IN RE: Luis VERAS (2008)

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Donohue, J.), entered March 12, 2008 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denying petitioner's request for parole release.

In 1988, petitioner was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree, manslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree after he shot a woman to death and shot at her male companion while petitioner was intoxicated.   He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 16 2/323 to 40 years in prison for these crimes.   In February 2007, petitioner made his third appearance before the Board of Parole for parole release.   At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board denied his request and ordered him held for an additional 24 months.   Petitioner's administrative appeal was never decided and he commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding.   Following joinder of issue, Supreme Court dismissed the petition.   This appeal ensued.

 We affirm.   Initially, it is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will be upheld as long as they comply with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of DeLagarde v. New York State Div. of Parole, 23 A.D.3d 876, 876, 803 N.Y.S.2d 820 [2005];  Matter of Mendez v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 20 A.D.3d 742, 743, 797 N.Y.S.2d 782 [2005] ).   The record here discloses that the Board considered the relevant statutory factors, including the seriousness of petitioner's crimes, his lack of criminal record, his program accomplishments and his postrelease plans, in denying his request for parole release.   Although the Board did not specifically mention the sentencing minutes that referenced the fact that petitioner experienced blackouts when he was drinking, the record reveals that the minutes were properly before the Board.   We note that the Board was not required to give equal weight to or specifically articulate each factor considered in making its decision (see Matter of Stasinski v. Travis, 18 A.D.3d 1106, 1107, 795 N.Y.S.2d 404 [2005], lv. denied 5 N.Y.3d 707, 801 N.Y.S.2d 801, 835 N.E.2d 661 [2005];  Matter of Gamez v. Dennison, 18 A.D.3d 1099, 1099, 795 N.Y.S.2d 397 [2005];  Matter of De La Cruz v. Travis, 10 A.D.3d 789, 789, 781 N.Y.S.2d 798 [2004] ).

 Moreover, while the Board's transcribed disposition mistakenly referenced one of petitioner's convictions to be for murder in the second degree, its written disposition correctly noted that the subject conviction was for attempted murder in the second degree.   Consequently, the Board's decision was not based upon erroneous information requiring annulment (see Matter of Baez v. Dennison, 25 A.D.3d 1052, 1053, 807 N.Y.S.2d 485 [2006], lv. denied 6 N.Y.3d 713, 816 N.Y.S.2d 749, 849 N.E.2d 972 [2006];  Matter of Parmes v. Travis, 17 A.D.3d 885, 886, 792 N.Y.S.2d 881 [2005] ).   We have considered petitioner's remaining contentions and find them to be unavailing.   Inasmuch as the Board's decision does not evince “ ‘irrationality bordering on impropriety’ ” (Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982, 405 N.E.2d 225 [1980] ), we decline to disturb it.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.