COHEN v. COHEN (2018)

DECISION & ORDER

In a matrimonial action, the plaintiff appeals, and the defendant cross-appeals, from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Stacy D. Bennett, J.), dated September 30, 2015.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was, in effect, for a determination of the plaintiff's proportionate liability for the parties' jointly filed 2013 taxes and to direct the plaintiff to pay that sum to the extent of directing the plaintiff to pay 11.3% of the parties' 2013 joint tax liability, and denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for an award of counsel fees.  The order, insofar as cross-appealed from, granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was, in effect, for a determination of the plaintiff's proportionate liability for the parties' jointly filed 2013 taxes and to direct the plaintiff to pay that sum only to the extent of directing the plaintiff to pay 11.3% of the parties' 2013 joint tax liability, and denied that branch of the defendant's motion which was for an award of counsel fees.

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the facts, by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the defendant's motion which was, in effect, for a determination of the plaintiff's proportionate liability for the parties' jointly filed 2013 taxes and to direct the plaintiff to pay that sum;  as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.

In October 2013, the parties entered into a “Stipulation of Settlement Opting Out Agreement,” which was incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce dated April 2, 2014.  Insofar as relevant to this appeal, article XIII, paragraph “1,” of the stipulation of settlement addressed the parties' respective liability for their jointly filed 2013 tax returns, and provided that any taxes due were to be “paid by the parties in proportion to their respective income.”

In January 2015, the defendant moved, inter alia, to enforce the stipulation of settlement by seeking a determination of the plaintiff's proportionate liability for the parties' jointly filed 2013 taxes and to direct the plaintiff to pay that sum.  The plaintiff cross-moved, inter alia, for an award of counsel fees.  In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was, in effect, for a determination of the plaintiff's proportionate liability for the parties' jointly filed 2013 taxes, and determined that the plaintiff was responsible for 11.3% of the parties' tax liability for 2013, with credit for any payments already made.  The court also denied those branches of the motion and cross motion which were for an award of counsel fees.

“A stipulation of settlement is a contract, enforceable according to its terms” (Stein v. Stein, 130 A.D.3d 604, 605, 12 N.Y.S.3d 284;  see Palaia v. Palaia, 158 A.D.3d 719, 71 N.Y.S.3d 131;  Klein v. Klein, 134 A.D.3d 1066, 1068, 22 N.Y.S.3d 547).  “As with other contracts, when the terms of a separation agreement are clear and unambiguous, the general rule is that the intent of the parties is to be found within the four corners of the agreement” (Surlak v. Surlak, 95 A.D.2d 371, 375, 466 N.Y.S.2d 461).  “ ‘Whether an agreement is ambiguous is a question of law for the courts’ ” (Boster–Burton v. Burton, 92 A.D.3d 909, 910, 940 N.Y.S.2d 111, quoting Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 566, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350, 696 N.E.2d 174).  “The resolution of an ambiguous provision, for which extrinsic evidence may be used, is for the trier of fact” (Boster–Burton v. Burton, 92 A.D.3d at 910, 940 N.Y.S.2d 111).

Here, the relevant provision of the parties' stipulation of settlement is ambiguous as to how to calculate the parties' respective income in connection with the apportionment of their 2013 tax liability.  The parties' submissions were insufficient to resolve the ambiguity.  Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for an evidentiary hearing at which extrinsic evidence may be introduced to determine the parties' intent with regard to the relevant provision of the stipulation (see id.;  Bianco v. Bianco, 21 A.D.3d 918, 919, 801 N.Y.S.2d 338;  Chudick v. Chudick, 287 A.D.2d 590, 731 N.Y.S.2d 880;  Laing v. Laing, 282 A.D.2d 655, 655–656, 723 N.Y.S.2d 710;  see also Nirenberg v. Nirenberg, 203 A.D.2d 980, 612 N.Y.S.2d 709;  Graepel v. County of Nassau, 119 A.D.2d 800, 501 N.Y.S.2d 428), and for a new determination thereafter as to that branch of the defendant's motion which was, in effect, for a determination of the plaintiff's proportionate liability for the parties' jointly filed 2013 taxes and to direct the plaintiff to pay that sum.

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying those branches of the motion and cross motion which were for an award of counsel fees (cf.  Pinto v. Pinto, 151 A.D.3d 715, 716, 54 N.Y.S.3d 673).

RIVERA, J.P., SGROI, DUFFY and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.