IN RE: SEA CLIFF EQUITIES (2013)

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Board of Zoning Appeals of the Incorporated Village of Sea Cliff, dated May 5, 2011, which, after a hearing, revoked the petitioners' special use permit, the petitioners appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Adams, J.), entered October 3, 2011, which denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

“ ‘The classification of a “special permit” or “special exception” is tantamount to a legislative finding that, if the special permit or exception conditions are met, the use will not adversely affect the neighborhood and the surrounding areas' “ (Matter of Metro Enviro Transfer, LLC v. Village of Croton–On–Hudson, 7 AD3d 625, 627, affd 5 NY3d 236, quoting Matter of C.B.H. Props. v. Rose, 205 A.D.2d 686). “Judicial review of a determination by a zoning board is generally limited to determining whether the action taken by the zoning board was illegal, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion” (Matter of Witkowich v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Yorktown, 84 AD3d 1101, 1102). Here, we agree with the Supreme Court that the determination under review, which revoked a previously-issued special use permit due to noncompliance with the stated conditions, was rational, and was neither illegal, arbitrary and capricious, nor an abuse of discretion (see Matter of Rossney v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Inc. Vil. of Ossining, 79 AD3d 894, 895; Matter of Halperin v. City of New Rochelle, 24 AD3d 768, 770; see also Matter of Metro Enviro Transfer, LLC v. Village of Croton–On–Hudson, 7 AD3d at 626–627; Matter of Bell v. Szmigel, 171 A.D.2d 1032). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.