DEPASQUALE v. STATEN ISLAND UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In a consolidated action to recover damages for medical malpractice, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Judith N. McMahon, J.), dated July 27, 2020.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the motion of the defendants Staten Island University Hospital, North Shore–LIJ Network, Inc., and Shailraj Parikh which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Staten Island University Hospital.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiffs commenced separate actions, which were later consolidated, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice against, among others, the defendant Staten Island University Hospital (hereinafter the hospital).  The hospital, certain of its employees, and certain independent attending physicians treated the plaintiff Estelle DePasquale after she presented to the hospital's emergency department with abdominal pain and underwent two separate surgical procedures.  The plaintiffs alleged, in relevant part, that the hospital, certain of its employees, and the independent attending physicians who treated DePasquale failed to properly monitor her postoperatively and discharged her while she was exhibiting symptoms of an infection, leading to additional hospitalizations and medical procedures.  Following the completion of discovery, the hospital and the defendants North Shore–LIJ Network, Inc., and Shailraj Parikh (hereinafter collectively with the hospital, the defendants) moved, among other things, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the hospital.  In an order dated July 27, 2020, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted that branch of the motion.  The plaintiffs appeal.

“ ‘A defendant moving for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action must demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact with respect to at least one of the elements of a cause of action alleging medical malpractice:  (1) whether the physician deviated or departed from accepted community standards of practice, or (2) [whether] such a departure was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries’ ” (Balgobind v. Long Is. Jewish Med. Ctr., 218 A.D.3d 428, 429, 193 N.Y.S.3d 93 [citation and internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Russell v. Garafalo, 189 A.D.3d 1100, 1101, 136 N.Y.S.3d 317).  “ ‘Once a defendant has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to the elements on which the defendant met the prima facie burden’ ” (id., quoting Piazza v. NYU Hosps. Ctr., 208 A.D.3d 525, 526, 173 N.Y.S.3d 293).

“While ‘[s]ummary judgment is [generally] not appropriate in a medical malpractice action where the parties adduce conflicting medical expert opinions, as [s]uch credibility issues can only be resolved by a jury’ (Smith v. Sommer, 189 A.D.3d 906, 907, 137 N.Y.S.3d 99), ‘expert opinions that are conclusory, speculative, or unsupported by the record are insufficient to raise triable issues of fact’ ” (Elstein v. Hammer, 192 A.D.3d 1075, 1077, 145 N.Y.S.3d 572 [citations omitted], quoting Wagner v. Parker, 172 A.D.3d 954, 955, 100 N.Y.S.3d 280).  “ ‘In order not to be considered speculative or conclusory, expert opinions in opposition should address specific assertions made by the movant's experts, setting forth an explanation of the reasoning and relying on specifically cited evidence in the record’ ” (id., quoting Tsitrin v. New York Community Hosp., 154 A.D.3d 994, 996, 62 N.Y.S.3d 506).

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that there were no departures from the accepted standard of care in the treatment received by DePasquale, thereby demonstrating the hospital's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it (see Corujo v. Caputo, 224 A.D.3d 729, 731, 205 N.Y.S.3d 174;  Wijesinghe v. Buena Vida Corp., 210 A.D.3d 824, 826, 178 N.Y.S.3d 184).  In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.  The plaintiffs’ expert affirmation did not specifically cite evidence in the record and failed to address specific opinions offered by the defendants’ experts.  The plaintiffs’ expert affirmation was thus speculative, conclusory, and insufficient to defeat that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the hospital (see Corujo v. Caputo, 224 A.D.3d at 732, 205 N.Y.S.3d 174;  Getselevich v. Ornstein, 219 A.D.3d 1493, 1495, 196 N.Y.S.3d 515;  Elstein v. Hammer, 192 A.D.3d at 1079, 145 N.Y.S.3d 572).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion.

In light of our determination, we need not reach the plaintiffs’ remaining contention.

CHAMBERS, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, LANDICINO and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.