JRIDI v. MINAJ (2020)

This case arises out of a dispute between plaintiff, Maher Jridi, and Onika Maraj (defendant), the recording artist professionally known as Nicki Minaj, over costs incurred for stylist services that Jridi performed for Maraj.

Plaintiff worked as a stylist for defendant on numerous occasions between February and October 2017. (NYSCEF No. 53 at 15—16, 112.) To secure these jobs, plaintiff was required to sign a representation agreement with a talent agency, nonparty Wilhelmina Models. (See NYSCEF No. 45.) The agreement provided that Wilhelmina would collect all fees and expense reimbursements, deduct a 20% commission, and transfer the remainder to plaintiff. (See id. at ¶¶ 2, 4.) The agreement made Wilhelmina plaintiff's attorney-in-fact with regard to these transactions; and it provided that all claims for payment would belong to Wilhelmina, not plaintiff. (See id. at ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff has alleged that during some of his styling sessions with defendant she asked him to rent extra garments using his personal funds, that she later took some of these garments, and that she has retained them notwithstanding numerous requests for their return. Cloak Wardrobe, the clothing library from which plaintiff rented the missing garments, is suing plaintiff over those garments in a separate, related action pending before this court. (See Cloak Wardrobe Inc. v Jridi, Index No. 650442/2018 [Sup Ct, NY County].)

Plaintiff has asserted claims for (i) breach of contract, based on defendant's asserted failure to pay the full cost of plaintiff's styling services and her asserted failure to cover the costs of extra garment rentals; (ii) contribution from defendant for any damages incurred by plaintiff in the related Cloak Wardrobe action; (iv) conversion of the rented-but-unreturned garments; and (iv) unjust enrichment based on defendant's asserted retention of the garments and failure to pay the full value of plaintiff's stylist services. Defendant now moves for summary judgment under CPLR 3212 on all four causes of action.

DISCUSSION

A party moving for summary judgment under CPLR 3212 “must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of a material issues of fact.” (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986].) If the movant makes that prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the non-movant to produce sufficient evidentiary proof to raise material issues of fact requiring a trial. (See Alvarez, 68 NY2d at 324.) In evaluating the parties' respective showings, the “evidence should be analyzed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” (Martin v Briggs, 235 AD2d 192, 196 [1st Dept 1997].)

I. Breach of Contract

Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's cause of action for breach of contract is granted. Defendant argues that plaintiff's contract is with Whilhelmina, rather than with defendant; and that the contract gives Wilhelmina, not plaintiff, the right to sue defendant for failing to pay for plaintiff's services or cover the cost of the extra rented garments. And plaintiff concedes that his only written contract was with Whilhelmina. (See NYSCEF No. 60 at 6.) He therefore may not maintain a breach-of-contract claim against defendant.

II. Contribution

Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's cause of action for contribution is granted.

CPLR 1401 provides that “two or more persons who are subject to liability for damages for the same ․ injury to property ․ may claim contribution among them.” An injury to property is “an actionable act, whereby the estate of another is lessened, other than a personal injury, or the breach of a contract.” (General Construction Law § 25-b.) “[P]urely economic loss resulting from a breach of contract does not constitute ‘injury to property’ within the meaning” of CPLR 1401. (Bd. of Educ. of Hudson City Sch. Dist. v Sargent, Webster, Crenshaw & Folley, 71 NY2d 21, 26 [1987].) A party may claim contribution for purely economic losses only when those losses stem from (i) liability sounding in tort that (ii) gives rise to damages determined based on tort principles. (See Children's Corner Learning Ctr. v A. Miranda Contracting Corp., 64 AD3d 318, 324 [1st Dept 2009].)

Plaintiff claims contribution from defendant based on his potential liability in Cloak's related action against him. But that liability would constitute recovery for “purely economic loss resulting from ․ breach of contract.” (NYSCEF No. 49 at 4 [reproducing Cloak's reply memorandum in support of summary judgment, Cloak Wardrobe Inc. v Jridi, Index No. 650442/2018, NYSCEF No. 54].) Indeed, Cloak specifically agreed in that action that if it prevailed on its breach-of-contract claim against plaintiff, Cloak would discontinue its tort-based conversion claim. (See Index No. 650442/2018, NYSCEF No. 40, at 4 n 1 [Cloak agreeing to discontinue its conversion claim if the court were to grant summary judgment on Cloak's breach-of-contract claim]; NYSCEF No. 59 [order granting summary judgment on the breach-of-contract claim].) As a result, plaintiff is not subject to liability to a third party for damages resulting from an injury to property, and may not maintain a contribution claim against defendant.

III. Conversion

Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's cause of action for conversion is denied.

As an initial matter, defendant asserts that plaintiff's conversion claim against her is foreclosed by the existence of plaintiff's contract with Wilhelmina. (See NYSCEF No. 63 at 2-3.) This assertion is not properly before this court; it was raised for the first time on reply. Even if the court were to consider the argument it would still be unpersuasive. True, a plaintiff may not maintain a claim for conversion against a defendant if the defendant's alleged wrongful conduct was limited to breaching a contract between the parties by retaining funds or goods required to be provided under the contract. (See Peters Griffin Woodward, Inc. v WCSC, Inc., 88 AD2d 883, 883-884 [1st Dept 1982].) But that principle cannot apply here—as discussed above, plaintiff did not have a contract with defendant; and his conversion claim is not premised on allegations that defendant breached a contractual duty she owed to him.

Plaintiff also has introduced evidence of defendant's liability for conversion sufficient to raise a dispute of fact requiring trial.

To recover on a claim for conversion, a plaintiff must show two elements: “(1) legal ownership or an immediate superior right of possession to specifically identifiable property,” and “(2) that the defendant exercised unauthorized dominion over that property to the exclusion of the plaintiff's rights.” (NY Medscan, LLC v JC-Duggan Inc., 40 AD3d 536, 537 [1st Dept 2007].) Here, disputed issues of fact exist about both these elements.

A. Superior Right of Possession

Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he rented various garments from Cloak for defendant's use. (See NYSCEF No. 53 at 33—35.) This testimony is corroborated by allegations in Cloak's complaint in the related action—submitted by defendant at summary judgment—that on several occasions plaintiff rented items of apparel from Cloak. (See NYSCEF No. 48 at 2-5.) Plaintiff's renting these garments would make him Cloak's bailee—thereby affording him a superior right of possession to defendant. (See Foulke v New York Consol. R. Co., 228 NY 269, 275 [1920] [noting that the bailee's right of possession is “absolute ․ as to all except the owner”]; Pivar v Graduate Sch. of Figurative Art of the NY Acad. of Art, 290 AD2d 212, 213 [1st Dept 2002] [explaining that bailments are created by (1) “lawful possession” of a thing, and (2) “the duty to account for the thing as the property of another”].)

In response, defendant argues principally that because plaintiff concedes that Cloak's right to possess the garments is superior to plaintiff's own right, plaintiff cannot establish that his right to possess the garments is superior to defendant's, as required to prevail on a conversion claim. But that does not follow. (See NYSCEF No. 50 at 5.) Plaintiff's right of possession as a bailee can be both inferior to that of the owner, Cloak, and still superior to that of defendant. (See Pivar, 290 AD2d at 213.) Nor would plaintiff have to establish that he himself was the owner of the garments to demonstrate that he had a superior right of possession. (See id.)

B. Unauthorized Dominion

As to the element of unauthorized dominion, plaintiff gave deposition testimony that, if credited, would establish that defendant denied plaintiff access to the missing garments, took them for herself, and failed to return them either to him or to Cloak after he requested that she give them back. (See NYSCEF No. 53 at 112, 115, 119.) Defendant's motion papers do not offer an alternative explanation or evidence that would demonstrate as a matter of law that this deposition testimony either was inaccurate or incomplete, or that it was insufficient to show that she exercised unauthorized dominion over the garments.

These are matters of fact that a jury must resolve. Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's conversion cause of action is denied.

IV. Unjust Enrichment

Given this court's holding on defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's conversion claim, plaintiff's cause of action for unjust enrichment as to the value of the garments is dismissed as duplicative. Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's cause of action for unjust enrichment about the value of his uncompensated services is granted.

Unjust enrichment occurs outside a contractual relationship, where one party “hold[s] property under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience [they] ought not to retain it.” (Alan B. Greenfield, M.D., P.C. v Long Beach Imaging Holdings, LLC, 114 AD3d 888, 889 [2d Dept 2014].) “An unjust enrichment claim is not available where it “simply duplicates ․ a conventional contract or tort claim.” (Id.) Claims should be dismissed as duplicative when they are “based on the same allegations and seek the same damages.” (Ullmann-Schneider v Lacher & Lovell-Taylor, P.C., 121 AD3d 415, 416 [1st Dept 2014].)

Plaintiff's requested damages on his unjust-enrichment claim include the value of rented apparel that plaintiff claims defendant has improperly retained. To that extent, plaintiff's unjust-enrichment claim is subject to dismissal as duplicative of plaintiff's conversion claim, discussed above.

Plaintiff also seeks unjust-enrichment damages from defendant for failing to pay fees she owed for plaintiff's stylist services. But plaintiff's contract with Wilhelmina provides that “[m]onies owed to [plaintiff] from clients” like defendant would be paid “when payment is received by Wilhelmina.” (NYSCEF No. 45 at 2.) It was Wilhelmina's responsibility to “take all reasonable steps to collect the amounts due from clients for [plaintiff's] services”; and ownership of “any claim against a client for monies owed for [plaintiff's] services” is given to Wilhelmina. (Id.)

This court agrees with defendant that plaintiff may not recover in unjust enrichment against her for his unpaid fees because the contract expressly limited the ways in which plaintiff could obtain payment for his stylist services—i.e., he was a subcontractor who was contractually limited to payment from the asserted general contractor (Wilhelmina) rather than from the defendant client. (See Raven Elevator Corp. v City of New York, 291 AD2d 355, 355 [1st Dept 2002] [affirming denial of leave to amend to add a claim for unjust enrichment where the subcontract “made clear that subcontractors ․ would not have any recourse against” the end-user]; accord Metro. Elec. Mfg. Co. v Herbert Const. Co., 183 AD2d 758, 759 [2d Dept 1992] [holding that “the existence of an express contract between the plaintiff and [a contracting middle party] governing the particular subject matter of its claim for unjust enrichment precludes the plaintiff from maintaining a cause of action sounding in quasi contract against [the end-user of the service].”)

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's unjust-enrichment claim regarding the value of his unpaid stylist fees.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment under CPLR 3212 is denied as to plaintiff's conversion claim, and is otherwise granted.

Gerald Lebovits, J.