IN RE: TERRANCE D. (Anonymous) (2007)

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Bogacz, J.), dated May 9, 2006, which, inter alia, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated March 27, 2006, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree and petit larceny, adjudicated him a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation under the supervision of the Probation Department of the County of Queens for a period of 12 months.   The appeal brings up for review the denial of that branch of the appellant's omnibus motion which was to sever his case from that of his corespondent and the fact-finding order dated March 27, 2006.

ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant on probation under the supervision of the Probation Department of the County of Queens for a period of 12 months is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements, as the period of placement has expired;  and it is further,

ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.

 The appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant on probation under the supervision of the Probation Department of the County of Queens for a period of 12 months has been rendered academic, as the period of placement has expired (see Matter of Ricky A., 11 A.D.3d 532, 532-533, 782 N.Y.S.2d 855;  Matter of Rosalis D., 305 A.D.2d 407, 758 N.Y.S.2d 535).   However, because there may be collateral consequences resulting from the adjudication of delinquency, that portion of the appeal which brings up for review the fact-finding order is not academic (see Matter of Ricky A., 11 A.D.3d at 533, 782 N.Y.S.2d 855;  Matter of Ejiro A., 268 A.D.2d 428, 701 N.Y.S.2d 622).

 Contrary to the appellant's contention, under the circumstances of this case, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of his motion which was to sever his case from that of his corespondent (see Matter of Antoine L., 248 A.D.2d 472, 473, 668 N.Y.S.2d 925;  Matter of Michael J., 117 A.D.2d 602, 603, 498 N.Y.S.2d 68;  Matter of Barry G., 4 Misc.3d 1015(A), 2004 WL 1852893;  Family Ct. Act § 311.3;  cf. People v. Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d 61, 69, 495 N.Y.S.2d 14, 485 N.E.2d 221;  People v. Bornholdt, 33 N.Y.2d 75, 87, 350 N.Y.S.2d 369, 305 N.E.2d 461;  CPL 200.40).   The appellant's argument that the Family Court was influenced by certain noncompetent evidence in arriving at its fact-finding determination is without merit.   The Family Court, sitting as the trier of fact, is presumed to have disregarded the irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, and considered only the competent evidence in reaching its verdict (cf. People v. Moreno, 70 N.Y.2d 403, 406, 521 N.Y.S.2d 663, 516 N.E.2d 200;  People v. Pettiford, 28 A.D.3d 687, 687-688, 812 N.Y.S.2d 371;  People v. Palmer, 300 A.D.2d 412, 413, 751 N.Y.S.2d 748).

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621;  cf. People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree and petit larceny.   Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power (cf. 470.15[5] ), we find that the Family Court's fact-finding determination was not against the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Bryan C., 23 A.D.3d 652, 805 N.Y.S.2d 105;  Matter of James B., 262 A.D.2d 480, 481, 692 N.Y.S.2d 417).