and retention and intentional infliction of emotional distress insofar as asserted against each of the defendants.  The Diocese and the Church appeal, and the DMFS separately appeals.

As a threshold matter, there is no merit to the DFMS's contention that it played no role in hiring, supervising, transferring, or disciplining the alleged attacker because its Constitution and Canons state that the hiring, transfer, and discipline of local priests is performed at the local and diocesan levels, and not at the churchwide level.  “A motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) will be granted only if the documentary evidence resolves all factual issues as a matter of law, and conclusively disposes of the plaintiff's claim” (Greenberg v. Spitzer, 155 A.D.3d 27, 44, 62 N.Y.S.3d 372 [internal quotation marks omitted]).  Here, the dispute is not regarding the existence or contents of the DMFS's Constitution and Canons, but concerning what the DMFS actually did, or did not do, with respect to the hiring, transfer, or discipline of the alleged attacker.  Since the Constitution and Canons neither prove nor disprove any of the plaintiff's factual allegations, the DMFS failed to establish any grounds to dismiss, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), the negligent hiring and retention and intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of action insofar as asserted against it.

We reach a different conclusion, however, with respect to the defendants’ contentions pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7).

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), we afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see CPLR 3026;  J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 21 N.Y.3d 324, 334, 970 N.Y.S.2d 733, 992 N.E.2d 1076;  260 Mamaroneck Ave., LLC v. Guaraglia, 172 A.D.3d 661, 662, 97 N.Y.S.3d 521).  With respect to a cause of action alleging negligent hiring and retention, “[t]he employer's negligence lies in having placed the employee in a position to cause foreseeable harm, harm which would most probably have been spared the injured party had the employer taken reasonable care in making decisions respecting the hiring and retention of the employee” (Johansmeyer v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 165 A.D.3d 634, 635–636, 85 N.Y.S.3d 562 [internal quotation marks omitted]).  As such, a necessary element of a cause of action to recover damages for negligent hiring and retention is a nexus or connection between the defendant's negligence in hiring and retaining the offending employee and the plaintiff's injuries (see Miller v. Miller, 189 A.D.3d 2089, 2091, 137 N.Y.S.3d 853;  Gonzalez v. City of New York, 133 A.D.3d 65, 70, 17 N.Y.S.3d 12).  Here, the plaintiff failed to allege any such nexus, since the sexual assault occurred far from the Church's premises, and there is no allegation in the complaint that the plaintiff had any prior contact with the alleged attacker, any prior relationship with any of the defendants, or even any knowledge, at the time of the sexual assault, that the alleged attacker was employed by the defendants.  Even assuming, as we must, that the defendants were negligent in hiring or retaining the alleged attacker, there is simply no nexus between the alleged attacker's employment and the sexual assault (see “John Doe 1” v. Board of Educ. of Greenport Union Free Sch. Dist., 100 A.D.3d 703, 705–706, 955 N.Y.S.2d 600;  Anonymous v. Dobbs Ferry Union Free School Dist., 290 A.D.2d 464, 464–465, 736 N.Y.S.2d 117;  K.I. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 256 A.D.2d 189, 192, 683 N.Y.S.2d 228).

Similarly, the complaint failed to state a viable cause of action alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action are “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct;  (2) the intent to cause, or the disregard of a substantial likelihood of causing, severe emotional distress;  (3) causation;  and (4) severe emotional distress” (Klein v. Metropolitan Child Servs., Inc., 100 A.D.3d 708, 710, 954 N.Y.S.2d 559).  Here, the complaint failed to allege a causal connection between the defendants’ allegedly outrageous conduct and the plaintiff's injuries (cf.  LoFaso v. City of New York, 66 A.D.3d 425, 426, 886 N.Y.S.2d 385;  Brown v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 297 A.D.2d 205, 212, 746 N.Y.S.2d 141).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the separate motions of the Diocese and the Church, and the DMFS, which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the causes of action alleging negligent hiring and retention and intentional infliction of emotional distress insofar as asserted against each of them.

In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendants’ remaining contention.

CHAMBERS, J.P., CONNOLLY, ZAYAS and DOWLING, JJ., concur.