IN RE: KEVIN M. (Anonymous) (2009)

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Hunt, J.), dated July 31, 2008, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated July 1, 2008, made after a hearing, finding that appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of menacing in the third degree and attempted assault in the third degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent, and placed him on probation for a period of 15 months with the directive, inter alia, that he perform community service.   The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated July 1, 2008.

ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621;  Matter of Jonathan D., 33 A.D.3d 996, 997, 826 N.Y.S.2d 301;  Matter of Dan H., 26 A.D.3d 438, 808 N.Y.S.2d 907), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of attempted assault in the third degree (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.00[1];  Matter of Alex R., 36 A.D.3d 922, 828 N.Y.S.2d 559;  Matter of Felix D., 30 A.D.3d 598, 818 N.Y.S.2d 142;  Matter of Nikita P., 3 A.D.3d 499, 769 N.Y.S.2d 602), and the crime of menacing in the third degree (see Penal Law § 120.15;  Matter of Denzel F., 44 A.D.3d 389, 843 N.Y.S.2d 60;  Matter of Dwayne H., 173 A.D.2d 466, 570 N.Y.S.2d 89).   Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Hasan C., 59 A.D.3d 617, 873 N.Y.S.2d 709;  Matter of Victor I., 57 A.D.3d 779, 868 N.Y.S.2d 897;  Matter of Tanasia Elanie E., 49 A.D.3d 642, 853 N.Y.S.2d 380;  cf. CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the opportunity of the fact finder to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Daniel R., 51 A.D.3d 933, 933-934, 856 N.Y.S.2d 876;  Matter of Victor I., 57 A.D.3d 779, 868 N.Y.S.2d 897;  Matter of Robert A., 57 A.D.3d 770, 870 N.Y.S.2d 392;  cf. People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053, cert. denied 542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828).   Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determination was not against the weight of the evidence (see Family Ct. Act § 342.2[2];  Matter of Ashanti B., 62 A.D.3d 790, 878 N.Y.S.2d 447;  Matter of Charmaine B., 60 A.D.3d 672, 874 N.Y.S.2d 566;  Matter of Hasan C., 59 A.D.3d 617, 873 N.Y.S.2d 709;  Matter of Victor I., 57 A.D.3d 779, 868 N.Y.S.2d 897).   In this regard, we particularly note that the evidence credited by the Family Court disproved the appellant's defense of justification beyond a reasonable doubt (see Penal Law § 35.15 [1];  Matter of Louis C., 38 A.D.3d 541, 830 N.Y.S.2d 518;  Matter of Rosario S., 18 A.D.3d 563, 795 N.Y.S.2d 79;  Matter of Javier F., 16 A.D.3d 290, 791 N.Y.S.2d 419).