JP MORGAN CHASE BANK v. Victoria Gotti, a/k/a Victoria Agnello, respondent. (2009)

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Mahon, J.), entered February 5, 2008, as, upon reargument, adhered to its original determination in an order dated October 23, 2007, denying those branches of its motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint and for appointment of a referee to compute the amount due it, and to examine and report whether the mortgaged premises can be sold in one parcel.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, upon reargument, the order dated October 23, 2007, is vacated, and those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint and for appointment of a referee to compute the amount due it, and to examine and report whether the mortgaged premises can be sold in one parcel, are granted.

 The plaintiff established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting a mortgage, the unpaid mortgage note, a Forbearance Agreement executed by both the plaintiff and the defendant Victoria Gotti, a/k/a Victoria Agnello (hereinafter Gotti), which required Gotti to repay the loan in full by February 1, 2006, and an affidavit attesting to Gotti's default (see Daniel Perla Assoc., LP v. 101 Kent Assoc., Inc., 40 A.D.3d 677, 677-678, 836 N.Y.S.2d 630;  Coppa v. Fabozzi, 5 A.D.3d 718, 773 N.Y.S.2d 604;  Chiarelli v. Kotsifos, 5 A.D.3d 345, 346, 772 N.Y.S.2d 531;  EMC Mtge. Corp. v. Riverdale Assoc., 291 A.D.2d 370, 737 N.Y.S.2d 114).   In opposition, Gotti failed to “assert any defenses which could properly raise a viable question of fact as to [the] default” (Federal Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Karastathis, 237 A.D.2d 558, 559, 655 N.Y.S.2d 631;  see Daniel Perla Assocs., 40 A.D.3d at 678, 836 N.Y.S.2d 630;  Chiarelli v. Kotsifos, 5 A.D.3d at 346, 772 N.Y.S.2d 531;  Green Point Sav. Bank v. Spivey, 253 A.D.2d 410, 411, 676 N.Y.S.2d 228).   Contrary to Gotti's contention, the plaintiff's mere acceptance of monthly payments made on the loan subsequent to February 1, 2006, did not operate to extend the Forbearance Agreement, which specifically provided that any remaining sums owed on the loan became due and payable on February 1, 2006, unless the parties agreed in writing to an extension.

 Further, Gotti failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should have been denied pending further discovery.  “The mere hope that further discovery would yield evidence of a triable issue of fact is not a basis for denying summary judgment” (Lee v. T.F. DeMilo Corp., 29 A.D.3d 867, 868, 815 N.Y.S.2d 700;  see Chemical Bank v. PIC Motors Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 1023, 1026, 462 N.Y.S.2d 438, 448 N.E.2d 1349;  Lambert v. Bracco, 18 A.D.3d 619, 620, 795 N.Y.S.2d 662).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have, upon reargument, granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint and for appointment of a referee to compute the amount due to the plaintiff, and to examine and report whether the mortgaged premises can be sold in one parcel.