IN RE: Akeem SMITH (2025)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (William Little, J.), entered November 21, 2024 in Albany County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, granted respondents’ motion to dismiss the petition/complaint.

Petitioner was convicted of numerous offenses in 1999 and sentenced, as modified on appeal, to serve a total of 25 years to life in prison (see People v. Smith, 288 A.D.2d 244, 732 N.Y.S.2d 571 [2d Dept. 2001], lv denied 97 N.Y.2d 761, 742 N.Y.S.2d 622, 769 N.E.2d 368 [2002]).  At his initial appearance before respondent Board of Parole in November 2022, he was granted parole with an open release date of March 13, 2023.  After a review by respondent Department of Corrections and Community Supervision revealed that petitioner had been erroneously credited for jail time and was not actually eligible for parole release until October 23, 2023, the Board rescinded his parole release and scheduled a new initial appearance for June 2023.  Petitioner's attempts to obtain administrative relief were unavailing, prompting him to commence this combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action in January 2024 seeking to, among other things, prohibit respondents from implementing the rescission of parole release and obtain a declaration as to whether the recalculation of his release date was valid.  In lieu of serving an answer, respondents moved to dismiss the petition/complaint as moot given petitioner's release to parole supervision on October 23, 2023.  Supreme Court granted the motion, and petitioner appeals.

We affirm.  Petitioner's claims relate to the calculation of his parole eligibility date and the rescission of his March 2023 parole release and, contrary to his assertion, neither have any impact upon his future entitlement to a discharge from parole supervision because such depends upon his being “on unrevoked community supervision for at least three consecutive years” regardless of when the supervision potentially could have commenced (Executive Law § 259–j [1]).  We accordingly agree with Supreme Court that petitioner's release to parole supervision rendered his claims moot (see generally Matter of Mills v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 224 A.D.3d 1025, 1028 n. 4, 206 N.Y.S.3d 191 [3d Dept. 2024], lv dismissed & denied 41 N.Y.3d 1015, 213 N.Y.S.3d 756, 237 N.E.3d 822 [2024];  Matter of Franco v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1150, 1151, 66 N.Y.S.3d 923 [3d Dept. 2018];  Matter of Burgos v. Goord, 246 A.D.2d 833, 833, 666 N.Y.S.2d 967 [3d Dept. 1998], lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 814, 676 N.Y.S.2d 127, 698 N.E.2d 956 [1998]).  Supreme Court was “unpersuaded by petitioner's contention that this matter falls within the exception to the mootness doctrine,” and so are we (Matter of Waters v. Central Off. Review Comm. of the Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 142 A.D.3d 1204, 1204, 37 N.Y.S.3d 469 [3d Dept. 2016];  see Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714–715, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d 876 [1980]).

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Garry, P.J., Pritzker, Ceresia, Powers and Mackey, JJ., concur.