IN RE: DARNELL C. (Anonymous) (2009)

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Elkins, J.), dated June 18, 2008, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated May 1, 2008, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and theft of services, and acts which constituted the crime of possession of a weapon by a person under sixteen, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent, and placed him in the custody of the Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 12 months.

ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant in the custody of the Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 12 months is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements, as the placement has expired pursuant to its terms (see Matter of Joseph R., 49 A.D.3d 651, 852 N.Y.S.2d 805);  and it is further,

ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Presentment Agency (see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and committed acts constituting the crime of possession of a weapon by a person under sixteen (see Penal Law §§ 265.03[3], 265.02 [3];  § 265.05).   Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Hasan C., 59 A.D.3d 617, 873 N.Y.S.2d 709;  Matter of Victor I., 57 A.D.3d 779, 868 N.Y.S.2d 897;  cf. CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the trier of fact's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Daniel R., 51 A.D.3d 933, 933-934, 856 N.Y.S.2d 876;  cf. People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053, cert. denied 542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828;  People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).   Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determination was not against the weight of the evidence (see Family Ct. Act § 342.2[2];  cf. People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 644-645, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).

Specifically, with respect to criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court properly applied the so-called “automobile presumption” (see Penal Law § 265.15[3];  Matter of Jonathan V., 55 A.D.3d 273, 278, 865 N.Y.S.2d 44;  Matter of Tamara E., 19 A.D.3d 489, 490, 798 N.Y.S.2d 447;  People v. O'Brien, 212 A.D.2d 741, 742, 622 N.Y.S.2d 782;  People v. Hines, 173 A.D.2d 730, 730-731, 570 N.Y.S.2d 613).   There is no merit to the appellant's contention that the Presentment Agency did not offer any evidence that he had knowledge of the weapon's defacement and, thus, failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (Penal Law § 265.02[3] ).   Pursuant to Penal Law § 265.15(5), “[t]he possession by any person of a defaced ․ firearm ․ is presumptive evidence that such person defaced the same” (Penal Law § 265.15[5];  see Matter of Gregory M., 184 A.D.2d 252, 585 N.Y.S.2d 193, affd. 82 N.Y.2d 588, 606 N.Y.S.2d 579, 627 N.E.2d 500).

The appellant's remaining contention is unpreserved for appellate review, and we decline to review it in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.