Learn About the Law
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
IN RE: Vincente DEARMAS, Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE, Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Torraca, J.), entered August 13, 1998 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, granted respondent's motion to dismiss the petition as, inter alia, time barred.
Petitioner, a prison inmate, was arrested in April 1994 following his February 1993 release to parole supervision. He later pleaded guilty in October 1995 to the charges arising from this arrest. On December 1, 1995, respondent declared petitioner delinquent as a result of the April 1994 arrest and informed him that his sentence was to be recalculated and a new maximum expiration date set in accordance with this final declaration of delinquency. The recalculation itself was performed on December 4, 1995. Subsequently, in November 1997, petitioner wrote to respondent complaining that his sentence had been improperly recalculated. Respondent rejected petitioner's complaint in a November 20, 1997 letter. Thereafter, by petition sworn to February 6, 1998, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the recalculation of his sentence. Petitioner, however, failed to satisfy the service requirements set forth in an order to show cause signed on February 13, 1998 and an amended order to show cause signed on March 19, 1998. Upon respondent's motion, Supreme Court, inter alia, dismissed the petition as barred by the four-month Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 217. This appeal ensued.
We affirm. Even aside from petitioner's difficulties in properly effecting service, we note that petitioner does not dispute that he was notified of the recalculation in December 1995, over two years before he commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding. It is well settled that the Statute of Limitations period begins to run from the point the inmate receives notice of the adverse determination and not from the date of its issuance (see, Matter of Biondo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 N.Y.2d 832, 834, 470 N.Y.S.2d 130, 458 N.E.2d 371; Matter of Warburton v. Department of Correctional Servs., 251 A.D.2d 831, 674 N.Y.S.2d 481). Inasmuch as the proceeding was not commenced within two years of petitioner's receipt of notice, Supreme Court properly dismissed it as untimely. Petitioner's remaining arguments have been examined and found to be unpersuasive.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
MEMORANDUM DECISION.
A free source of state and federal court opinions, state laws, and the United States Code. For more information about the legal concepts addressed by these cases and statutes visit FindLaw's Learn About the Law.
Decided: July 15, 1999
Court: Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)
Harness the power of our directory with your own profile. Select the button below to sign up.
Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy.
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)