ROBLES v. Queens Borough Public Library, appellant. (2008)

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Queens Borough Public Library appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Flaherty, J.), entered January 28, 2008, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured when she slipped and fell on a patch of ice located on the public sidewalk adjacent to the building occupied by the defendant Queens Borough Public Library (hereinafter the defendant).   The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.   We affirm.

 In slip-and-fall cases on snow or ice, the general rule is that an “owner or lessee of property abutting a public sidewalk is under no duty to remove ice and snow that naturally accumulates upon the sidewalk unless a statute or ordinance specifically imposes tort liability for failing to do so” (Bruzzo v. County of Nassau, 50 A.D.3d 720, 721, 854 N.Y.S.2d 774;  see Klotz v. City of New York, 9 A.D.3d 392, 393, 781 N.Y.S.2d 357;  Archer v. City of New York, 300 A.D.2d 518, 519, 752 N.Y.S.2d 698).   While Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210 imposes tort liability on certain parties for, inter alia, negligent failure to remove snow and ice, that statute did not go into effect until September 14, 2003, and is not applicable here (see Bisontt v. Rockaway One Co., LLC, 47 A.D.3d 862, 863, 850 N.Y.S.2d 621;  Crudo v. City of New York, 42 A.D.3d 479, 480, 839 N.Y.S.2d 232;  Klotz v. City of New York, 9 A.D.3d at 393, 781 N.Y.S.2d 357).

 In the absence of a statute or ordinance, an owner or lessee of property abutting a public sidewalk may be held liable where it “undertook snow and ice removal efforts which made the naturally-occurring conditions more hazardous” (Bruzzo v. County of Nassau, 50 A.D.3d at 721, 854 N.Y.S.2d 774;  see Bisontt v. Rockaway One Co., LLC, 47 A.D.3d at 863, 850 N.Y.S.2d 621;  Reynolds v. Gendron, 28 A.D.3d 735, 736, 812 N.Y.S.2d 898;  Artis v. City of New York, 24 A.D.3d 477, 478, 808 N.Y.S.2d 291;  Amendolace v. City of New York, 2 A.D.3d 659, 768 N.Y.S.2d 642;  Lopez v. City of New York, 290 A.D.2d 539, 539-540, 736 N.Y.S.2d 628).   Here, the defendant failed to establish as a matter of law that it did not, in fact, undertake efforts to clear the sidewalk and that its snow removal activities did not create or exacerbate the icy condition which allegedly caused the plaintiff to fall (see Petrocelli v. Marrelli Dev. Corp., 31 A.D.3d 623, 624, 817 N.Y.S.2d 913;  Artis v. City of New York, 24 A.D.3d 477, 478, 808 N.Y.S.2d 291;  Legoff v. 34th St. Partnership, 305 A.D.2d 552, 759 N.Y.S.2d 393;  Lopez v. City of New York, 290 A.D.2d at 540, 736 N.Y.S.2d 628).   Since the defendant failed to satisfy its prima facie burden of establishing its entitlement to summary judgment, the plaintiff's opposition papers need not be considered (see Kouros v. Mendez, 41 A.D.3d 786, 787-788, 838 N.Y.S.2d 669;  Legoff v. 34th St. Partnership, Inc., 305 A.D.2d at 552-553, 759 N.Y.S.2d 393).

The defendant's remaining contentions either are without merit or have been rendered academic by our determination.