Kaplon-Belo Associates, Inc., appellant, v Frank D'Angelo, et al., respondents. v. << (2010)

Argued-November 29, 2010

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover a real estate brokerage commission, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Agate, J.), entered August 25, 2009, which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In order to recover a brokerage commission, the plaintiff must plead and prove that it was retained by the defendants (see Julien J. Studley, Inc. v. New York News, 70 N.Y.2d 628, 629;  Steven Fine Assoc. v. Serota, 273 A.D.2d 375, 376;  Wallice v Waterpointe at Oakdale Shores, 249 A.D.2d 383;  Schuckman Realty v. Marine Midland Bank, 244 A.D.2d 400).   The plaintiff must then “establish, inter alia, that it procured a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy the subject property on the terms set by the [defendants]” (Crifasi Real Estate, Inc. v. Harv Enters., Inc., 60 AD3d 802, 802-803;  see Kaelin v. Warner, 27 N.Y.2d 352, 355;  Hampton Country Real Estate v. Rizzo, 305 A.D.2d 458).  “[I]t [is] settled that ‘mere agreement as to price on a proposed sale of real property does not constitute a meeting of the minds of vendor and vendee so as to entitle the real estate broker to commissions.   The parties must be brought to agreement with respect to all terms customarily encountered in such a transaction’ ” (Kaelin v. Warner, 27 N.Y.2d at 355, quoting Matter of Altz, 274 App.Div. 894, 894, affd 300 N.Y. 607;  see Hausman Realty Co. v. Klaver, 262 A.D.2d 613;  Harold F. Shepherd Real Estate v Ferguson, 204 A.D.2d 392).

The defendants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that the plaintiff was not authorized by the defendants to be the defendants' real estate broker but, instead, was the prospective buyer's real estate broker (see Julien J. Studley, Inc. v. New York News, 70 N.Y.2d at 629;  Steven Fine Assoc. v. Serota, 273 A.D.2d at 376;  Wallice v Waterpointe at Oakdale Shores, 249 A.D.2d 383;  Schuckman Realty v. Marine Midland Bank, 244 A.D.2d 400).   The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition.

In any event, the defendants also made a prima facie showing of their entitlement to judgment as matter of law by establishing that there was no meeting of the minds with respect to all terms customarily encountered in a real estate transaction (see Kaelin v. Warner, 27 N.Y.2d at 355-356;  Hampton Country Real Estate v. Rizzo, 305 A.D.2d 458;  Jacob v. O'Brien, 252 A.D.2d 515).   In opposition to the defendant's prima facie showing in this regard, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Kaelin v. Warner, 27 N.Y.2d 352;  Hampton Country Real Estate v. Rizzo, 305 A.D.2d 458;  Jacob v. O'Brien, 252 A.D.2d 515).

The defendants also met their burden on the summary judgment motion by submitting sufficient evidence that the plaintiff did not produce a buyer that was “ready, willing and able” to proceed with the transaction (Taibi v. American Banknote Co., 135 A.D.2d 810, 810;  see Brenhouse v. Shah Realty Corp., 271 A.D.2d 468).   In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

MASTRO, J.P., FISHER, ROMAN and SGROI, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Matthew G. Kiernan

Clerk of the Court