PEOPLE v. BRYSON (2009)

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Mullen, J.), rendered June 23, 2006, convicting him of murder in the second degree (two counts), burglary in the first degree (two counts), and assault in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

In the early morning hours of April 27, 2004, the defendant and two friends kicked in the door to the home of the first victim, in Central Islip, demanding money and drugs.   The first victim was sleeping in the bedroom with his four-month old son and the child's mother, while the second victim was watching television in the living room with a friend.

The intruders wore bandannas covering the bottoms of their faces and were armed with a baseball bat, a knife, and a nonworking gun.   The victims were beaten and stabbed as they resisted the intruders.   The intruders fled in a car driven by Wanda Santalis, the defendant's sometime girlfriend.   The first victim died from his injuries before he arrived at the hospital.

On a tip from an incarcerated drug dealer the following year, the defendant Ronald Bryson and codefendants William Brewster, Stanley Williams, and Santalis were arrested.

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.   Independent evidence sufficiently corroborated the accomplice testimony which Santalis provided at trial (see CPL 60.22[1];  People v. Demolaire, 55 A.D.3d 621, 622, 865 N.Y.S.2d 625;  People v. Montefusco, 44 A.D.3d 879, 880-881, 843 N.Y.S.2d 671;  People v. Reyes, 204 A.D.2d 361, 611 N.Y.S.2d 563).   The trial court properly admitted Santalis' prior consistent statements after defense counsel effectively challenged her testimony as a recent fabrication (see People v. McClean, 69 N.Y.2d 426, 428, 515 N.Y.S.2d 428, 508 N.E.2d 140;  People v. Herrera, 16 A.D.3d 699, 700, 794 N.Y.S.2d 57;  People v. King, 293 A.D.2d 759, 741 N.Y.S.2d 442), as such statements were made prior to Santalis' alleged motive to fabricate testimony (see People v. McClean, 69 N.Y.2d at 429-430, 515 N.Y.S.2d 428, 508 N.E.2d 140;  People v. Wright, 62 A.D.3d 916, 878 N.Y.S.2d 788).

 In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053, cert. denied 542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828;  People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).   Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902, affd. 7 N.Y.3d 911, 828 N.Y.S.2d 274, 861 N.E.2d 89).

The defendant's contention that he was denied his right to be present at all stages of trial and was denied the effective assistance of counsel in connection with the jury's request for a conference with the court is without merit (cf. People v. Harris, 76 N.Y.2d 810, 812, 559 N.Y.S.2d 966, 559 N.E.2d 660;  People v. Torres, 72 N.Y.2d 1007, 1009, 534 N.Y.S.2d 914, 531 N.E.2d 635).   Viewing the record in its totality, we find that the defendant was afforded meaningful representation (see People v. Caban, 5 N.Y.3d 143, 152, 800 N.Y.S.2d 70, 833 N.E.2d 213;  People v. Demolaire, 55 A.D.3d 621, 621-622, 865 N.Y.S.2d 625;  People v. Valath, 56 A.D.3d 578, 867 N.Y.S.2d 186).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Valath, 56 A.D.3d 578, 867 N.Y.S.2d 186;  People v. Demolaire, 55 A.D.3d 621, 865 N.Y.S.2d 625;  People v. Stanley, 50 A.D.3d 1066, 856 N.Y.S.2d 221;  People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).

The defendant's contention that he was denied due process of law based on the court's refusal to declare a mistrial is without merit.   Additionally, notwithstanding the defendant's failure to preserve his objection to the court's subsequent instruction to the jury for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ), the contention that the instruction was coercive also is without merit (see People v. Applewhite, 50 A.D.3d 1046, 1047, 856 N.Y.S.2d 230;  People v. Auguste, 294 A.D.2d 371, 372, 741 N.Y.S.2d 700;  People v. Johnson, 224 A.D.2d 635, 639 N.Y.S.2d 407).