BOADNARAINE v. White Glove Placement, Inc., appellant. (2009)

In a consolidated action, inter alia, to recover damages for negligent hiring, the defendant White Glove Placement, Inc., appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kerrigan, J.), entered December 18, 2008, as denied that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action asserted against it alleging negligent hiring.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the appellant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action asserted against it alleging negligent hiring is granted.

On September 6, 2005, the plaintiff, Parbatie Boadnaraine, while a patient at the defendant Queens Hospital Center, allegedly was sexually assaulted by the defendant Jacob Onanuga. At the time, Onanuga was a New York State-licensed, registered nurse, employed by the appellant White Glove Placement, Inc. (hereinafter White Glove), and was assigned by White Glove to work at the defendant Queens Hospital Center.

The Supreme Court denied that branch of White Glove's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action asserted against it, alleging negligent hiring, holding that White Glove failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. We reverse.

White Glove established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that it “acted with reasonable care in hiring, retaining and supervising the employee” (Judith M. v. Sisters of Charity Hosp., 93 N.Y.2d 932, 933-934, 693 N.Y.S.2d 67, 715 N.E.2d 95; see Mason v. Ben Roy Das, Inc., 34 A.D.3d 768, 825 N.Y.S.2d 515; Doe v. Whitney, 8 A.D.3d 610, 612, 779 N.Y.S.2d 570). Contrary to the Supreme Court's holding, White glove satisfied its prima facie burden by submitting the affidavit of Carol Abraham, its employment manager, in which she averred that, at the time Onanuga was hired, he was a New York State-licensed, registered nurse, with two favorable references from supervisors from other facilities where he had worked as a nurse.

In opposition to White Glove's prima facie showing, Boadnaraine failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Onanuga was not a New York State-licensed, registered nurse in good standing when he was hired, or that White Glove knew or should have known of any propensity on his part to engage in the conduct resulting in the injury (see Doe v. Whitney, 8 A.D.3d at 612, 779 N.Y.S.2d 570; Mataxas v. North Shore Univ. Hosp., 211 A.D.2d 762, 763, 621 N.Y.S.2d 683). A duty to investigate further into Onanuga's background, or to “institute specific procedures for hiring employees,” may be imposed upon White Glove only if it knew “facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to investigate the prospective employee” (Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d 159, 163, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, cert denied 522 U.S. 967, 118 S.Ct. 413, 139 L.Ed.2d 316; see Mason v. Ben Roy Das, Inc., 34 A.D.3d at 768, 825 N.Y.S.2d 515). Here, no such facts were shown to exist.

Although disclosure was incomplete when White Glove moved for summary judgment, the motion was not premature because Boadnaraine failed to demonstrate that further discovery might lead to relevant evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Dempaire v. City of New York, 61 A.D.3d 816, 817, 877 N.Y.S.2d 224; Lopez v. WS Distrib., Inc. ., 34 A.D.3d 759, 760, 825 N.Y.S.2d 516; David B. v. Millar, 2 A.D.3d 763, 769 N.Y.S.2d 731).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of White Glove's motion which was for summary judgment to dismissing the first cause of action asserted against it, alleging negligent hiring.