INFINITY CONSULTING GROUP INC v. TOWN OF HUNTINGTON (2008)

In an action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that the one-acre residential zoning classification of the plaintiff's property is invalid because it does not comply with a comprehensive plan, the defendant appeals from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Hudson, J.), entered December 4, 2006, as, after a nonjury trial, declared that the one-acre residential zoning classification of the plaintiff's property is invalid and directed it to rezone the property, and the plaintiff cross-appeals from so much of the same judgment as denied its claim for damages pursuant to 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1988.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, and it is declared that the one-acre residential zoning classification of the plaintiff's property is valid;  and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as cross-appealed from;  and it is further,

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant.

 The plaintiff owns approximately one acre of residentially-zoned property improved by a one-family house on the northwest corner of Gwynne Road and Route 110 in the Town of Huntington.   The property has been zoned for residential use since 1947.   The Town Planning Board adopted comprehensive plans in or about 1965 and 1993.   The 1993 plan designated that the front of the subject property abutting Route 110 to a depth of 250 feet be zoned commercial and that the rear of the property remain residential.   However, the subject property was never rezoned to reflect the plan's recommendation.   By deed dated September 8, 2000, the plaintiff took title to the subject property with the intention of using it as an office for an accounting firm and a licensed chiropractor.   The plaintiff then applied to the Town Board to have the entire property rezoned for commercial use.   The plaintiff did not seek judicial review of the denial of the application.   Instead, it commenced this action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring the residential zoning of its property invalid as (1) inconsistent with the Town's comprehensive zoning plan, or (2) a violation of equal protection of the law.   After a nonjury trial, the Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff's claim that the residential zoning of the property was invalid as inconsistent with the Town's comprehensive plan.   We disagree.

 Town Law § 272-a(11) provides that where, as here, a town has adopted a formal comprehensive plan, the town's zoning decisions must be consistent with that plan.   Compliance with the statutory requirement is measured, however, in light of the long-standing principle that one who challenges such a legislative act bears a heavy burden (see Matter of Town of Bedford v. Village of Mount Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 186, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129, 306 N.E.2d 155).  “ ‘If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control’ ” (Shepard v. Village of Skaneateles, 300 N.Y. 115, 118, 89 N.E.2d 619, quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303;  see De Sena v. Gulde, 24 A.D.2d 165, 169, 265 N.Y.S.2d 239).   Thus, when a plaintiff fails to establish a clear conflict with the comprehensive plan, the zoning classification must be upheld (see Taylor v. Incorporated Vil. of Head of Harbor, 104 A.D.2d 642, 644-645, 480 N.Y.S.2d 21;  Blumberg v. City of Yonkers, 41 A.D.2d 300, 306-308, 341 N.Y.S.2d 977).   Zoning decisions must be consonant with a total planning strategy, reflecting consideration of the needs of the community (see Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 469, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 235 N.E.2d 897).  “What is mandated is that there be comprehensiveness of planning, rather than special interest, irrational ad hocery.   The obligation is support of comprehensive planning, not slavish servitude to any particular comprehensive plan” (Matter of Town of Bedford v. Village of Mount Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d at 188, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129, 306 N.E.2d 155).

In this case, the subject property is bordered to the north by a one-acre residential lot, and to its immediate west is a series of 13 residential properties along Gwynne Road.   In effect, the property is situated at the entrance to a residential neighborhood from a commercial roadway, and more importantly, the only access to the property is at the corner of a residential street.   There is no entrance to the property from the Route 110 commercial roadway.   Viewed in this light, the Town Board's decision to deviate from the comprehensive plan and not to rezone the entire property for commercial use was justified and had a rational basis (cf. Osiecki v. Town of Huntington, 170 A.D.2d 490, 565 N.Y.S.2d 564).   The Board's determination tends to promote the public interest in that there are legitimate concerns that rezoning the property for commercial use will have a negative effect on traffic congestion and the residential character of Gwynne Road (see Tilles Inv. Co. v. Town of Huntington, 74 N.Y.2d 885, 888, 547 N.Y.S.2d 835, 547 N.E.2d 90, affg. 137 A.D.2d 118, 528 N.Y.S.2d 386;  Stevens v. Town of Huntington, 20 N.Y.2d 352, 355, 283 N.Y.S.2d 16, 229 N.E.2d 591).

The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.