PRETTERHOFER v. PRETTERHOFER (2007)

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lebowitz, J.), dated February 17, 2006, which granted the defendant's motion for leave to enter judgment upon the parties' stipulation of settlement of the action to the extent of authorizing the defendant to submit the stipulation to the court so that it could be so-ordered.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

 “[O]pen-court stipulations of settlement are judicially favored, and will not lightly be set aside” (DeGregorio v. Bender, 4 A.D.3d 385, 386, 771 N.Y.S.2d 388;  see Hallock v. State of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 230, 485 N.Y.S.2d 510, 474 N.E.2d 1178).   Such agreements are governed by the law of contracts, and a party will not be relieved of his or her obligations thereunder absent a legally valid basis for invalidating a contract, such as fraud, collusion, mistake or accident (see McCoy v. Feinman, 99 N.Y.2d 295, 302, 755 N.Y.S.2d 693, 785 N.E.2d 714;  Borghoff v. Borghoff, 8 A.D.3d 519, 779 N.Y.S.2d 215;  Lukaszuk v. Lukaszuk, 304 A.D.2d 625, 757 N.Y.S.2d 479;  Bossom v. Bossom, 141 A.D.2d 794, 529 N.Y.S.2d 1022).

 The parties in this case validly entered into a comprehensive open-court stipulation (see CPLR 2104;  Rubenfeld v. Rubenfeld, 279 A.D.2d 153, 720 N.Y.S.2d 29;  Nordgren v. Nordgren, 264 A.D.2d 828, 695 N.Y.S.2d 588;  De Jose v. De Jose, 104 A.D.2d 629, 479 N.Y.S.2d 1004, affd. 66 N.Y.2d 804, 497 N.Y.S.2d 907, 488 N.E.2d 837;  Harrington v. Harrington, 103 A.D.2d 356, 479 N.Y.S.2d 1000), by which the plaintiff unequivocally, knowingly, and voluntarily agreed to be bound (see Matter of Suzuki v. Peters, 12 A.D.3d 612, 784 N.Y.S.2d 393;  Natole v. Natole, 256 A.D.2d 558, 682 N.Y.S.2d 864).   The plaintiff's conclusory and unsubstantiated assertions to the contrary were inadequate to render the oral stipulation unenforceable (see DeGregorio v. Bender, supra;  Golfinopoulos v. Golfinopoulos, 144 A.D.2d 537, 534 N.Y.S.2d 407;  Bossom v. Bossom, supra ), as was her subsequent refusal to prepare and execute a written stipulation to the same effect (see Storette v. Storette, 11 A.D.3d 365, 784 N.Y.S.2d 34;  Friedman v. Garey, 8 A.D.3d 129, 779 N.Y.S.2d 44).   Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion to the extent of authorizing him to submit the parties' stipulation to the court so that it could be so-ordered.