ABDELHAY v. 1105 GROUP PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LLC (2022)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiffs appeal and defendant cross-appeals from an order that, inter alia, denied plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability on the Labor Law § 240 (1) and the derivative causes of action and denied that part of defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint with respect to the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action. We affirm.

Fawzi Abdelhay (plaintiff) sustained injuries while performing electrical work on a construction project on defendant's property. Plaintiff's injuries occurred when he fell off of an A-frame ladder after he rested his foot on a shelf in order to reach tape being passed to him through an electrical conduit and the shelf collapsed. Labor Law § 240 (1) provides in relevant part that contractors and owners in the “erection, demolition, repairing, [or] altering ․ of a building or structure shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected ․ ladders ․ and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed.” “ ‘Labor Law § 240 (1) was designed to prevent those types of accidents in which the ․ ladder or other protective device proved inadequate to shield the injured worker from harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person’ ” (Runner v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 N.Y.3d 599, 604, 895 N.Y.S.2d 279, 922 N.E.2d 865 [2009]). The purpose of that section is to protect workers by placing the ultimate responsibility for safety practices on the owner and general contractor, instead of on the workers (see Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 500, 601 N.Y.S.2d 49, 618 N.E.2d 82 [1993]; Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 513, 520, 493 N.Y.S.2d 102, 482 N.E.2d 898 [1985], rearg denied 65 N.Y.2d 1054, 494 N.Y.S.2d 1033, 484 N.E.2d 1055 [1985]). Thus, section 240 (1) imposes absolute liability on owners for any breach of the statutory duty that proximately causes injury (see Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 513, 577 N.Y.S.2d 219, 583 N.E.2d 932 [1991]).

We reject plaintiffs’ contention on their appeal that Supreme Court erred in denying their motion with respect to liability on the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action. To be entitled to summary judgment on a Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action, a plaintiff must establish “ ‘a statutory violation and proximate cause’ ” (Weitzel v. State of New York, 160 A.D.3d 1394, 1394, 75 N.Y.S.3d 713 [4th Dept. 2018]). If the plaintiff meets that burden, “[t]he defendant may ․ defeat [a plaintiff's] entitlement to summary judgment by raising an issue of fact whether the [plaintiff's] own conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident” (id. at 1394-1395, 75 N.Y.S.3d 713). Here, although plaintiffs met their initial burden (see generally Lorenti v. Stickl Constr. Co., Inc., 78 A.D.3d 1598, 1599, 912 N.Y.S.2d 359 [4th Dept. 2010]; Calderon v. Walgreen Co., 72 A.D.3d 1532, 1533, 900 N.Y.S.2d 533 [4th Dept. 2010], appeal dismissed 15 N.Y.3d 900, 912 N.Y.S.2d 568, 938 N.E.2d 1002 [2010]; Williams v. City of Niagara Falls, 43 A.D.3d 1426, 1427, 843 N.Y.S.2d 902 [4th Dept. 2007]), defendant raised an issue of fact whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injuries and in particular whether an adequate safety device, i.e., an extension ladder, was “readily available at the work site and whether plaintiff knew that he was expected to use [the extension ladder] but for no good reason chose not to do so” (Banks v. LPCiminelli, Inc., 125 A.D.3d 1334, 1334-1335, 4 N.Y.S.3d 416 [4th Dept. 2015]).

We also reject defendant's contention on its cross appeal that the court erred in denying its motion with respect to the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action inasmuch as defendant's own submissions raised a triable issue of fact whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident (see generally Biaca-Neto v. Boston Rd. II Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 34 N.Y.3d 1166, 1167-1168, 121 N.Y.S.3d 753, 144 N.E.3d 363 [2020]; Cahill v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 4 N.Y.3d 35, 40, 790 N.Y.S.2d 74, 823 N.E.2d 439 [2004]; Fazekas v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 132 A.D.3d 1401, 1402-1403, 18 N.Y.S.3d 251 [4th Dept. 2015]).