PEOPLE v. ALSTON (2018)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant, as limited by his motion, from a sentence of the Supreme Court, Kings County (John T. Hecht, J.), imposed April 4, 2016, upon his plea of guilty, on the ground that the sentence was excessive.

ORDERED that the sentence is affirmed.

The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery in the second degree (see Penal Law § 160.10[2][b] ).  He was sentenced to a determinate term of six years' imprisonment on each count.  The Supreme Court directed the sentences of imprisonment to run concurrently.  On appeal, the defendant contends that his sentences of imprisonment were excessive.  The People argue that the defendant's contention is precluded by his waiver of his right to appeal.

A defendant who has validly waived the right to appeal cannot invoke this Court's interest of justice jurisdiction to obtain a reduced sentence (see People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 255, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145).  Here, however, this Court is not precluded from exercising its interest of justice jurisdiction because the defendant's purported waiver of his right to appeal was invalid.

A waiver of the right to appeal “is effective only so long as the record demonstrates that it was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily” (People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d at 256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145;  see People v. Bradshaw, 18 N.Y.3d 257, 264, 938 N.Y.S.2d 254, 961 N.E.2d 645;  People v. Brown, 122 A.D.3d 133, 136, 992 N.Y.S.2d 297).  Although the Court of Appeals has “repeatedly observed that there is no mandatory litany that must be used in order to obtain a valid waiver of appellate rights” (People v. Johnson, 14 N.Y.3d 483, 486, 903 N.Y.S.2d 299, 929 N.E.2d 361), “[t]he best way to ensure that the record reflects that the right is known and intentionally relinquished by the defendant is to fully explain to the defendant, on the record, the nature of the right to appeal and the consequences of waiving it” (People v. Brown, 122 A.D.3d at 142, 992 N.Y.S.2d 297;  see People v. Rocchino, 153 A.D.3d 1284, 59 N.Y.S.3d 715;  People v. Blackwood, 148 A.D.3d 716, 716, 48 N.Y.S.3d 709).

“[A] thorough explanation should include an advisement that, while a defendant ordinarily retains the right to appeal even after he or she pleads guilty, the defendant is being asked, as a condition of the plea agreement, to waive that right” (People v. Brown, 122 A.D.3d at 144, 992 N.Y.S.2d 297;  see People v. Medina, 161 A.D.3d 778, 76 N.Y.S.3d 629).  “[A] defendant should [also] ․ receive an explanation of the nature of the right to appeal, which essentially advises that this right entails the opportunity to argue, before a higher court, any issues pertaining to the defendant's conviction and sentence and to have that higher court decide whether the conviction or sentence should be set aside based upon any of those issues ․ [and] that appellate counsel will be appointed in the event that he or she were indigent” (People v. Brown, 122 A.D.3d at 144, 992 N.Y.S.2d 297).  Finally, “trial courts should then explain the consequences of waiving the right to appeal, i.e., that the conviction and sentence will not receive any further review, and shall be final” (id.).

Here, the record does not demonstrate that the defendant understood the nature of the right to appeal and the consequences of waiving it (see People v. Etienne, 152 A.D.3d 790, 790, 59 N.Y.S.3d 427;  People v. Gonzalez, 150 A.D.3d 1024, 1025, 52 N.Y.S.3d 229;  People v. De La Rosa, 148 A.D.3d 927, 927, 48 N.Y.S.3d 606;  People v. Cuevas–Alcantara, 136 A.D.3d 650, 650, 23 N.Y.S.3d 902).  The Supreme Court did not provide the defendant with an adequate explanation of the nature of the right to appeal or the consequences of waiving that right (cf.  People v. Brown, 122 A.D.3d at 144, 992 N.Y.S.2d 297).  The court failed to advise the defendant that he would ordinarily retain the right to appeal even after pleading guilty, but that in this case he was being asked to voluntarily relinquish that right as a condition of the plea agreement (cf.  People v. Brown, 122 A.D.3d at 144, 992 N.Y.S.2d 297).  Moreover, the court never elicited an acknowledgment that the defendant was voluntarily waiving his right to appeal (see People v. Santeramo, 153 A.D.3d 1286, 61 N.Y.S.3d 295;  People v. Guarchaj, 122 A.D.3d 878, 879, 996 N.Y.S.2d 372;  People v. Pelaez, 100 A.D.3d 803, 803, 954 N.Y.S.2d 554).

Although the record on appeal reflects that the defendant signed a written appeal waiver form, a written waiver “is not a complete substitute for an on-the-record explanation of the nature of the right to appeal” (People v. Bradshaw, 76 A.D.3d 566, 569, 906 N.Y.S.2d 93, affd 18 N.Y.3d 257, 938 N.Y.S.2d 254, 961 N.E.2d 645;  see People v. Cuevas–Alcantara, 136 A.D.3d at 650, 23 N.Y.S.3d 902;  People v. Brown, 122 A.D.3d at 138–139, 992 N.Y.S.2d 297;  People v. Keiser, 100 A.D.3d 927, 928, 954 N.Y.S.2d 184).  While the written waiver in this case “expressly provided that the court had informed the defendant about the nature of his right to appeal, that representation is contradicted by the oral colloquy” (People v. Brown, 122 A.D.3d at 145, 992 N.Y.S.2d 297).  Rather, the record reflects that the Supreme Court's colloquy regarding the written waiver amounted to nothing more than “a simple confirmation that the defendant signed [it]” (id. at 140, 992 N.Y.S.2d 297;  see People v. Burnett–Hicks, 133 A.D.3d 773, 774, 19 N.Y.S.3d 181;  People v. Cantarero, 123 A.D.3d 841, 841–842, 996 N.Y.S.2d 724).  The transcript of the plea proceedings shows that the court did not ascertain on the record whether the defendant had read the written waiver or discussed it with defense counsel, or whether he was even aware of its contents (see People v. Santeramo, 153 A.D.3d 1286, 61 N.Y.S.3d 295;  People v. Black, 144 A.D.3d 935, 936, 41 N.Y.S.3d 126;  People v. Pacheco, 138 A.D.3d 1035, 1036, 28 N.Y.S.3d 627).  Under the circumstances here, we conclude that the defendant did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to appeal (see People v. Brown, 122 A.D.3d 133, 992 N.Y.S.2d 297;  see generally People v. Bradshaw, 18 N.Y.3d 257, 264–267, 938 N.Y.S.2d 254, 961 N.E.2d 645;  People v. Ramos, 7 N.Y.3d 737, 738, 819 N.Y.S.2d 853, 853 N.E.2d 222;  People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d at 255, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145).

Nevertheless, contrary to the defendant's contention, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).

RIVERA, J.P., MILLER, DUFFY and LASALLE, JJ., concur.