IN RE: JAVED K. (Anonymous) (2008)

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Hunt, J.), dated April 8, 2008, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated March 5, 2008, made upon the appellant's admission, finding that he had committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of attempted robbery in the second degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation for a period of 18 months.

ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in finding that he was in need of supervision, adjudicating him a juvenile delinquent, and ordering an 18-month period of probation instead of granting him an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal.   The Family Court has broad discretion in entering dispositional orders (see Matter of Yasin H., 31 A.D.3d 638, 638, 819 N.Y.S.2d 83;  Matter of Jarel S., 282 A.D.2d 681, 723 N.Y.S.2d 693;  Matter of Naiquan T., 265 A.D.2d 331, 696 N.Y.S.2d 79;  Matter of Tristan W., 258 A.D.2d 585, 685 N.Y.S.2d 477;  Family Ct. Act § 141).   The Family Court's determination in entering dispositional orders is entitled to great deference, as it had the opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, and observe their demeanor (see Matter of Yasin H., 31 A.D.3d at 638, 819 N.Y.S.2d 83;  Matter of Stephone M.H., 11 A.D.3d 464, 465, 782 N.Y.S.2d 786;  Matter of Severn J., 250 A.D.2d 682, 683, 672 N.Y.S.2d 894).   Here, the record demonstrates that the Family Court did “consider the needs and best interests of the [appellant] as well as the need for protection of the community,” and that the Family Court ordered “the least restrictive available alternative” which was consistent with such needs and interests (Family Ct. Act § 352.2[2][a] ).   The nature of the incident, the recommendation by the Department of Probation, and the appellant's poor school performance and attendance record support the Family Court's determination (see Matter of Erika R., 55 A.D.3d 740, 865 N.Y.S.2d 660;  Matter of Cindy A., 31 A.D.3d 440, 817 N.Y.S.2d 662;  Matter of Gerald W., 12 A.D.3d 522, 784 N.Y.S.2d 626).   Moreover, the appellant was not entitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal merely because this was his first “ brush with the law” (see Matter of Melissa B., 49 A.D.3d 536, 537, 853 N.Y.S.2d 586;  Matter of Michael E., 48 A.D.3d 810, 810, 851 N.Y.S.2d 377;  Matter of Oneil D., 35 A.D.3d 602, 602, 824 N.Y.S.2d 743;  Matter of Yasin H., 31 A.D.3d at 638, 819 N.Y.S.2d 83;  Matter of Isaiah I., 23 A.D.3d 469, 470, 805 N.Y.S.2d 630;  Matter of Gerald W., 12 A.D.3d at 523, 784 N.Y.S.2d 626;  Matter of Nikita P., 3 A.D.3d 499, 501, 769 N.Y.S.2d 602).