71 PIERREPONT ASSOCIATES v. 71 PIERREPONT CORP (1997)

In an action to recover damages for tortious interference with business relations and abuse of process, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schneier, J.), dated July 15, 1996, which denied their separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the motions for summary judgment are granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

 “To make out a claim for tortious interference with business relationships, a plaintiff must show that the defendant interfered with the plaintiff's business relationships either with the sole purpose of harming the plaintiff, or by means that were unlawful or improper” (Nassau Diagnostic Imaging & Radiation Oncology Assocs. v. Winthrop-Univ. Hosp., 197 A.D.2d 563, 563-564, 602 N.Y.S.2d 650;  see also, Guard-Life Corp. v. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 183, 428 N.Y.S.2d 628, 406 N.E.2d 445;  EDP Hosp. Computer Sys. v. Bronx-Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., 212 A.D.2d 570, 622 N.Y.S.2d 557;  Jurlique, Inc. v. Austral Biolab Pty., 187 A.D.2d 637, 590 N.Y.S.2d 235).   Furthermore, in order to prove the tort of abuse of process a plaintiff must demonstrate, inter alia, “an intent to do harm without excuse or justification, and * * * use of the process in a perverted manner to obtain a collateral objective” (Curiano v. Suozzi, 63 N.Y.2d 113, 116, 480 N.Y.S.2d 466, 469 N.E.2d 1324;  see also, Board of Educ. of Farmingdale Union Free School Dist. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Assn., Local 1889, AFT AFL-CIO, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 403, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 343 N.E.2d 278).

 There is no showing that the defendants' previous legal action, which attempted to set aside the plaintiff's deed to the subject property, was motivated by anything other than legitimate economic self-interest, and accordingly, it cannot be characterized as malicious or without justification.   Therefore, in order to defeat the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendants' prior action was improper, unlawful, or constituted “use of process in a perverted manner” (Curiano v. Suozzi, supra;  see, Guard-Life Corp. v. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., supra).   The plaintiff's conclusory allegations in this regard were insufficient, and thus there is no genuine issue of fact to preclude the granting of summary judgment to the defendants (see, Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718;  Alvord & Swift v. Muller Constr. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 276, 413 N.Y.S.2d 309, 385 N.E.2d 1238;  Nassau Diagnostic Imaging & Radiation Oncology Assocs. v. Winthrop-Univ. Hosp., supra).

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.