John D. GIVENS, appellant, v. Desiree Venicia DE MOYA, etc., respondent, et al., defendant.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Sherri L. Eisenpress, J.), entered June 29, 2018. The order granted the motion of the defendant Desiree Venicia De Moya for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as alleged legal malpractice in connection with the settlement of a combined equitable distribution and maintenance award and a separate dispute regarding a vehicle and for summary judgment on her counterclaim for an account stated in a certain principal sum.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The defendant Desiree Venicia De Moya (hereinafter the defendant) represented the plaintiff in a divorce action he had commenced in 2012. The divorce action culminated in settlements which the defendant negotiated on behalf of the plaintiff. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for legal malpractice against the defendant, and another person, alleging, inter alia, that the defendant had negligently represented him in the divorce action. The defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint. In an order dated October 7, 2016, the Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion except as to the plaintiff's claims regarding so much of the stipulation as settled the combined equitable distribution and maintenance award and the subsequent settlement of a dispute which arose thereafter but before the entry of the judgment of divorce, regarding a vehicle.
Upon answering the remaining claims, the defendant interposed a counterclaim against the plaintiff, alleging an account stated for unpaid fees in a certain principal sum. Following the completion of discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's remaining claims and on her counterclaim. The Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion. The plaintiff appeals.
“In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the attorney failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession and that the attorney's breach of this duty proximately caused plaintiff to sustain actual and ascertainable damages” (Glenwayne Dev. Corp. v. James J. Corbett, P.C., 175 A.D.3d 473, 473–474, 106 N.Y.S.3d 378 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Katsoris v. Bodnar & Milone, LLP, 186 A.D.3d 1504, 1505, 131 N.Y.S.3d 89; Betz v. Blatt, 160 A.D.3d 696, 697, 74 N.Y.S.3d 75). “ ‘A claim for legal malpractice is viable, despite settlement of the underlying action, if it is alleged that settlement of the action was effectively compelled by the mistakes of counsel’ ” (Katsoris v. Bodnar & Milone, LLP, 186 A.D.3d at 1505, 131 N.Y.S.3d 89, quoting Bernstein v. Oppenheim & Co., 160 A.D.2d 428, 430, 554 N.Y.S.2d 487; see Gad v. Sherman, 160 A.D.3d 622, 623, 75 N.Y.S.3d 57). Nevertheless, “ ‘[t]he fact that the plaintiff subsequently was unhappy with the settlement [he or she] obtained ․ does not rise to the level of legal malpractice’ ” (Katsoris v. Bodnar & Milone, LLP, 186 A.D.3d at 1505, 131 N.Y.S.3d 89, quoting Holschauer v. Fisher, 5 A.D.3d 553, 554, 772 N.Y.S.2d 836). “A defendant seeking summary judgment dismissing a legal malpractice cause of action has the burden of establishing prima facie that he or she did not fail to exercise such skill and knowledge, or that the claimed departure did not proximately cause the plaintiff to sustain damages” (Bakcheva v. Law Offs. of Stein & Assoc., 169 A.D.3d 624, 625, 93 N.Y.S.3d 388; see Iannucci v. Kucker & Bruh, LLP, 161 A.D.3d 959, 960, 77 N.Y.S.3d 118; Betz v. Blatt, 160 A.D.3d 696, 698, 74 N.Y.S.3d 75).
Here, the defendant met her prima facie burden of establishing her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the plaintiff's remaining claims. The defendant's submissions demonstrated that, in representing the plaintiff in the divorce action, she exercised the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession, and that the stipulations of settlement entered into by the plaintiff in open court in the underlying action were not the product of any mistakes by the defendant (see Holtzman v. Griffith, 162 A.D.3d 874, 876, 80 N.Y.S.3d 307; Schiff v. Sallah Law Firm, P.C., 128 A.D.3d 668, 669, 7 N.Y.S.3d 587). In addition, with respect to the in-court stipulation of settlement of the combined equitable distribution and maintenance award, the transcript of the plaintiff's allocution in the divorce action demonstrated that he understood the stipulation settling the combined equitable distribution and maintenance award and that it would be final, that he had discussed it with the defendant and was satisfied with her representation, that no one had made him promises or coerced him to enter into the settlement, and that he was not under the influence of any substance which would affect his ability to understand the significance of the settlement (see Holtzman v. Griffith, 162 A.D.3d at 876, 80 N.Y.S.3d 307; Schiff v. Sallah Law Firm, P.C., 128 A.D.3d at 669, 7 N.Y.S.3d 587; see also Chamberlain, D'Amanda, Oppenheimer & Greenfield, LLP v. Wilson, 136 A.D.3d 1326, 1328, 25 N.Y.S.3d 468).
In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Holtzman v. Griffith, 162 A.D.3d at 876, 80 N.Y.S.3d 307). The plaintiff submitted no evidence to demonstrate a triable issue of fact as to whether he did not agree to the settlements, whether the settlements were not supported by the financial information or evidence before the divorce court, or whether he agreed to those settlements as a result any alleged mistake on the part of the defendant.
Further, “ ‘[a]n account stated is an agreement between parties, based upon their prior transactions, with respect to the correctness of the account items and the specific balance due’ ” (Bashian & Farber, LLP v. Syms, 147 A.D.3d 714, 715, 46 N.Y.S.3d 202, quoting Citibank [South Dakota], N.A. v. Abraham, 138 A.D.3d 1053, 1056, 31 N.Y.S.3d 517; see Holtzman v. Griffith, 162 A.D.3d at 875, 80 N.Y.S.3d 307). “ ‘Although an account stated may be based on an express agreement between the parties as to the amount due, an agreement may be implied where a defendant retains bills without objecting to them within a reasonable period of time, or makes partial payment on the account’ ” (Holtzman v. Griffith, 162 A.D.3d at 875, 80 N.Y.S.3d 307, quoting Citibank [South Dakota], N.A. v. Abraham, 138 A.D.3d at 1056, 31 N.Y.S.3d 517).
Here, the defendant demonstrated her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on her counterclaim to recover legal fees on an account stated in a certain principal sum (see Holtzman v. Griffith, 162 A.D.3d at 875, 80 N.Y.S.3d 307). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Darby & Darby, P.C. v. VSI Intl., Inc., 95 N.Y.2d 308, 315, 716 N.Y.S.2d 378, 739 N.E.2d 744; Langione, Catterson & Lofrumento, LLP v. Schael, 148 A.D.3d 797, 47 N.Y.S.3d 913). The plaintiff did not explain why he retained the invoices without objection within a reasonable time or identify specific charges to which he had an objection. Although the plaintiff contends that the defendant improperly billed him for services rendered after the conclusion of the divorce action, the invoices demonstrate that, to the extent they contained more than carry-forward balances, those charges related to the entry and distribution of the judgment of divorce or were related to telephone calls or meetings with the plaintiff.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's remaining claims and on her counterclaim for an account stated.
The plaintiff's remaining contentions relating to his child support obligation are not properly before this Court since dismissal of his claims relating to child support were directed in the prior order dated October 7, 2016, and the plaintiff did not appeal from that order.
DILLON, J.P., AUSTIN, DUFFY and WOOTEN, JJ., concur.
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