John J. Vinasco, appellant, v. LLC (2014)

Argued—October 3, 2014

DECISION & ORDER

In a consolidated action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Brathwaite Nelson, J.), entered December 12, 2012, which, upon the denial of his motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1), made at the close of the evidence, and upon a jury verdict, is in favor of the defendants and against him on the issue of liability, dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for a trial on the issue of damages.

At the close of evidence in the liability phase of the bifurcated trial, the plaintiff moved for a directed verdict on his Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action.   The trial court denied the motion, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, finding that they did not fail to provide proper protection to the plaintiff.   A judgment subsequently was entered on the verdict, and the plaintiff appeals.

The trial court erred in denying the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on his Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action.   In order to grant such a motion, the court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, must conclude that there is no rational process by which the jury could base a finding in favor of the defendant (see CPLR 4401;  Szczerbiak v. Pilat, 90 N.Y.2d 553, 556;  Nestro v. Harrison, 78 AD3d 1032, 1033).   Here, there was no rational process by which the jury could find that the defendants did not violate Labor Law § 240(1).   Upon the evidence presented, the jury could not rationally have concluded that the hoist which was holding the gate was adequate under the statute, that the unsecured ladder from which the plaintiff fell afforded him adequate protection, or that the inadequacy of the hoist and ladder was not the proximate cause of the injury (see generally Pritchard v. Tully Constr.   Co., Inc., 82 AD3d 730).   Accordingly, the Supreme Court erroneously denied the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on his Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action.

In light of our determination, the plaintiff's remaining contention has been rendered academic.

MASTRO, J.P., SKELOS, ROMAN and MALTESE, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court