PEOPLE v. CLARK (2021)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 265.03 [3]). We affirm.

Defendant contends that County Court erred in refusing to suppress evidence and statements obtained when the police stopped his vehicle and searched him. At the outset, as the People correctly concede, we conclude that defendant did not validly waive his right to appeal and therefore we are not precluded from reviewing his challenge to the suppression ruling (see People v. Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d 545, 565-566, 122 N.Y.S.3d 226, 144 N.E.3d 970 [2019], cert denied ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 2634, 206 L.Ed.2d 512 [2020]; People v. Mitchell, 185 A.D.3d 1410, 1410-1411, 128 N.Y.S.3d 110 [4th Dept. 2020]). We note that the better practice with respect to a waiver of the right to appeal is for the court “to use the Model Colloquy, which neatly synthesizes ․ the governing principles” (People v. Williams, 186 A.D.3d 1112, 1113, 127 N.Y.S.3d 366 [4th Dept. 2020] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see NY Model Colloquies, Waiver of Right to Appeal).

We nevertheless conclude that the court did not err in refusing to suppress the evidence and statements obtained as a result of the challenged vehicle stop because the stop was based on reasonable suspicion that the driver of the vehicle had been involved in criminal activity (see generally People v. Hinshaw, 35 N.Y.3d 427, 431, 132 N.Y.S.3d 90, 156 N.E.3d 812 [2020]; People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 185, 581 N.Y.S.2d 619, 590 N.E.2d 204 [1992]; People v. Black, 48 A.D.3d 1154, 1155, 851 N.Y.S.2d 757 [4th Dept. 2008], lv denied 10 N.Y.3d 859, 860 N.Y.S.2d 486, 890 N.E.2d 249 [2008]). The evidence at the suppression hearing established that a police officer responded to a 911 call broadcast over the radio, reporting that a man had been seen brandishing a gun at a woman near the officer's location. The caller specifically described the gunman's vehicle, the driver and his clothing, the license plate number of the vehicle, its general direction of travel, and the location of the crime.

Within minutes of receiving that radio broadcast, the police officer saw a vehicle, license plate, and driver—i.e., defendant—that matched the description provided by the 911 caller. We conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant had been involved in criminal activity “based on the totality of the circumstances, including a radio transmission providing a general description of the perpetrator[ ] of [the] crime ․ [,] the ․ proximity of the defendant to the site of the crime, the brief period of time between the crime and the discovery of the defendant near the location of the crime, and the [officer's] observation of the defendant, who matched the radio-transmitted description” (People v. Moss, 89 A.D.3d 1526, 1527, 933 N.Y.S.2d 158 [4th Dept. 2011], lv denied 18 N.Y.3d 885, 939 N.Y.S.2d 755, 963 N.E.2d 132 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Pruitt, 158 A.D.3d 1138, 1139, 70 N.Y.S.3d 691 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 1120, 81 N.Y.S.3d 380, 106 N.E.3d 763 [2018]).

Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant's contention that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel survives the guilty plea (see People v. Glowacki, 159 A.D.3d 1585, 1586, 70 N.Y.S.3d 441 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 1117, 81 N.Y.S.3d 377, 106 N.E.3d 760 [2018]; People v. Morris, 94 A.D.3d 1450, 1451, 942 N.Y.S.2d 725 [4th Dept. 2012], lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 976, 950 N.Y.S.2d 358, 973 N.E.2d 768 [2012]), we reject that contention. Specifically, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a line of defense regarding the operability of the gun recovered from defendant. However, because there is evidence in the record supporting the conclusion that the gun was operable (see People v. Habeeb, 177 A.D.3d 1271, 1273, 112 N.Y.S.3d 386 [4th Dept. 2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 1159, 120 N.Y.S.3d 253, 142 N.E.3d 1155 [2020]; People v. Solomon, 78 A.D.3d 1426, 1428, 911 N.Y.S.2d 514 [3d Dept. 2010], lv denied 16 N.Y.3d 899, 926 N.Y.S.2d 35, 949 N.E.2d 983 [2011]; People v. Velez, 278 A.D.2d 53, 53, 718 N.Y.S.2d 25 [1st Dept. 2000], lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 808, 726 N.Y.S.2d 386, 750 N.E.2d 88 [2001]), defendant failed to demonstrate that defense counsel's decision to forego that line of defense was not strategic (see generally People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 712, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584 [1998]). In addition, we conclude that defense counsel was not ineffective in light of the favorable plea deal he obtained for defendant inasmuch as, “[i]n the context of a guilty plea, a defendant has been afforded meaningful representation when he or she receives an advantageous plea and nothing in the record casts doubt on the apparent effectiveness of counsel” (People v. Booth, 158 A.D.3d 1253, 1255, 70 N.Y.S.3d 704 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 1078, 79 N.Y.S.3d 100, 103 N.E.3d 1247 [2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]).