PEOPLE v. CHAPMAN (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20[1]), defendant contends in his main brief that his waiver of the right to appeal is not valid. We reject that contention. The record establishes that, prior to the plea, Supreme Court advised defendant of the maximum sentence that could be imposed (see People v. Lococo, 92 N.Y.2d 825, 827, 677 N.Y.S.2d 57, 699 N.E.2d 416 [1998]); that the court “did not improperly conflate the waiver of the right to appeal with those rights automatically forfeited by a guilty plea” (People v. Tilford, 162 A.D.3d 1569, 1569, 74 N.Y.S.3d 918 (4th Dept. 2018), lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 942, 84 N.Y.S.3d 868, 109 N.E.3d 1168 [2018] [internal quotation marks omitted] ); and that defendant understood that he was waiving his right to appeal both the conviction and the sentence. Thus, we conclude that defendant's waiver of the right to appeal was knowing, voluntary and intelligent (see generally People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 [2006]), and that valid waiver forecloses his challenge in his main brief to the severity of the sentence (see id. at 255, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145; see generally Lococo, 92 N.Y.2d at 827, 677 N.Y.S.2d 57, 699 N.E.2d 416; People v. Hidalgo, 91 N.Y.2d 733, 737, 675 N.Y.S.2d 327, 698 N.E.2d 46 [1998]).

Defendant contends in his pro se supplemental brief that the guilty plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently due to the prosecution's failure to comply with its Brady obligations (see generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 [1963]). “Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant's contention survives his valid waiver of the right to appeal” (People v. Kyler, 96 A.D.3d 1431, 1431, 945 N.Y.S.2d 887 (4th Dept. 2012)), defendant failed to preserve that contention for our review (see People v. Johnson, 60 A.D.3d 1496, 1497, 876 N.Y.S.2d 282 (4th Dept. 2009), lv denied 12 N.Y.3d 926, 884 N.Y.S.2d 707, 912 N.E.2d 1088 [2009]). In any event, we conclude that “there is no support in the record for defendant's contention that the People committed a Brady violation that induced him to plead guilty” (People v. Williams, 170 A.D.3d 1666, 1666, 96 N.Y.S.3d 776 (4th Dept. 2019)).

Defendant further contends in his pro se supplemental brief that the court erred in failing to order a competency hearing sua sponte. That contention survives the plea and the valid waiver of the right to appeal to the extent that it implicates the voluntariness of the plea (see People v. Stoddard, 67 A.D.3d 1055, 1055, 889 N.Y.S.2d 282 (3d Dept. 2009), lv denied 14 N.Y.3d 806, 899 N.Y.S.2d 140, 925 N.E.2d 944 [2010]; People v. Jermain, 56 A.D.3d 1165, 1165, 867 N.Y.S.2d 326 (4th Dept. 2008), lv denied 11 N.Y.3d 926, 874 N.Y.S.2d 11, 902 N.E.2d 445 [2009]), and it need not be preserved for our review (see People v. Henderson, 162 A.D.3d 1507, 1508, 78 N.Y.S.3d 830 (4th Dept. 2018), lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 1004, 86 N.Y.S.3d 762, 111 N.E.3d 1118 [2018]). Nevertheless, we reject defendant's contention. It is well settled that a defendant's “ ‘history of psychiatric illness does not in itself call into question defendant's competence’ to proceed” (People v. Carpenter, 13 A.D.3d 1193, 1194, 786 N.Y.S.2d 683 (4th Dept. 2004), lv denied 4 N.Y.3d 797, 795 N.Y.S.2d 172, 828 N.E.2d 88 [2005], quoting People v. Tortorici, 92 N.Y.2d 757, 765, 686 N.Y.S.2d 346, 709 N.E.2d 87 [1999], cert denied 528 U.S. 834, 120 S.Ct. 94, 145 L.Ed.2d 80 [1999]), and evidence that a defendant is “ ‘emotionally distraught’ when pleading guilty affords no basis to withdraw the plea” (People v. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d 482, 486, 743 N.Y.S.2d 45, 769 N.E.2d 802 [2002]). Here, we conclude that nothing in the plea proceeding established that defendant's mental illness or his attempt at suicide “so stripped him of orientation or cognition that he lacked the capacity to plead guilty” (id.). He “responded appropriately to questioning by the court ․ and was ‘unequivocal in assuring the court that he understood the meaning of the plea proceeding, and the implications of his decision to accept the plea agreement’ ” (People v. Yoho, 24 A.D.3d 1247, 1248, 808 N.Y.S.2d 856 (4th Dept. 2005); see People v. Terry, 90 A.D.3d 1571, 1571, 936 N.Y.S.2d 798 (4th Dept. 2011)). Moreover, “defense counsel, who was in the best position to assess defendant's capacity, did not raise the issue of defendant's fitness to proceed or request an examination pursuant to CPL 730.30(2)” (People v. Brown, 9 A.D.3d 884, 885, 779 N.Y.S.2d 683 (4th Dept. 2004), lv denied 3 N.Y.3d 671, 784 N.Y.S.2d 9, 817 N.E.2d 827 [2004] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Winebrenner, 96 A.D.3d 1615, 1617, 947 N.Y.S.2d 279 (4th Dept. 2012), lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 1029, 953 N.Y.S.2d 563, 978 N.E.2d 115 [2012]) and, indeed, we note that defense counsel specifically stated at sentencing that there was no basis upon which to challenge defendant's competence to proceed at the time of the plea.

We have considered the remaining contention in defendant's pro se supplemental brief and conclude that it does not warrant reversal or modification of the judgment.