IN RE: N.A. S. (2023)

Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Ashley B. Black, J.), entered on or about November 1, 2021, to the extent it brings up for a review a fact-finding order, same court and Judge, entered on or about July 6, 2021, finding that respondent mother neglected the subject child, unanimously affirmed, without costs.  Appeal from fact-finding order, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the order of disposition.

A preponderance of the evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing established that the mother was suffering from mental illness and lacked insight into the need for treatment, and that her mental condition interfered with her judgment and parenting abilities, thus placing the child, who was a year old and totally dependent on her, at imminent risk of physical, mental, or emotional impairment (see Family Court Act § 1046[b][i];  § 1012[f][i][B];  Matter of Karma C. [Tenequa A.], 122 A.D.3d 415, 416, 995 N.Y.S.2d 71 [1st Dept. 2014];  Matter of Yamailiz G. [Yamara R.], 178 A.D.3d 610, 610, 112 N.Y.S.3d 504 [1st Dept. 2019]).

The record shows that the mother exhibited paranoia and delusions;  was hospitalized several times, including once after the amended petition was filed against her;  and discontinued her medication and therapy despite knowing that her therapist did not agree with her “holistic approach” to treatment (see Matter of Shanai W. [Sherry P.], 212 A.D.3d 447, 448, 179 N.Y.S.3d 577 [1st Dept. 2023]).  Furthermore, the record shows that the mother made repeated unfounded allegations of sexual abuse against her family even after a doctor examined the child and found no evidence of abuse, and once insisted that the child was in danger while visiting the father even after the police arrived at the father's home, took photographs of the child, and showed them to her (see Matter of Chance Y. [Danielle Y.], 176 A.D.3d 424, 425, 110 N.Y.S.3d 685 [1st Dept. 2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 911, 2020 WL 1429254 [2020]).  This evidence supports a conclusion that because of her mental illness, the mother did not exercise the minimum degree of care required of a “reasonable and prudent parent” (see Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3 N.Y.3d 357, 370, 787 N.Y.S.2d 196, 820 N.E.2d 840 [2004]);  Matter of Ruth Joanna O.O. [Melissa O.], 149 A.D.3d 32, 39, 49 N.Y.S.3d 374 [1st Dept. 2017], affd 30 N.Y.3d 985, 65 N.Y.S.3d 122, 87 N.E.3d 154 [2017]).

We find no grounds for disturbing the Family Court's credibility determinations (see Matter of Nathaniel T., 67 N.Y.2d 838, 842, 501 N.Y.S.2d 647, 492 N.E.2d 775 [1986];  Matter of Sade B. [Scott M.], 103 A.D.3d 519, 520, 960 N.Y.S.2d 85 [1st Dept. 2013]).

The Family Court did not violate the mother's right to due process by permitting the nonparty respondent father to participate during the hearings in accordance with Family Court Act § 1035.  The transcripts from the proceeding show that the father's participation was limited to the issue of where the child should be placed.  In addition, medical records were properly entered in evidence because the treating therapist's certification and delegation of authority satisfied the requirements of Family Court Act § 1046(a)(iv).

We have considered the mother's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.