IN RE: Malgorzata LENGIEWICZ (2018)

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Bogdan Lengiewicz appeals from an order of protection of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Rosann O. Orlando, Ct. Atty. Ref.), dated September 11, 2017.  The order of protection, after a fact-finding hearing, inter alia, directed Bogdan Lengiewicz to stay away from the petitioner and the child Anthony G. for a period up to and including September 11, 2018.

ORDERED that the order of protection is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

In May 2017, the petitioner filed a family offense petition in Family Court seeking an order of protection against the appellant for herself and her child, alleging that the appellant had committed numerous family offenses against her.  After a fact-finding hearing, the court determined that the appellant's conduct constituted harassment in the second degree and disorderly conduct.  The court then issued an order of protection directing that the appellant stay away from the petitioner and the child and refrain from any type of communication with them for a period of one year.

“A family offense must be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence” (Matter of Washington v. Washington, 158 A.D.3d 717, 718, 70 N.Y.S.3d 560;  see Family Ct Act § 832).  “The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the Family Court” (Matter of Washington v. Washington, 158 A.D.3d at 718, 70 N.Y.S.3d 560;  see Matter of Pierre v. Dal, 142 A.D.3d 1021, 1023, 37 N.Y.S.3d 317).  The court's determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed if supported by the record (see Matter of Washington v. Washington, 158 A.D.3d at 718, 70 N.Y.S.3d 560;  Matter of Pierre v. Dal, 142 A.D.3d at 1023, 37 N.Y.S.3d 317).

Although the order of protection expired by its own terms, the appeal from the order has not been rendered academic “ ‘given the totality of the enduring legal and reputational consequences of the contested order of protection’ ” (Matter of Pierre v. Dal, 142 A.D.3d at 1022, 37 N.Y.S.3d 317, quoting Matter of Veronica P. v. Radcliff A., 24 N.Y.3d 668, 673, 3 N.Y.S.3d 288, 26 N.E.3d 1143;  see Matter of Fruchthandler v. Fruchthandler, 161 A.D.3d 1151, 78 N.Y.S.3d 214).

Contrary to the appellant's contentions, a fair preponderance of the credible evidence supports the Family Court's determination that he committed the family offenses of harassment in the second degree and disorderly conduct (see Penal Law §§ 240.20;  240.26).

The Family Court properly added the child as a person protected by the order.  A court may require a petitioner or respondent to “observe such other conditions as are necessary to further the purposes of protection” (Family Ct Act § 842[k] ).  Here, there was evidence that adding the child to the order was needed to further the purposes of protection.  The testimony at the hearing established that the addition of the child to the order was reasonably necessary to protect the petitioner from future family offenses (see Matter of Brito v. Vasquez, 93 A.D.3d 842, 843, 941 N.Y.S.2d 634;  Matter of Jodi S. v. Jason T., 85 A.D.3d 1239, 1242, 925 N.Y.S.2d 211).

Accordingly, there is no basis to disturb the order of protection (see Matter of Magana v. Delph, 163 A.D.3d 673, 76 N.Y.S.3d 845;  Matter of Washington v. Washington, 158 A.D.3d at 718, 70 N.Y.S.3d 560).

DILLON, J.P., MILLER, LASALLE and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.