IN RE: TIRELL R. (Anonymous) (2006)

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (McLeod, J.), dated September 20, 2005, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated June 29, 2005, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, assault in the second degree (two counts), grand larceny in the fourth degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, assault in the third degree, attempted assault in the third degree, and menacing in the third degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him with the Office of Children and Family Services for a period of up to 18 months.   The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated June 29, 2005.

ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621;  Matter of Quanel M., 8 A.D.3d 386, 777 N.Y.S.2d 726), we are satisfied that it was legally sufficient to establish that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes charged.   The evidence that the appellant struck and broke the complainant's jaw, requiring it to be wired shut for six weeks, was sufficient to establish a “serious physical injury” within the meaning of Penal Law § 10.00(10) to uphold the findings relating to robbery in the first degree (see Penal Law § 120.05[1] ) and assault in the second degree (see Penal Law § 160.15[1] ).

 Moreover, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses (see Matter of Jabari W., 18 A.D.3d 767, 797 N.Y.S.2d 755;  Matter of James B., 262 A.D.2d 480, 481, 692 N.Y.S.2d 417).   The determination of a Family Court Judge sitting as trier of fact is to be accorded the same weight as that given to a jury verdict, and its determination should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see Matter of Gabriel A., 12 A.D.3d 666, 667, 785 N.Y.S.2d 512;  Matter of James B., 262 A.D.2d at 481, 692 N.Y.S.2d 417).   Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the Family Court's findings were not against the weight of the evidence (cf.   CPL 470.15 [5] ).

The Family Court considered all of the dispositional alternatives and providently exercised its discretion in deciding that the appropriate disposition was to place the appellant with the Office of Children and Family Services for a period of up to 18 months without credit for the time served before the disposition (see Matter of Katherine W., 62 N.Y.2d 947, 479 N.Y.S.2d 190, 468 N.E.2d 28;  Matter of Henry M., 220 A.D.2d 667, 668, 632 N.Y.S.2d 575;  Matter of Frank C., 211 A.D.2d 596, 597, 621 N.Y.S.2d 876).   The Family Court's determination should therefore not be disturbed.   Moreover, there is no evidence that the Family Court punished the appellant for exercising his right to have a trial (see People v. Goolsby, 213 A.D.2d 722, 722-723, 624 N.Y.S.2d 955).

The appellant's remaining contention is without merit.