IN RE: Gwendolyn KNIGHTNER (2000)

In a proceeding for leave to serve a late notice of claim pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e(5), the petitioners appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Taylor, J.), dated September 17, 1998, which denied their application.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

 The determination of whether to grant an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim is left to the sound discretion of the court (see, Matter of Sverdlin v. City of New York, 229 A.D.2d 544, 545, 645 N.Y.S.2d 843;  Matter of Gallino v. Village of Shoreham, 222 A.D.2d 506, 634 N.Y.S.2d 550;  Matter of Rudisel v. City of New York, 217 A.D.2d 702, 630 N.Y.S.2d 259).   Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the petitioners' application.   The infancy of the injured petitioner, standing alone, did not compel the granting of an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim (see, Matter of Bischert v. County of Westchester, 212 A.D.2d 529, 622 N.Y.S.2d 308).   The petitioners failed to establish any nexus between the eight-month delay and the infancy of the injured petitioner which would excuse the delay, and the other excuses for the delay offered by the petitioners were insufficient (see, Matter of Salter v. Housing Auth. of the City of N.Y., 251 A.D.2d 585, 586, 674 N.Y.S.2d 758;  Matter of Bischert v. County of Westchester, supra;  cf., Henry v. City of New York, 94 N.Y.2d 275, 702 N.Y.S.2d 580, 724 N.E.2d 372).

Contrary to the petitioners' contentions, the respondents did not have actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within ninety days or a reasonable time thereafter, and the delay prejudiced the respondents' ability to maintain their defense on the merits (see, Rudisel v. City of New York, supra;  Carbone v. Town of Brookhaven, 176 A.D.2d 778, 575 N.Y.S.2d 105).

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.