PEOPLE v. DENNIS (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Stephen Braslow, J.), rendered January 7, 2021, convicting her of manslaughter in the first degree, upon her plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant entered a plea of guilty to manslaughter in the first degree.  Prior to sentencing, the defendant, in effect, made a pro se motion to withdraw her plea of guilty and for the assignment of new counsel.  The County Court denied the defendant's motion, without a hearing, and imposed sentence.

“A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty rests within the sound discretion of the court, and generally the court's determination will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of the court's discretion” (People v. Roberts, 210 A.D.3d 1014, 1014, 179 N.Y.S.3d 150 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see CPL 220.60[3];  People v. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d 482, 485, 743 N.Y.S.2d 45, 769 N.E.2d 802).  “Generally, a plea of guilty may not be withdrawn absent some evidence of innocence, fraud, or mistake in its inducement” (People v. Jackson, 170 A.D.3d 1040, 1040, 96 N.Y.S.3d 330 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v. Corines, 204 A.D.3d 827, 828, 166 N.Y.S.3d 260;  People v. Rodriguez, 142 A.D.3d 1189, 1190, 38 N.Y.S.3d 224).  “When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea, the nature and extent of the fact-finding inquiry ‘rest[s] largely in the discretion of the Judge to whom the motion is made’ and a hearing will be granted only in rare instances” (People v. Brown, 14 N.Y.3d 113, 116, 897 N.Y.S.2d 674, 924 N.E.2d 782, quoting People v. Tinsley, 35 N.Y.2d 926, 927, 365 N.Y.S.2d 161, 324 N.E.2d 544;  see People v. Kazimer, 210 A.D.3d 1109, 1110, 178 N.Y.S.3d 780).

Here, the County Court providently exercised its discretion in denying, without a hearing, that branch of the defendant's motion which was to withdraw her plea of guilty.  Reviewing the record as a whole and the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea (see People v. Sougou, 26 N.Y.3d 1052, 1055, 23 N.Y.S.3d 121, 44 N.E.3d 196), we conclude that the defendant's plea of guilty was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made (see People v. Kazimer, 210 A.D.3d at 1110, 178 N.Y.S.3d 780;  People v. Hollman, 197 A.D.3d 484, 484–485, 151 N.Y.S.3d 158).  The defendant's assertions in support of that branch of her motion which was to withdraw her plea of guilty were unsubstantiated and contradicted by the record of the plea proceeding (see People v. Harrison, 235 A.D.3d 996, 997, 226 N.Y.S.3d 614;  People v. Caruso, 88 A.D.3d 809, 810, 930 N.Y.S.2d 668).

Moreover, the County Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the defendant's motion which was for the assignment of new counsel.  “The right of an indigent criminal defendant to the services of a court-appointed lawyer does not encompass a right to appointment of successive lawyers at defendant's option” (People v. Washington, 25 N.Y.3d 1091, 1095, 13 N.Y.S.3d 343, 34 N.E.3d 853 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v. Graham, 188 A.D.3d 909, 909, 135 N.Y.S.3d 410).  “Rather, a defendant may be entitled to new counsel only ‘upon showing good cause for a substitution, such as a conflict of interest or other irreconcilable conflict with counsel’ ” (People v. Fredericks, 43 N.Y.3d 551, 557, 238 N.Y.S.3d 133, 264 N.E.3d 1264 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v. Washington, 25 N.Y.3d at 1095, 13 N.Y.S.3d 343, 34 N.E.3d 853).  “A trial court's duty to consider substitution arises only where [the] defendant makes a seemingly serious request” (People v. Milonovich, 215 A.D.3d 764, 765, 185 N.Y.S.3d 713 [internal quotation marks omitted]).  A request is seemingly serious if it contains “specific factual allegations of serious complaints about counsel” (People v. English, 201 A.D.3d 733, 734, 156 N.Y.S.3d 885 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Here, the defendant's motion contained no specific allegation that indicated a serious complaint about the representation that she received.  Further, contrary to the defendant's contention, she was not deprived of the right to conflict-free representation, as defense counsel did not adversely express an opinion as to the merits of the defendant's motion, and therefore, the appointment of a new attorney to represent the defendant on that motion was not required (see People v. Harrison, 235 A.D.3d at 998, 226 N.Y.S.3d 614;  People v. Edwards, 223 A.D.3d 840, 841, 203 N.Y.S.3d 710).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).

The contentions raised by the defendant in her pro se supplemental brief regarding the grand jury proceeding and the County Court's alleged failure to consider certain documents are based on matter dehors the record and, therefore, cannot be addressed on direct appeal (see People v. Petion, 186 A.D.3d 1410, 1411, 129 N.Y.S.3d 529;  People v. Flores, 151 A.D.3d 740, 741, 53 N.Y.S.3d 556).

The defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit.

CHAMBERS, J.P., WOOTEN, VENTURA and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.