LAMPKIN v. CHAN (2009)

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Satterfield, J.), entered June 22, 2009, which denied her motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability is granted.

A rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on “that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision” (Klopchin v. Masri, 45 A.D.3d 737, 737, 846 N.Y.S.2d 311; see Niyazov v. Bradford, 13 A.D.3d 501, 501-502, 786 N.Y.S.2d 582; Russ v. Investech Sec., 6 A.D.3d 602, 775 N.Y.S.2d 867). Here, the plaintiff made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment by submitting evidence that she was stopped in traffic when her vehicle was struck in the rear by the defendants' vehicle, causing her vehicle to collide with the vehicle in front of her (see Piltser v. Donna Lee Mgt. Corp., 29 A.D.3d 973, 974, 816 N.Y.S.2d 543; Espinoza v. Diaz, 280 A.D.2d 639, 720 N.Y.S.2d 841). In opposition, the defendants failed to come forward with sufficient evidence to rebut the inference of negligence and to raise a triable issue of fact (see Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 563, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718; Gomez v. Sammy's Transp., Inc., 19 A.D.3d 544, 544, 798 N.Y.S.2d 84; Rainford v. Sung S. Han, 18 A.D.3d 638, 639, 795 N.Y.S.2d 645). The defendants interposed only an affirmation of their attorney who lacked knowledge of the facts (see Gomez v. Sammy's Transp., Inc., 19 A.D.3d 544, 798 N.Y.S.2d 84). The defendants' claim that the plaintiff made a sudden stop in heavy traffic, standing alone, under the circumstances of this case, was insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence (see Lundy v. Llatin, 51 A.D.3d 877, 877-878, 858 N.Y.S.2d 341; Campbell v. City of Yonkers, 37 A.D.3d 750, 751, 833 N.Y.S.2d 101; Emil Norsic & Son, Inc. v. L.P. Transp., Inc., 30 A.D.3d 368, 368-369, 815 N.Y.S.2d 736; Neidereger v. Misuraca, 27 A.D.3d 537, 538, 811 N.Y.S.2d 758; Leal v. Wolff, 224 A.D.2d 392, 638 N.Y.S.2d 110).

Furthermore, in view of the fact that the defendants had personal knowledge of the relevant facts underlying the accident, their purported need to conduct discovery did not warrant denial of the motion (see Emil Norsic & Son, Inc. v. L.P. Transp., Inc., 30 A.D.3d at 369, 815 N.Y.S.2d 736; Rainford v. Sung S. Han, 18 A.D.3d 638, 639, 795 N.Y.S.2d 645; Niyazov v. Bradford, 13 A.D.3d at 502, 786 N.Y.S.2d 582).

Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability should have been granted.