Joanne Conte, appellant, v. County of Nassau, et al., respondents, et al., defendants. (2011)

Argued—May 31, 2011

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from (1) so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Cozzens, Jr., J.), entered October 5, 2009, as granted that branch of the cross motion of the defendant County of Nassau which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, and denied, as academic, the plaintiff's motion for a further deposition of the County, and (2) so much of an order of the same court entered October 16, 2009, as granted those branches of the motion of the defendant City of Glen Cove which were to quash certain nonparty subpoenas.

ORDERED that on the Court's own motion, the notice of appeal from so much of the order entered October 5, 2009, as denied, as academic, the plaintiff's motion for a further deposition of the County, is treated as an application for leave to appeal from that portion of the order, and leave to appeal is granted (see Sainz v New York City Health & Hosps.   Corp., 106 A.D.2d 500);  and it is further,

ORDERED that the orders are affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the cross motion of the defendant County of Nassau which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.   The County demonstrated, prima facie, that the subject sidewalk and catch basin were installed and maintained by the defendant City of Glen Cove and not the County, and, in opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see generally Alvarez v. Propsect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324).   As such, the Supreme Court properly denied, as academic, the plaintiff's motion for a further deposition of the County.

While CPLR 3101(a) provides for full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of an action, unlimited disclosure is not required, and supervision of disclosure is generally left to the trial court's broad discretion (see Constantino v Dock's Clam Bar & Pasta House, 60 AD3d 612;  Youngquist v. Youngquist, 44 AD3d 1034, 1035;  Auerbach v. Klein, 30 AD3d 451, 452;  Silcox v. City of New York, 233 A.D.2d 494;  NBT Bancorp v. Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, 192 A.D.2d 1032, 1033).   Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised it discretion in quashing the nonparty subpoenas, as the plaintiff's overly broad discovery requests were neither material nor necessary to the prosecution of the action (see Young v. Baker, 21 AD3d 550, 550–551;  White Bay Enters. v. Newsday, Inc., 288 A.D.2d 211, 212;  Myrie v. Shelley, 237 A.D.2d 337, 339;  Ayubo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 158 A.D.2d 641, 642).   Additionally, the plaintiff failed to show that the disclosure sought could not be obtained from sources other than from the nonparties (see Kooper v. Kooper, 74 AD3d 6, 16–17;  Moran v McCarthy, Safrath & Carbone, P.C., 31 AD3d 725, 726;  Tannenbaum v. Tenenbaum, 8 AD3d 360;  Lanzello v. Lakritz, 287 A.D.2d 601;  Tsachalis v. City of Mount Vernon, 262 A.D.2d 399, 401;  Matter of Validation Review Assoc.  [Berkun–Schimel ], 237 A.D.2d 614, 615).

DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HALL and LOTT, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Matthew G. Kiernan

Clerk of the Court