Diana Davis, Plaintiff, v. Abdugani Rakhimjonov, Michael A. Taylor, Shawn A. Goddard, Vincent Moy, and Suen Wai Wong, Defendants. (2023)

The following numbered papers were read on this motion:

Submitted by Defendant Abdugani Rakhimjonov

NYSCEF Doc No. 135: Notice of Motion

NYSCEF Doc No. 136: Affirmation of John McEvoy, Esq. in Support

NYSCEF Doc No. 137: Exhibit A — Summons and Complaint

NYSCEF Doc No. 138: Exhibit B — Answer of Shawn A. Goddard

NYSCEF Doc No. 139: Exhibit C — Answer of Vincent Moy and Suen Wai Wong

NYSCEF Doc No. 140: Exhibit D — Answer of Abdugani Rakhimjonov

NYSCEF Doc No. 141: Exhibit E — Answer of Michael A. Taylor

NYSCEF Doc No. 142: Exhibit F — Abdugani Rakhimjonov's EBT Transcript

NYSCEF Doc No. 143: Exhibit G — Police Report

NYSCEF Doc No. 144: Exhibit H — Plaintiff's EBT Transcript

NYSCEF Doc No. 145: Exhibit I — Shawn A. Goddard's EBT Transcript

NYSCEF Doc No. 146: Exhibit J —Vincent Moy's EBT Transcript

NYSCEF Doc No. 147: Statement of Material Facts

NYSCEF Doc No. 148: Statement of Authorization for Electronic Filing

Submitted by Defendant Michael A. Taylor

NYSCEF Doc No. 154: Counter-Statement of Material Facts

NYSCEF Doc No. 155: Affirmation of Nancy Goodman, Esq. in Opposition

Submitted by Defendant Abdugani Rakhimjonov

NYSCEF Doc No. 157: Reply Affirmation of John McEvoy

Upon the foregoing papers and having heard oral argument on the record from appearing counsel, the within motion is determined as follows.

Background

This action arises from an incident that occurred on August 12, 2018, wherein five vehicles were involved in a motor vehicle accident on the eastbound upper lane of the Manhattan Bridge. Defendant Abdugani Rakhimjonov ("Defendant Rakhimjonov") headed a chain collision when his vehicle was struck from behind by a vehicle operated by Plaintiff Diana Davis ("Plaintiff Davis"). Plaintiff Davis's vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle operated by Co-Defendant Michael A. Taylor ("Co-Defendant Taylor"), which was struck from behind by a vehicle operated by Co-Defendant Shawn A. Goddard ("Co-Defendant Goddard"), which was rear-ended by a vehicle operated by Co-Defendant Vincent Moy ("Co-Defendant Moy") and owned by Co-Defendant Suen Wai Wong. (See NYSCEF Doc No. 136 ¶ 3, 22; NYSCEF Doc No. 147 ¶¶ 1-3; NYSCEF Doc No. 154 ¶¶ 1-3.)

This action was commenced by Plaintiff Davis by service of a summons and complaint to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained during the August 12, 2018 motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff Davis claimed that Defendant Rakhimjonov and the other Defendants should be held liable for the accident. Specifically, Plaintiff Davis alleged that Defendant Rakhimjonov "was reckless, careless and negligent in maintenance [and] control of his vehicle; and in failing to keep his vehicle under proper control, in failing to observe the traffic and roadway conditions; in traveling [at] an excessive and unsafe rate of speed; [and] in failing to properly steer the vehicle and use the brakes" (NYSCEF Doc No. 137 ¶ 16). In answer, Co-Defendants Goddard and Taylor filed cross-claims against Defendant Rakhimjonov, arguing that if Plaintiff Davis's negligence was not the sole cause of her alleged injuries, Defendant Rakhimjonov's negligence was a significant contributing factor (see NYSCEF Doc No. 138 at 5; NYSCEF Doc No. 141 ¶ Fifteenth).

Defendant Rakhimjonov has moved for an order granting him summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212, dismissing all claims and cross-claims as against him on the basis that he bears no responsibility for this motor vehicle accident, and for such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper (see NYSCEF Doc No. 135). Co-Defendant Taylor submitted written opposition to the motion (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 154-155), and a review of the record reveals that no other parties have filed papers regarding the motion.

Contentions

Defendant Rakhimjonov argues that summary judgment should be awarded to him, asserting that there are no triable issues of fact and that he is not negligent as a matter of law. Defendant claims traffic was heavy on the Manhattan Bridge prior to the accident, and that he was stopped in stop-and-go traffic at the time of the accident. Hearing no brake sounds or horns before the collision, Defendant Rakhimjonov testified that he felt two or three impacts to the rear of his car (see NYSCEF Doc No. 142 at 18).

Defendant Rakhimjonov asserts that "a party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law when they submit evidence that they were struck from behind by another involved vehicle, thereby requiring the rear driver to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a non-negligent explanation for the collision" (NYSCEF Doc No. 136 ¶ 12). Defendant Rakhimjonov relies on numerous rear-end motor vehicle accident cases establishing this principle, citing to Byrne v Calogero (96 AD3d 707 [2d Dept 2012]); Franco v Breceus (70 AD3d 767 [2d Dept 2010]); Parra v Hughes (79 AD3d 1113 [2d Dept 2010]); Ahmad v Grimaldi (40 AD3d 786 [2d Dept 2007]); and Harrington v Kern (52 AD3d 473 [2d Dept 2008]) (see id.). Additionally, he maintained that the driver of the lead vehicle making a sudden stop is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence against the rear driver in a rear-end accident, citing to Ng v Reid (259 AD2d 601 [2d Dept 1999]) (see id. ¶ 16).

Defendant Rakhimjonov relies on the police accident report concerning the incident, as well as on the depositions of Co-Defendants Davis, Goddard, and Moy, in claiming that he was rear-ended by Plaintiff Davis. The police accident report stated that "Vehicle 1 was struck from behind by Vehicle 2, causing a chain reaction collision. . ." (NYSCEF Doc No. 143). All testimony in the record supports a version of events in which the chain of collisions resulted from the failure of at least one driver behind Defendant Rakhimjonov to stop timely. Plaintiff Davis testified that the impact to the rear of her vehicle by Co-Defendant Taylor caused her collision with the rear of Defendant Rakhimjonov (see NYSCEF Doc No. 144 at 22). Co-Defendant Goddard, whose vehicle was the fourth involved in the accident, testified that an impact to the rear of his vehicle pushed it into Taylor's vehicle (see NYSCEF Doc No. 145 at 25-33). Co-Defendant Moy, the last vehicle in the chain of collision, stated that there was only one impact to the front of his vehicle (see NYSCEF Doc No. 146 at 25-6).¹

Co-Defendant Taylor argues that Defendant Rakhimjonov has not demonstrated prima facie entitlement to summary judgment because the police report (NYSCEF Doc No. 143) relied upon does not constitute admissible evidence, as the police report does not claim that a police officer witnessed the accident, citing to Fox v Walsh (120 AD2d 488 [2d Dept 1986]) (see NYSCEF Doc No. 155 ¶ 3). The Second Department has ruled that police reports are inadmissible as evidence of events that the reporting officer does not claim to have witnessed (see also Hatton v Gassler, 219 AD2d 697 [2d Dept 1995]). However, the issue of the admissibility of the police report is academic since Defendant Rakhimjonov also relies on multiple EBTs, which support his account of being rear-ended.

Co-Defendant Taylor asserts that there are numerous substantial issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. Specifically, Taylor argues that there is a question of fact as to whether Defendant Rakhimjonov made a sudden stop for no apparent reason (see NYSCEF Doc No. 155 ¶¶ 12, 16). This is based on Plaintiff Davis's testimony that Defendant Rakhimjonov made a sudden stop  ² and Defendant Rakhimjonov's testimony that he "only stopped for one second" prior to the accident (see id. ¶ 13; NYSCEF Doc No. 142 at 19; NYSCEF Doc No. 144 at 22). Co-Defendant Taylor asserts that a sudden stop of the vehicle ahead is a legally reasonable cause for rear-ending another vehicle, citing to Power v Hupart (260 AD2d 458 [2d Dept 1999]) (see NYSCEF Doc No. 155 ¶ 15).³

Co-Defendant Taylor also proffers a question of whether or not Defendant Rakhimjonov "acted reasonably in failing to observe the plaintiff's vehicle and take steps to avoid the impact," citing to the latter's deposition testimony that "he didn't see the plaintiff's vehicle at any time prior to the accident" (NYSCEF Doc. No 155 ¶ 17; see NYSCEF Doc No. 142 at 22-23).

Discussion

This Court notes the well-recited principle that summary judgment is a drastic remedy that should be granted only if no triable issues of fact exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361, 364 [1974]). The party moving for summary judgment must present a prima facie case of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence in admissible form demonstrating the absence of material issues of fact, and the failure to make such a showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see CPLR § 3212 [b]; Smalls v AJI Industries, Inc., 10 NY3d 733 [2008]; Alvarez, 68 NY2d at 324). Once a prima facie showing has been made, however, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact that require a trial for resolution or tender an acceptable excuse for the failure to do so; mere expressions of hope are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). If there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable fact, the motion for summary judgment must be denied (see Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223, 231 [1978]).

An alleged short stop by Defendant Rakhimjonov is the only reason proffered to assign liability to him, but a claim that a driver short-stopped, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence attributed to a vehicle that rear-ends another (see Jumandeo v Franks, 56 AD3d 614 [2d Dept 2008]; see also Zdenek v Safety Consultants, Inc., 63 AD3d 918 [2d Dept 2009]; Russ v Investech Sec., Inc., 6 AD3d 602 [2d Dept 2004]). It is established that "vehicle stops which are foreseeable under the prevailing conditions, even if sudden and frequent, must be anticipated by the driver who follows, since he or she is under a duty to maintain a safe distance between his or her car and the car ahead" (Shamah v Richmond County Ambulance Serv., Inc., 279 AD2d 564 [2d Dept 2001]). The cases cited by Co-Defendant Taylor to support the position that a sudden stop alone is enough to rebut the presumption of negligence are the minority in the Second Department. Thus, the question of whether Defendant Rakhimjonov stopped short is immaterial to the outcome of this case. No special circumstances have been presented by Defendant Taylor to show that this Court should depart from the proposition that a rear-end striking of a vehicle in front creates a presumption of negligence.

Additionally, this Court finds that the question of whether Defendant Rakhimjonov exercised reasonable care in avoiding the accident is insufficiently raised by Co-Defendant Taylor to rebut the presumption of negligence on the part of Plaintiff Davis. Taylor claims that "there are questions of facts as to whether [Defendant Rakhimjonov] acted reasonably in failing to observe the plaintiff's vehicle and take steps to avoid the impact," but no specific allegations are made (NYSCEF Doc No. 155 ¶ 17). Co-Defendant Taylor does not, for example, claim that the brake lights on Defendant Rakhimjonov's vehicle were defective at the time of the accident nor make any other specific allegation of failure to exercise reasonable care sufficient to override the presumption of negligence on the part of Plaintiff Davis. Again, this Court emphasizes that Defendant Rakhimjonov was ahead of Plaintiff Davis and his focus would be on what was occurring in front of him, not behind him.

Co-Defendant Taylor, then, fails to sufficiently raise an issue of material fact precluding Defendant Rakhimjonov's entitlement to summary judgment (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557), which the latter established on a prima facie basis (see Smalls, 10 NY3d 733; Alvarez, 68 NY2d 320).

Conclusion

On this motion for summary judgment, Defendant Rakhimjonov sufficiently established his entitlement as a matter of law to summary judgment dismissing all claims and cross-claims against him.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this Court GRANTS Defendant Rakhimjonov's motion for summary judgment, and all claims of negligence against him shall be DISMISSED.

Dated: September 29, 2023

HON. AARON D. MASLOW

Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

FOOTNOTES

1.   It is notable that, based on witness testimony, the chain of collisions appears to have begun with the rearmost collision in the chain. Plaintiff Davis's testimony alone is in Defendant Rakhimjonov's favor to the extent that it establishes that Plaintiff Davis was able to stop safely and that the collision of her vehicle with Defendant Rakhimjonov's was caused by a rear impact.

2.   Co-Defendant Taylor notes that "plaintiff Diana Davis specifically testified that the vehicle operated by defendant Abdugani Rakhimjonov[ ] came to a sudden stop for no apparent reason," citing to page 21 of Plaintiff Davis's EBT testimony (see NYSCEF Doc No. 155 ¶ 13). However, Plaintiff Davis testified only that the lead driver came to a sudden stop, not that the stop was "for no apparent reason" (see NYSCEF Doc No. 144 at 22).

3.   Co-Defendant Taylor also relies on Richards v Manley Driving School, Inc. (27 AD3d 443 [2d Dept 2006]) and Chepel v Meyers (306 AD2d 235 [2d Dept 2003]) to establish this principle (see NYSCEF Doc No. 155 ¶ 23). However, Richards was subject to the "particular facts of the case" wherein the lead vehicle sought damages, not the dismissal of liability claims against him. Additionally, the Second Department noted in Le Grand v Silberstein (123 AD3d 773 [2d Dept 2014]) that while Chepel and similar cases held that a non-negligent explanation for a rear-end collision might be a sudden stop of the lead vehicle, stops which are foreseeable under the prevailing traffic conditions, even if sudden and frequent, must be anticipated by the driver who follows, since he or she is under a duty to maintain a safe distance between his or her car and the car ahead.

Aaron D. Maslow, J.