PEOPLE v. MERALUNA (2022)

On April 20, 2022, defendant, Ivanyeli Meraluna, was arraigned on the indictment with two counts of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree (P.L. §§ 265.03[1][b] and [3]), one count of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree (P.L. § 265.01[2]), one count of Reckless Endangerment in the Second Degree (P.L. § 120.20), one count of Unlawful Fleeing a Police Officer in a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree (P.L. § 270.25), one count of Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree (P.L. § 195.05), and one count of Reckless Driving (V.T.L. § 1212).

In a Decision and Order dated July 27, 2022, this Court dismissed count six of the indictment, Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree. Additionally, this Court granted a Mapp/Dunaway hearing. This Court presided over the hearing on October 20, 2022 and November 1, 2022. The People called one witness, Police Officer Christian Martinez of the 111th Precinct. Defendant did not call any witnesses. This Court finds the officer's testimony credible and makes the below findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Findings of Fact

Officer Martinez has been employed by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) for approximately five years. He has been assigned to the 111th Precinct for approximately a year and a half and was assigned to the 63rd Precinct prior to that. On February 11, 2022, the officer was working from 3:00 p.m. to 11:35 p.m. with his partner, Officer Rawlins. They were assigned to patrol in a marked police car, where Officer Martinez was the passenger. At approximately 6:35 p.m., the officers responded to a radio run of a burglary in progress. The information received in the radio run included two males entering the rear of 56-05 215th Street in Queens County. The radio run did not mention a white Explorer being involved. The officers arrived at that residential location approximately two minutes after receiving the radio run.

Upon arriving at the location, Officer Martinez did not see the two males or anyone else. There were parked cars on the street. Officer Rawlins parked the patrol car in front of a white Ford Explorer. The white Ford Explorer was parked approximately 15 feet from the location of the burglary. The house being burglarized was the first house on the block. Officer Martinez could not see who was inside the Explorer because it was “blacked out” (H. 12).¹ The windows were completely tinted that the officer could not see anything inside the car. When Officer Martinez first parked in front of that car, he and his partner did not have any discussion concerning the Explorer. Officer Martinez “thought nothing of it up until [he] got out of the vehicle ․” (H. 12).

When Officer Martinez and his partner got out of the car and took two steps, the Explorer “backed out abruptly as two other patrol cars were also getting on scene” (H. 12). Officer Martinez also described the car “reversing out” suddenly (H. 60). In explaining what he meant by “reversing out” suddenly, Officer Martinez stated that the driver “reversed back onto ․ either 56th or 58th Avenue. When it reversed, it did an angle out of the block and then it went eastbound and then it turned onto Bell Boulevard” (H. 60). Essentially, Officer Martinez testified that the car reversed and then went forward.

Officer Martinez and his partner got back in their car and proceeded to follow the Explorer. At that point, Officer Martinez believed that the Explorer was connected to the burglary because “why would it back out so suddenly?” (H. 59). Other patrol cars joined the pursuit.

Officer Martinez observed the Explorer turn northbound onto Bell Boulevard and thereafter the car went onto a grassy patch on a median dividing the north and south bound lanes. Initially, the officer was able to trap the Explorer in the grassy patch area. Officers from a different sector got out of their car and ordered the driver of the Explorer to stop and get out; however, the Explorer was able to maneuver itself away from the police and it continued to travel on side streets before it turned right onto eastbound on Northern Boulevard. During this pursuit, Officer Martinez's patrol car's light and sirens were on. Officer Martinez observed the Explorer speeding between 35-40 miles per hour in a 25 miles per hour zone and it ran through stop signs and red lights. Additionally, the Explorer was swerving around vehicles on the road.

As the police approached the Cross Island Parkway, the Explorer ran a red light at 223rd Street. Thereafter, a “pedestrian vehicle” struck a patrol car that was in front of the Explorer, and then the Explorer came to a stop after it struck that patrol car (H. 14). Officer Martinez got out of his car and opened the right rear of the passenger door and ordered the driver, later identified as defendant, to get down on the ground. No one else was in the car with defendant. Defendant was immediately arrested and transported to the 111th Precinct. Officer Martinez's body camera captured the events as they unfolded from approximately 90 seconds after when he first arrived at the location of the burglary in progress. See People's Exhibit 4.

Approximately four hours later, defendant's car was towed back to the precinct's parking lot. During those four hours, officers had safeguarded the Explorer before it was towed to the precinct. While at the precinct, Officer Martinez learned that the Explorer was a stolen vehicle that was involved in a previous crime. Officer Martinez conducted an inventory search of the Explorer. Prior to that search, Officer Martinez had conducted two to three other inventory searches. He received on-the-job training in conducting inventory searches. In conducting the inventory search of defendant's car, Officer Martinez followed the procedures contained in section 218-13 of the NYPD patrol guide, which was admitted in evidence as People's Exhibit 1.

During the inventory search, Officer Martinez recovered clothes, a kitchen knife and a black satchel. The satchel, which was found in the rear seat of the third row, contained a loaded gun with 10 rounds of ammunition. See People's Exhibit 2: four photographs depicting the satchel, firearm, magazine and ammunition. Thereafter, Officer Martinez notified the evidence collection team. The officer then vouchered all the items recovered from the car. See People's Exhibit 3A-N. The inventory search was captured on Officer Martinez's body camera. See People's Exhibit 4.

Conclusions of Law

Mapp/Dunaway

Defendant argues the firearm, magazine, ammunition and all the other items vouchered by Officer Martinez should be suppressed as the recovery of these items was precipitated by unlawful police conduct. Specifically, defendant contends that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that she was engaged in criminal activity and therefore, the pursuit of her car was unlawful.

The People assert that the police were justified in their pursuit of defendant's car after she fled from the scene of a burglary in progress. They contend that the police had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot when the Explorer abruptly backed out and fled the location of the burglary.

The initial burden of proof at a suppression hearing rests with the People to establish law enforcement acted properly and legally under the circumstances. People v. Baldwin, 25 NY2d 66, 70 (1969). A defendant who challenges the legality of a search and seizure has the burden of proving illegality. However, the People always retain the burden of going forward to show the legality of the police conduct in the first instance. People v. Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367 (1971).

The stop of a motor vehicle constitutes a seizure, and an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate criminal activity when he has a reasonable suspicion that its occupants have been engaged, or are about to engage in conduct in violation of the law. People v. May, 81 NY2d 725 (1992). Reasonable suspicion requires the police to be able to articulate specific facts justifying the intrusion, and, of course, mere “[v]ague or unparticularized hunches will not suffice” for this purpose. People v. Kirby, 124 AD2d 67, 70 (2d Dept. 1987), quoting People v. Cantor, 36 NY2d 106, 113 (1975). Absent reasonable suspicion, the stop constitutes an impermissible seizure of the vehicle's occupants, and any evidence seized as a result must be suppressed.

Here, the People failed to meet their burden in showing that the police conduct was lawful. Officer Martinez testified that he pursued defendant's car because he believed that defendant's car was involved in the burglary that he was investigating because the car “reversed out” suddenly after he got out of his patrol car and took two steps (H. 60). However, in describing how defendant's car reversed suddenly, Officer Martinez testified that the car reversed, made an angle out of the block and drove forward. There was no testimony that Officer Martinez had prior experience in making arrests for burglary that involved a driver of a vehicle serving as a look-out. He never testified that he believed that the driver of the Explorer served as a look-out for the two males involved in the burglary. There was also no testimony that the burglary involved a white Ford Explorer or that the two males involved in the burglary were inside the Explorer. To the contrary, Officer Martinez testified that the radio run did not include information relating to a white Explorer and that he did not see anyone inside the Explorer, let alone the two males described in the radio run. Up until the time when the Explorer reversed, the officers did not have any reason to believe that the Explorer was connected to the burglary in progress.

Officer Martinez testified that he believed the Explorer was connected to the burglary when it reversed after he and his partner got out of the patrol car, because “why would it back out so suddenly” (H. 59). This explanation, of course, does not provide Officer Martinez with reasonable suspicion to believe that the occupant of the Explorer was engaged or about to engage in criminal activity. Simply put, the officer failed to articulate specific facts justifying the stop of defendant's car. At most, the officer had a “vague or unparticularized hunch” that the Explorer was involved in the burglary. Other than this hunch, the police had no information whatsoever tending to connect the Explorer to the burglary. This hunch, however, does not suffice in establishing reasonable suspicion. See Kirby, 124 AD2d at 70.

Since the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's car, all the items seized during the inventory search are suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to suppress the physical evidence is granted.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Numbers preceded by an “H.” refer to the hearing minutes.

Frances Y. Wang, J.