Learn About the Law
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
IN RE: Giustina T. SCHIANO, appellant, v. Jeffrey HIRSCH, respondent.
In a support proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the mother appeals from so much of an order of the Family Court, Nassau County (Ayres, J.), dated August 5, 2004, as denied her objection to so much of an order of the same court (Bannon, S.M.), dated June 2, 2004, as, in effect, denied that branch of her petition which was to enforce the provision of the parties' separation agreement dated December 22, 1989, that was incorporated but not merged into the judgment of divorce dated April 26, 1990, obligating the father to pay the college expenses of the parties' child.
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the objection is sustained, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Nassau County, for a determination as to the amount of the father's obligation to pay the college expenses of the parties' child, including any arrears.
When interpreting a contract, such as a separation agreement, the court should arrive at a construction that will give fair meaning to all of the language employed by the parties to reach a practical interpretation of the expressions of the parties so that their reasonable expectations will be realized (see Fetner v. Fetner, 293 A.D.2d 645, 741 N.Y.S.2d 256). Where the intention of the parties is clearly and unambiguously set forth, effect must be given to the intent as indicated by the language used (see Fetner v. Fetner, supra ). Here, the parties' separation agreement dated December 22, 1989, clearly and unambiguously required the father to pay “all reasonable expenses” of the child's college education “for so long as the child evidences a desire and reasonable qualification to pursue a college education, on an undergraduate level, and on a full-time basis,” which was the case here. Further, no reasonable construction of the agreement would result in a conclusion that this obligation terminated on the child's 18th birthday.
In light of the foregoing, the mother's remaining contentions need not be reached.
A free source of state and federal court opinions, state laws, and the United States Code. For more information about the legal concepts addressed by these cases and statutes visit FindLaw's Learn About the Law.
Decided: October 03, 2005
Court: Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)
Harness the power of our directory with your own profile. Select the button below to sign up.
Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy.
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)