VALENTINE v. Sunshine Quality Construction, Inc., et al., Defendants–Respondents, (2022)

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Donald Miles, J.), entered on or about March 13, 2020, which granted defendants Gary Silver Architects, P.C.’s (GSA) and Sunshine Quality Construction, Inc.’s motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them and denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff, project safety coordinator for nonparty Homeland Safety Consultants (Homeland), commenced this action alleging injuries sustained at a demolition and construction project.  The property was owned by defendant 2147 Second Avenue LLC (Second Ave).  Second Avenue retained GSA to serve as architect of record for the project and third-party defendant Shan Construction, Inc. (Shan Construction) to serve as general contractor.  By contract dated June 22, 2008, Second Avenue hired Sunshine to replace Shan Construction as general contractor.

Liability cannot be imposed upon defendant GSA as the project architect, since there is no evidence that GSA committed an affirmative act of negligence, and there is no provision in its contract creating a clear obligation explicitly running to and for the benefit of the workers (see Walker v. Metro–North Commuter R.R., 11 A.D.3d 339, 341, 783 N.Y.S.2d 362 [1st Dept. 2004];  Ohadi v. Magnetic Constr. Group Corp., 182 A.D.3d 474, 477, 122 N.Y.S.3d 612 [1st Dept. 2020]).  Liability cannot be imposed on Sunshine, which established that it was not on site as a general contractor or manager until after the date of plaintiff's accident.  Sunshine's contract, while signed in June 2008, was silent as to the commencement date.  An affidavit by the project owner's principal stated that Sunshine did not begin its contractual obligations until after plaintiff's accident, and the affidavit was supported by documentary evidence and testimony by Sunshine's principal.  Plaintiff had no knowledge of when Sunshine came onto the project and further testified that he had no knowledge of ever interacting with anyone from that company.

The motion court correctly denied plaintiff summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim, since plaintiff had never properly asserted the claim.  It was not pleaded in any of his complaints.  Plaintiff's assertion of the claim in a supplemental bill of particulars served nearly eight years after the accident does not avail him, since the purpose of a bill of particulars is to amplify pleadings, not add a new theory or cause of action (see Paterra v. Arc Dev. LLC, 136 A.D.3d 474, 24 N.Y.S.3d 631 [1st Dept. 2016];  see also Greenwood v. Whitney Museum of Am. Art, 161 A.D.3d 425, 426, 76 N.Y.S.3d 41 [1st Dept. 2018]).

In light of the foregoing, we need not reach plaintiff's and defendant Second Avenue's remaining arguments for affirmative relief.