FORD v. GUISHARD (2001)

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Marian Guishard appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Glover, J.), dated February 13, 2001, which denied her motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly denied the appellant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her.   The appellant failed to rebut the presumption that her vehicle was being operated with her consent at the time of the accident (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 [1];  Leotta v. Plessinger, 8 N.Y.2d 449, 461, 209 N.Y.S.2d 304, 171 N.E.2d 454;  Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 205 A.D.2d 857, 858-859, 613 N.Y.S.2d 295;  Stewart v. Town of Hempstead, 204 A.D.2d 431, 611 N.Y.S.2d 909;  Bruno v. Privilegi, 148 A.D.2d 652, 539 N.Y.S.2d 403).   The appellant's submissions in support of her motion for summary judgment raise a triable issue of fact as to whether she had imposed a restriction of use of her vehicle when she allegedly entrusted it to her grandson for repair (see, Abdullah v. Husbands, 265 A.D.2d 435, 696 N.Y.S.2d 518;  Lipetz v. Palmer, 216 A.D.2d 367, 628 N.Y.S.2d 180;  Walls v. Zuvic, 113 A.D.2d 936, 493 N.Y.S.2d 628;  cf., Jackson v. Brown & Kleinhenz, 273 N.Y. 365, 368-369, 7 N.E.2d 265;  Fili v. Matson Motors, 183 A.D.2d 324, 590 N.Y.S.2d 961;  Brindley v. Krizsan, 18 A.D.2d 971, 238 N.Y.S.2d 260, affd. 13 N.Y.2d 976, 244 N.Y.S.2d 779, 194 N.E.2d 688).