IN RE: BLAKE P. (Anonymous) (2020)

DECISION & ORDER

ORDERED that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The appellant was accused of making several threatening telephone calls to his mother.  Following a fact-finding hearing, the Family Court found that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of aggravated harassment in the second degree, adjudicated him a juvenile delinquent, and placed him on probation for a period of two years.

The appellant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the threatening calls and the intent and true threat elements of aggravated harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.30[1][a]).  “The evidence supporting a fact-finding in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is legally sufficient if, viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency, any rational trier of fact could have found the appellant's commission of all the elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt” (Matter of Danielle B., 94 A.D.3d 757, 758, 941 N.Y.S.2d 685).  Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency, we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant's identity as the perpetrator of the threatening calls (cf.  People v. Martinez, 19 Misc.3d 1104[A], 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 50549[U], 2008 WL 711734 [Crim. Ct., New York County]).  In addition, the evidence was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the elements of intent (see People v. Jaber, 172 A.D.3d 1227, 1229, 101 N.Y.S.3d 371) and true threat (see People v. Orr, 47 Misc.3d 1213[A], 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 50568[U], 2015 WL 1810649 [Crim. Ct., New York County]) of aggravated harassment in the second degree.

“In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence, we nevertheless accord great deference to the opportunity of the factfinder to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor” (Matter of Dashawn R., 120 A.D.3d 1250, 1251, 992 N.Y.S.2d 122).  “The Family Court's credibility determinations should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record” (Matter of Brandon V., 133 A.D.3d 769, 769–770, 20 N.Y.S.3d 385).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determination was not against the weight of the evidence.

The appellant's remaining contention is without merit.

CHAMBERS, J.P., AUSTIN, MILLER and DUFFY, JJ., concur.