PEOPLE v. BRELAND (2019)

DECISION & ORDER

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The relevant facts of this case are set forth in the decision and order on the appeal of the codefendant Deshawn Wright (see People v. Wright, 166 A.D.3d 1022, 88 N.Y.S.3d 457).

There is no merit to the defendant's contention that the People committed a Brady violation (see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215) by failing to disclose that a witness had collected a $2,000 reward from Crime Stoppers prior to trial. The People have a duty to disclose to the defense evidence in its possession that is favorable to the accused (see id.; People v. Steadman, 82 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 603 N.Y.S.2d 382, 623 N.E.2d 509). The disclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule (see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104; People v. Steadman, 82 N.Y.2d at 7, 603 N.Y.S.2d 382, 623 N.E.2d 509; People v. Novoa, 70 N.Y.2d 490, 496, 522 N.Y.S.2d 504, 517 N.E.2d 219).

To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that the evidence is favorable to the defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeaching in nature, the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, and prejudice arose because the suppressed evidence was material (see People v. Fuentes, 12 N.Y.3d 259, 263, 879 N.Y.S.2d 373, 907 N.E.2d 286; see also People v. Garrett, 23 N.Y.3d 878, 885, 994 N.Y.S.2d 22, 18 N.E.3d 722). Absent a specific request by the defendant for the evidence, materiality can only be demonstrated by a showing that there is a “reasonable probability” that it would have changed the outcome of the proceedings (People v. Fuentes, 12 N.Y.3d at 263, 879 N.Y.S.2d 373, 907 N.E.2d 286 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Hunter, 11 N.Y.3d 1, 5, 862 N.Y.S.2d 301, 892 N.E.2d 365; People v. Bryce, 88 N.Y.2d 124, 128, 643 N.Y.S.2d 516, 666 N.E.2d 221). Here, the defendant made only a general request for exculpatory material (see People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 70–72, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518, 555 N.E.2d 915).

There is no evidence that the prosecution was aware of the $2,000 reward at the time of the defendant's trial, as the identity of individuals providing information to, and collecting rewards from, Crime Stoppers is kept confidential. Moreover, it is clear that the witness received substantial benefits of approximately $12,000 in exchange for his cooperation in the case against the defendant and that this information was disclosed to the defendant. The defendant engaged in extensive cross-examination of the witness regarding this issue, as well as that witness's extensive criminal history, current pending charges, and inconsistent statements regarding the shooting. Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable probability that additional cross-examination of that witness concerning the $2,000 reward would have yielded a different result and, therefore, reversal is not required on this ground (see People v. Fuentes, 12 N.Y.3d at 263, 879 N.Y.S.2d 373, 907 N.E.2d 286; People v. Portilloaguilar, 164 A.D.3d 1376, 81 N.Y.S.3d 746).

The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court erred in admitting excerpts of a sworn audiotaped statement made by a witness to law enforcement officials under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule is without merit (see People v. Taylor, 80 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 586 N.Y.S.2d 545, 598 N.E.2d 693; People v. Wright, 166 A.D.3d at 1024, 88 N.Y.S.3d 457). The defendants's alternative contention that the statement excerpts were improperly admitted as an attempt by the People to impeach their own witness is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]) and, in any event, without merit.

BALKIN, J.P., COHEN, MILLER and LASALLE, JJ., concur.