PEOPLE v. HURD (2018)

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles H. Solomon, J. at speedy trial motion; Roger S. Hayes, J. at jury trial and sentencing), rendered October 23, 2015, convicting defendant of criminal contempt in the second degree (seven counts), stalking in the fourth degree and harassment in the first degree, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 7 years and 180 days, and judgment, same court (A. Kirke Bartley, Jr., J.), rendered March 31, 2016, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of stalking in the second degree, and sentencing him to a concurrent term of 11/313 to 4 years, unanimously affirmed.

We find unavailing defendant's challenges to the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting the stalking and harassment convictions (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ).  The evidence of defendant's hundreds of tweets to the victim on Twitter, some of which were sexual, hostile, or aggressive in nature, established defendant's intent and the victim's reasonable fear, as required by the statutes, when viewed in light of all the circumstances, including orders of protection prohibiting defendant from contacting the victim or certain family members, issued in connection with defendant's prior conviction of stalking the same victim (see People v. Brown, 61 A.D.3d 1007, 877 N.Y.S.2d 482 [3d Dept. 2007]; see also People v. Noka, 51 A.D.3d 468, 857 N.Y.S.2d 549 [1st Dept. 2008], lv denied 11 N.Y.3d 739, 864 N.Y.S.2d 398, 894 N.E.2d 662 [2008] ).

Defendant's challenge to venue as to the second-degree stalking count is unpreserved and affirmatively waived (see People v. Hand, 140 A.D.3d 636, 34 N.Y.S.3d 54 [1st Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 971, 43 N.Y.S.3d 258, 66 N.E.3d 4 [2016] ), and we decline to review it in the interest of justice.  As an alternative holding, we find that the People met their burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that venue was proper in New York County, where the victim viewed defendant's electronic communications (see CPL 20.40[1][a], [2][a]; 20.60[1],[3] ).  For the same reasons, we reject, on the merits, defendant's arguments regarding venue for the fourth-degree stalking and harassment counts.

We have considered and rejected defendant's pro se speedy trial arguments.