MOURA v. New York City Department of Transportation, et al. Defendants, (2018)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol R. Edmead, J.), entered May 17, 2017, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied the motions of defendants City of New York and B & H Engineering, P.C. (B & H) for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) claim predicated on Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23–1.30 as against them, the common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 claims as against B & H, and the cross claims as against B & H, and granted the motions to the extent of dismissing the section 241(6) claim predicated on Industrial Code § 23–1.7(b)(1)(i), unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The injured plaintiff's employer was hired to erect, move, and adjust rolling scaffolding to facilitate B & H's inspection of the Manhattan Bridge. Viewed under the totality of the circumstances, this work constituted construction and alteration within the contemplation of Labor Law § 241(6) and Industrial Code § 23–1.4(b)(13) (see Saint v. Syracuse Supply Co., 25 N.Y.3d 117, 124–125, 8 N.Y.S.3d 229, 30 N.E.3d 872 [2015];  Prats v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 100 N.Y.2d 878, 882, 768 N.Y.S.2d 178, 800 N.E.2d 351 [2003];  cf. Martinez v. City of New York, 93 N.Y.2d 322, 690 N.Y.S.2d 524, 712 N.E.2d 689 [1999] ). In addition, the injured plaintiff's work was a covered activity because it involved the construction and alteration of a structure, namely, the large rolling pipe scaffold that he helped erect and alter (see Lewis–Moors v. Contel of N.Y., 78 N.Y.2d 942, 573 N.Y.S.2d 636, 578 N.E.2d 434 [1991];  McMahon v. 42nd St. Dev. Project, 188 Misc.2d 25, 32–33, 726 N.Y.S.2d 203 [Sup. Ct., Bronx County 2001] ).

The section 241(6) claim predicated on a violation of Industrial Code § 23–1.30 was properly sustained because there is an issue of fact as to whether the light at the accident site (the hole into which plaintiff stepped) was adequate, given the conflicting testimony supplied by defendants and the injured plaintiff (see Boggs v. City of New York, 135 A.D.3d 583, 22 N.Y.S.3d 858 [1st Dept. 2016];  Hernandez v. Columbus Ctr., LLC, 50 A.D.3d 597, 857 N.Y.S.2d 84 [1st Dept. 2008] ).

The Labor Law § 241(6) claim predicated on a violation of Industrial Code § 23–1.7(b)(1)(i) was properly dismissed because the area into which the injured plaintiff fell did not constitute a hazardous opening within the meaning of that provision (see Bisram v. Long Is. Jewish Hosp., 116 A.D.3d 475, 983 N.Y.S.2d 518 [1st Dept. 2014];  Messina v. City of New York, 300 A.D.2d 121, 123, 752 N.Y.S.2d 608 [1st Dept. 2002] ).

Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence liability cannot be imposed upon B & H premised on the methods and means of the work because it merely exercised general supervisory authority over the injured plaintiff's work. There was no evidence that B & H provided actual supervision or direction over his work on the scaffold (see Francis v. Plaza Constr. Corp., 121 A.D.3d 427, 428, 994 N.Y.S.2d 74 [1st Dept. 2014];  Hughes v. Tishman Constr. Corp., 40 A.D.3d 305, 306, 836 N.Y.S.2d 86 [1st Dept. 2007] ).

Nevertheless, there are issues of fact sufficient to support Labor Law § 200 and negligence claims as against B & H predicated on the dangerous condition of the premises. Evidence showed that the hole, combined with the alleged inadequate lighting, was a dangerous condition created by B & H when its inspectors removed lighting originally given to the injured plaintiff and his coworkers (see Hernandez, 50 A.D.3d at 598, 857 N.Y.S.2d 84;  cf. Cahill v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 31 A.D.3d 347, 350–351, 819 N.Y.S.2d 732 [1st Dept. 2006] ).

We have considered the parties' remaining contentions and find them unavailing.