Learn About the Law
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Anthony DALTO, Plaintiff, v. 3660 PARK WANTAGH OWNERS, INC., Defendant Third-Party Plaintiff, et al., Defendants; Wesley D. Ford, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant, John Martino, Third-Party Defendant-Respondent, et al., Third-Party Defendant. (and other actions)
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the third-party defendant Wesley D. Ford appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Lockman, J.), dated April 8, 1999, as denied his motion, in effect, to vacate the automatic dismissal of his claims against the third-party defendant John Martino and to restore the case to the trial calendar.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
By letter dated September 27, 1994, the former attorney for the third-party defendant-appellant, Wesley D. Ford, informed the court that the subject action had been settled except for claims against the third-party defendant-respondent, John Martino, and that the parties consented to have the case removed from the trial calendar. No action was taken to restore it to the trial calendar and, consequently, as of September 26, 1995, it was dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3404.
To vacate a dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3404, a litigant must show a reasonable excuse for the delay, a lack of prejudice to the adversary, a meritorious cause of action, and a lack of intent to abandon (see, Aguilera v. 366 Hewes St. Assocs., 265 A.D.2d 436, 696 N.Y.S.2d 851; Fico v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater New York, 248 A.D.2d 432, 669 N.Y.S.2d 380). Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in concluding that the appellant failed to offer a reasonable excuse for the 3 1/212 year delay in seeking to resume prosecution of his claims against the respondent and failed to rebut the presumption of abandonment.
While we recognize the distinction between a case removed from the calendar on consent, as here, and one which is stricken from the calendar without consent, the circumstances of the consensual removal of a case from the trial calendar is only a factor for the court to consider when determining whether the case should be restored and is not, in and of itself, dispositive of the motion (see, Escobar v. Deepdale Gen. Hosp., 172 A.D.2d 486, 487, 567 N.Y.S.2d 842; Nicolich v. Fitzgerald, 259 A.D.2d 741, 687 N.Y.S.2d 418).
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
Thank you for your feedback!
As the largest network of trusted legal brands, we help firms build authority across the platforms consumers and AI systems rely on most. Our network helps attorneys strengthen visibility, credibility, and preference where legal decisions begin.
Decided: August 07, 2000
Court: Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)
Harness the power of our directory with your own profile. Select the button below to sign up.
Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy.
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)