MASJID USMAN INC v. BEECH 140 LLC (2009)

In an action, inter alia, for injunctive relief, the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Weiss, J.), dated October 16, 2008, as granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction to the extent of enjoining them from interfering with the plaintiff's leasehold interest in the subject premises during the pendency of the action, and set an undertaking in the sum of only $1,800 pursuant to CPLR 6312(b).

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

“The decision to grant a preliminary injunction is a matter ordinarily committed to the sound discretion of the court hearing the motion” (Nelson, L.P. v. Jannace, 248 A.D.2d 448, 448-449, 668 N.Y.S.2d 936; see Doe v. Axelrod, 73 N.Y.2d 748, 750, 536 N.Y.S.2d 44, 532 N.E.2d 1272; Automated Waste Disposal, Inc. v. Mid-Hudson Waste, Inc., 50 A.D.3d 1072, 1073, 857 N.Y.S.2d 648). Moreover, “ ‘[i]n the absence of unusual or compelling circumstances, [the] court[s][are] reluctant to disturb said determination’ “ (Borenstein v. Rochel Props., 176 A.D.2d 171, 172, 574 N.Y.S.2d 192, quoting After Six v. 201 E. 66th St. Assn., 87 A.D.2d 153, 155, 450 N.Y.S.2d 793). In order to demonstrate entitlement to a preliminary injunction, the movant must establish (1) a probability of success on the merits, (2) the danger of irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief, and (3) a balance of the equities in favor of the movant (see Matter of Advanced Digital Sec. Solutions, Inc. v. Samsung Techwin Co., Ltd., 53 A.D.3d 612, 613, 862 N.Y.S.2d 551; Montauk-Star Is. Realty Group v. Deep Sea Yacht & Racquet Club, 111 A.D.2d 909, 910, 491 N.Y.S.2d 32). A court evaluating a motion for a preliminary injunction must be mindful that “[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo, not to determine the ultimate rights of the parties” (Matter of Wheaton/TMW Fourth Ave., LP v. New York City Dept. of Bldgs., 65 A.D.3d 1051, 1052, 886 N.Y.S.2d 41; see Coinmach Corp. v. Alley Pond Owners Corp., 25 A.D.3d 642, 643, 808 N.Y.S.2d 418).

Contrary to the defendants' contentions, consideration of the foregoing factors supports the Supreme Court's issuance of the preliminary injunction in this case. The plaintiff sustained its burden of establishing a likelihood of success on the merits by its submission of documentary evidence suggesting that its use of the subject premises was lawful and in accordance with the terms of the lease. In this regard, the plaintiff was entitled to a reduced degree of proof with respect to this issue, since the denial of a preliminary injunction in this case would disturb the status quo and likely render the final judgment ineffectual (see North Fork Preserve, Inc. v. Kaplan, 31 A.D.3d 403, 406, 819 N.Y.S.2d 53; State of New York v. City of New York, 275 A.D.2d 740, 741, 713 N.Y.S.2d 360; Gramercy Co. v. Benenson, 223 A.D.2d 497, 498, 637 N.Y.S.2d 383). Furthermore, the imminent threat of the plaintiff's loss of a valuable, long-term leasehold interest in the absence of an injunction satisfied the irreparable harm requirement for a preliminary injunction (see Chrysler Realty Corp. v. Urban Inv. Corp., 100 A.D.2d 921, 923, 474 N.Y.S.2d 805). A balance of the equities likewise favors the granting of preliminary injunctive relief to maintain the status quo pending the resolution of the action (see e.g. S.P.Q.R. Co., Inc. v. United Rockland Stairs, Inc., 57 AD3d 642, 643; Jiggetts v. Perales, 202 A.D.2d 341, 342, 609 N.Y.S.2d 222).

Finally, the court did not improvidently exercise its broad discretion (see Griffin v. 70 Portman Rd. Realty, Inc., 47 A.D.3d 883, 884, 850 N.Y.S.2d 603) in fixing the amount of the mandatory undertaking to be posted by the plaintiff pursuant to CPLR 6312(b).