IN RE: the Application of Red Hook Boat Club (2026)

The following papers were read on this petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 (Motion Seq. #1), Petitioner's motion to strike Respondent's memorandum of law filed April 17, 2026 (Motion Seq. #2), and Respondent's motion seeking to have said memorandum of law deemed timely filed (Motion Seq. #3):

Document: NYSCEF Doc. No(s).:

NOTICE OF PETITION — Seq. #1 9

PETITION and EXHIBITS 1—7 1—8

MEMORANDUM OF LAW 10

ANSWER 16

RESPONDENT AFFIRMATION IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 17

EXHIBIT A 18

CERTIFIED RECORD 19

MEMORANDUM OF LAW 20

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN REPLY 27

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE — Seq. #2 25

ATTORNEY AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT 22

ATTORNEY AFFIRMATION IN OPPOSITION 31

MEMORANDUM OF LAW 32

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE — Seq. #3 30

ATTORNEY AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT 29

ATTORNEY AFFIRMATION IN REPLY (Seq. #2) / OPPOSITION (Seq. #3)34, 35

BACKGROUND

This is the third proceeding commenced by Petitioner challenging legislative actions taken by Respondent, the Town of Red Hook, NY ("Respondent" or the "Town," as the context requires). Petitioner owns real property in the Town fronting on the Hudson River, on which it has operated a private boat club since the 1960's. Petitioner alleges that the actions challenged herein, like those actions challenged in the prior proceedings, are part of the Town's plan to take their property by eminent domain for conversion to a public park.

The first proceeding was commenced as a hybrid special proceeding / declaratory judgment action on February 21, 2025 under Index Number 2025-50809. That proceeding sought to annul Respondent's February 11, 2025 adoption of Local Law No. 1 of 2025. That local law included, among other things, amendments to the Town zoning code affecting Petitioner and its property, as well as establishing "Public park[s], including docks and boat ramps" as a permitted use in all zoning districts. In opposition to the proceeding, Respondent argued that the local law was adopted without the intent to condemn Petitioner's property, and that it therefore was not required to consider the potential environmental impacts of converting the property to a public park. However, on April 28, 2025, Respondent commenced condemnation proceedings against Petitioner's property "for the . . . public purpose(s) to provide for public waterfront recreational facilities including boat launch, boat slips, clubhouse, picnic area and related facilities." On August 14, 2025, the Court granted Petitioner's application in part, holding that the adoption of Local Law No. 1 of 2025 violated the State Environmental Quality Review Act ("SEQRA"), and that a new definition of "boat club" contained in that same legislation was ultra vires and void. Regarding non-compliance with SEQRA, the Court held that Respondent's undertaking of proceedings to acquire Petitioner's property by eminent domain two months after adopting Local Law No. 1 of 2025 constituted improper segmentation of the environmental review process. Simply put, the Town sought to avoid conducting a full environmental review by starting the condemnation process.

The second proceeding was commenced on August 18, 2025 under Index Number 2025-54836, challenging Respondent's adoption of three resolutions in furtherance of the condemnation proceeding. By Decision and Order dated November 7, 2025, the Court dismissed the proceeding for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Eminent Domain Procedure Law §§ 207 and 208, which place exclusive original jurisdiction for eminent domain challenges in the Appellate Division. The dismissal was without prejudice to a substantially similar proceeding commenced on August 19, 2025 in the Appellate Division, Second Department under Docket Number 2025-09981. As of this date, it appears that the briefing in the appellate matter was complete on May 21, 2026.

Apparently undeterred by this Court's August 14, 2025 Decision and Order, or the pending challenge to the condemnation proceeding, or a pending federal civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Case No. 7:25-cv-03647), on December 9, 2025, Respondent enacted two new local laws in furtherance of taking Petitioner's property for use as a public park. According to Petitioner, the new laws similar to nullified Local Law No. 1 of 2025, target Petitioner and its property as follows:

Local Law No. B of 2025[:] changes the use requirements for public parks and trail systems, which would become a permitted use (no local agency review at all) in all zoning districts; . . . changes the definition of wetlands based on New York State's updated freshwater wetlands program effective January 1, 2025[; and] . . . eliminates the potential for a nonconforming use (such as [the boat club]) to be changed to another nonconforming use[.]

Local Law No. C of 2025 (enacted simultaneously with Local Law No. B) amends the Zoning Law: a) to remove marinas as a special permit use in the Town "to limit new commercial uses to the two villages and the hamlet of Upper Red Hook and to limit waterfront uses on the Hudson River[;]" b) amends the definition of a "Club" so it eliminates the phrase: "with bona fide dues paying members" and adds new definitions for "Boat Club"; and c) includes "Boat Ramp," "Dock," and "Marina" definitions along with amended special permit conditions for new boat clubs, docks and boat ramps.

Petitioner alleges that in connection with these enactments, Respondent prepared a Full Environmental Assessment Form ("FEAF") in which it found that the local laws would not result in any significant environmental impacts, including consideration of the condemnation of Petitioner's property for a public park. The FEAF includes a thirty-page "narrative" with twenty pages of exhibits. According to the minutes of the December 9, 2025 Town Board meeting,¹ prior to approving the two local laws, the Town Board issued a negative declaration pursuant to SEQRA, finding that the enactment of the local laws "will not result in any significant adverse environmental impacts and that a Draft Environmental Impact Statement will not be prepared."

Petitioner commenced this proceeding on January 21, 2026, asserting three causes of action to annul Local Laws B and C, based on alleged non-compliance with SEQRA: (1) Respondent failed to recognize potentially significant environmental impacts and/or to take the requisite "hard look" at identified environmental impacts; (2) Respondent improperly segmented its review from a proposed separate, nearby acquisition of land for a public park; and (3) Respondent's finding that the proposed park is consistent with the Local Waterfront Revitalization Plan ("LWRP") is contradicted by the findings of the Town's Planning Board and is arbitrary, capricious, irrational, and contrary to law.

Respondent failed to timely answer the petition, and on March 18, 2026 the Court issued an Order directing Respondent to "answer or move with respect to the petition on or before April 10, 2026, failing which [it] will be deemed intentionally in default." That Order adjourned the petition's return date from February 27, 2026 to April 24, 2026. Respondent filed an answer with affirmative defenses, a supporting affirmation, and a certified record of the proceedings on April 10, 2026. On April 17, 2026, Respondent filed a memorandum of law, without seeking or obtaining permission from the Court for the untimely filing. On April 20, 2026, Petitioner moved by Order to Show Cause to strike Respondent's memorandum of law as untimely. On April 24, 2026, Respondent moved by Order to Show Cause to have its memorandum of law deemed timely and be considered in these proceedings. The petition and both motions are now fully submitted for decision.

DISCUSSION

Initially, the Court will consider Respondent's untimely memorandum of law (CPLR 2004). While Respondent's failure to provide a reasonable excuse for either its initial default or the untimely filing of the memorandum of law should not be countenanced (cf. Lurie v Lurie, 226 AD3d 1000 [2d Dept 2024]), the one-week delay could not have caused Petitioner any substantial prejudice (Tewari v Tsoutsouras, 75 NY2d 1, 13 [1989]; CPLR 2001). In any event, the two procedural objections raised in the memorandum of law are without merit. Respondent argues that Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the local law enactments, and that any challenge to making parks a permitted use in Petitioner's zoning district is untimely. However, Petitioner does not challenge the local laws directly—it challenges the negative declaration and the Local Waterfront Revitalization Plan consistency determination that were preconditions to the laws' enactment. Taking into account the relationship between the local laws and the eminent domain proceeding, Petitioner has standing under SEQRA to challenge any actions by Respondent that may result in a loss of or change in property rights (Seneca Meadows, Inc. v Town of Seneca Falls, 2025 NY Slip Op 06961, 2 [Ct App Dec. 16, 2025]). Moreover, This challenge was brought timely, as measured from the date the negative declaration was issued (Stengel v Town of Poughkeepsie Planning Bd., 167 AD3d 752, 753 [2d Dept 2018], lv to appeal denied 33 NY3d 912 [2019]).

Turning to the merits, many of the same legal principles applied in the first proceeding also apply here. Judicial review of SEQRA determination is "limited to considering 'whether a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion' " (Chinese Staff and Workers Association v City of New York, 68 NY2d 359, 363 [1986], quoting CPLR 7803[3]).

An agency's initial determination under SEQRA . . . is whether an EIS [environmental impact statement] is required, which in turn depends on whether an action may or will not have a significant effect on the environment. In making its initial determination, the agency will study many of the same concerns that must be assessed in an EIS, including both long- and short-term environmental effects. Where an agency determines that an EIS is not required, it will issue a "negative declaration." Although the threshold triggering an EIS is relatively low, a negative declaration is properly issued when the agency has made a thorough investigation of the problems involved and reasonably exercised its discretion.

(Matter of Chinese Staff v Burden, 19 NY3d 922, 924 [2012] [internal quotations and citations omitted]). However, "where a lead agency has failed to comply with SEQRA's mandates, the negative declaration must be nullified" (Matter of New York City Coalition to End Lead Poisoning, Inc. v Vallone, 100 NY2d 337, 348 [2003]). "[S]trict, not substantial, compliance is required" (Matter of King v Saratoga County Board of Supervisors, 89 NY2d 341, 347 [1996]). "Judicial review of a lead agency's negative declaration is restricted to whether the agency identified the relevant areas of environmental concern, took a 'hard look' at them, and made a 'reasoned elaboration' of the basis for its determination" (Matter of New York City Coalition to End Lead Poisoning, Inc. v Vallone, 100 NY2d 337, 348 [2003]).

The facts here are also substantially similar to those underlying the first proceeding. The Town Board declared itself to be the lead agency for SEQRA review, and classified the proposed local laws as "Type I" actions. "[T]he fact that an action or project has been listed as a Type I action carries with it the presumption that it is likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and may require an EIS" (6 NYCRR § 617.4[a][1]). Unlike the first proceeding, however, the materials considered by the Town Board included a lengthy narrative with traffic data. Petitioner argues that Respondent's materials nevertheless demonstrate a failure to comply with SEQRA and that the negative declaration was arbitrary, capricious, irrational and/or contrary to law.

In issuing the negative declaration, Respondent found that no significant environmental impacts would result from the Town's proposed use of Petitioner's property, the surrounding areas, and related infrastructure as a public park. However, the materials submitted in this proceeding, including Respondent's narrative, demonstrate that only potential traffic impacts and impacts on historical/archeological resources were considered in connection with using Petitioner's property as a public park. The remainder Respondent's narrative is either irrelevant to Petitioner's property, or is devoted to discussing environmental impacts of the proposed local laws without consideration of the public park use—which this Court already determined constitutes unlawful segmentation of the SEQRA process. Respondent's submissions do not show how other areas of potential environmental concern were addressed. Notably omitted from Respondent's record in this proceeding is the entire FEAF purportedly considered by the Town Board prior to issuing the negative declaration, or any of the SEQRA-related documents allegedly considered in connection with the eminent domain proceeding. As a result, the Court cannot determine whether the Town Board considered any of the numerous other "criteria . . . considered indicators of significant adverse impacts on the environment" (6 NYCRR 617.7[c][1][i]—[xii], [2], [3]), let alone determine whether it identified all relevant areas of environmental concern and took a 'hard look' at them. Absent proof that Respondent "adequately assess[ed] and consider[ed] the potential environmental impacts" of the proposed park, the "adoption of the negative declaration was arbitrary and capricious" (Neeman v Town of Warwick, 184 AD3d 567, 570 [2d Dept 2020]; see also Matter of Kahn v Pasnik, 90 NY2d 569, 574 [1997]). Accordingly, Respondent failed to demonstrate that it is not required to prepare an EIS, and the negative declaration must be annulled, along with the enactment of Local Laws B and C of 2025.

Given this holding, the Court need not reach Petitioner's other arguments.

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the petition is granted; and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the resolution of the Town of Red Hook Town Board on December 9, 2025 issuing a negative declaration pursuant to SEQRA regarding the enactment of Local Law Nos. B and C of 2025 (enacted as Local Law Nos. 3 and 4 of 2025) is annulled and set aside; and it is further

ORDERED that the resolutions of the Town of Red Hook Town Board issued December 9, 2025 enacting Local Law Nos. B and C of 2025 (enacted as Local Law Nos. 3 and 4 of 2025) are annulled and set aside.

The foregoing constitutes the decision, order and judgment of the Court.

Dated: June 25, 2026

Poughkeepsie, New York

ENTER:

MARIA G. ROSA, J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.    Available at https://redhookny.gov/AgendaCenter/ViewFile/Minutes/_12092025-2040. Neither the minutes nor the Town Board resolution adopting the negative declaration were contained in the certified record of proceedings filed by Respondent.

Maria G. Rosa, J.