BERNSTEIN v. FRAZER (2022)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action for injunctive relief and to recover damages for trespass and private nuisance, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (Thomas P. Zugibe, J.), dated September 4, 2019.  The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was to enforce a so-ordered stipulation of settlement dated August 30, 2018.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The parties, who own neighboring properties, entered into a so-ordered stipulation of settlement in this action, which, according to the stipulation, sought relief “related to artificial drainage being diverted from Defendants’ Property to Plaintiffs’ Property.”  Subsequently, the plaintiffs moved, inter alia, to enforce the stipulation, which provided, among other things, that the defendants would “discontinue use of [an] underground drainage pipe, which originates on Defendants’ Property and traverses onto Plaintiffs’ Property.”  In an order dated September 4, 2019, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion, and the plaintiffs appeal.

A stipulation of settlement is a contract between the parties thereto and, as such, is subject to principles of contract interpretation (see O'Brien v. O'Brien, 115 A.D.3d 720, 723, 981 N.Y.S.2d 780;  Aivaliotis v. Continental Broker–Dealer Corp., 30 A.D.3d 446, 447, 817 N.Y.S.2d 365).  When interpreting a contract, a court must read the document as a whole to determine the parties’ purpose and intent, giving a practical interpretation to the language used so that the parties’ reasonable expectations are realized (see O'Brien v. O'Brien, 115 A.D.3d at 723, 981 N.Y.S.2d 780;  Aivaliotis v. Continental Broker–Dealer Corp., 30 A.D.3d at 447, 817 N.Y.S.2d 365;  Petracca v. Petracca, 302 A.D.2d 576, 576–577, 756 N.Y.S.2d 587).

Here, reading the stipulation as a whole and giving a practical interpretation to the language used therein, we agree with the defendants that they have complied with their obligations thereunder, including the requirement that they redirect the flow of drainage away from the plaintiffs’ property.  Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, nothing in the stipulation may be reasonably viewed as requiring the defendants to regrade their property so as to restore it to its alleged original state or to otherwise require the defendants to control the flow of runoff from their property toward the plaintiffs’ property.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was to enforce the stipulation.

BARROS, J.P., MILLER, ZAYAS and WAN, JJ., concur.